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Pressurised situations have the potential to influence the performance of visual-motor 
tasks. The aim of this thesis was to investigate psychomotor mechanisms that may be 
responsible for such performance changes. A series of experimental studies were conducted 
in order to examine kinematic (Chapter 2) and attentional (Chapters 3 - 5) mechanisms. 
Performance pressure was successfully manipulated in all studies but performance was 
consistently maintained at a group-level. In the first experiment, individual differences in 
performance responses to pressure were found to correlate with kinematic changes, with 
decreases in movement amplitudes correlating with poorer performances. In the second 
experiment, pressure led to attentional narrowing as indicated by impaired performance of a 
useful field of view task. Pressure-induced changes in useful field of view correlated with 
performance changes. The third and fourth experiments demonstrated that pressure-induced 
changes in cognitive anxiety positively correlated with changes in the randomness of gaze 
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The ability to successfully perform visual-motor tasks in high pressure situations is 
essential for success in many different domains, ranging from sport to surgical medicine. 
Whilst people can sometimes rise to the occasion in a seemingly ‘ice-cool’ manner, other 
times people can crumble or ‘choke’. Rory McIlroy’s performance in the final round of the 
2011 US Masters golf tournament provides a prominent example of the latter outcome in 
sport. Before commencing the final round, McIlroy had amassed a four stroke lead over his 
nearest competitors. By the end of the round, he had dropped to a tie for 15th place, trailing 
the winner by 10 strokes after attaining his worst 18-hole score of the whole year. He later 
said when interviewed, “I hate using the word choke but that’s exactly what happened” 
(Donegan, 2011). This thesis examines the psychomotor mechanisms that underlie 
performance changes in pressure situations. The aim of this chapter is to provide an 
introduction to the topic, and in doing so, provide a backdrop for the rest of the thesis. Core 
constructs are defined and the influence of pressure on visual-motor skills in the real-world 
is investigated. A number of attentional and behavioral mechanisms are then outlined and 
supporting evidence is critically explored. Next, limitations of previous research are 
pinpointed and linked to subsequent experimental chapters.  
The constructs pressure, choking, stress, and anxiety are commonly used in sport and 
performance psychology, however, definitions for each of these terms vary therefore 
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clarification is warranted. Pressure can be defined as any single factor, or combination of 
factors, that increases the perceived importance of performing optimally in a particular 
situation (Baumeister, 1984; Baumeister & Showers, 1986), with Beilock & Carr (2001) 
similarly defining pressure as the “anxious desire to perform at a high level in a given 
situation” (p. 701). Inherent within these definitions is that the individual’s perception of the 
situation is key, what may be perceived to be a pressure situation to one performer may not 
be perceived as pressure by another performer. Baumeister and Showers (1986) provided a 
number of factors that were suggested to potentially elicit pressure in an additive manner, 
these included: performance contingent rewards or punishments, competition, the presence 
of an audience, and how performance may reflect on important features of the person’s self.  
Based on this definition, ‘choking under pressure’ can be characterised by a decrease 
in performance that occurs due to any pressure-inducing factor, with a commonly employed 
definition being “the occurrence of inferior performance despite striving and incentives for 
superior performance” (Baumeister & Showers, 1986, p. 361). Importantly, choking is 
therefore not just poor performance, it is a decrease in performance when compared to a 
baseline or expected level which specifically occurs due to pressure (Beilock & Gray, 2007). 
While this definition has been commonly adopted, other researchers have advocated 
definitions that encapsulate the extreme magnitude of performance deterioration commonly 
associated with choking (Gucciardi and Dimmock, 2008; Mesagno & Hill, 2013). However, 
Jackson (2013) expressed caution towards definitions that include a specific magnitude 
threshold. Firstly, he argued that it is difficult to establish what level this threshold should 
be. Secondly, he argued that it is unclear whether this approach is necessary if the goal of 
the research is to understand the reasons why performance can change under pressure. This 
uncertainty stems from the lack of evidence, or theorising, to suggest that the mechanisms 
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causing small performance deteriorations are any different to the mechanisms that underpin 
large, dramatic, performance deteriorations. Related to the individual differences in the 
perception of high pressure situations described above, at the opposite end of the 
performance change continuum is clutch performance, which has been antithetically defined 
as the occurrence of superior performance in pressure situations (Otten, 2009). Similar to the 
disagreement surrounding the definition of choking, being “clutch” under pressure is 
sometimes meant to indicate performing above one’s expected level while in other instances 
it refers to maintaining one’s typical level of performance in the face pressure, in other 
words, being clutch means not choking (Beilock & Gray, 2007). While the bulk of the 
statistical evidence supports the latter definition (e.g., Palmer, 1985; 1990), the former is 
likely perpetuated due to the availability bias in memory for successful performances under 
pressure. Regardless of definition, as will be discussed in detail below, recent research has 
shown that performance under pressure can be determined by how an individual appraises 
the stress associated with high pressure situations (Moore, Wilson, Vine, Coussens, 
Freeman, 2013). 
Stress has been defined in a multitude of ways (Linden, 1974; Staal, 2004). Stimulus-
based approaches suggest that certain conditions or situations are stressful, with examples 
of stressors being workload, heat, cold or time pressure. On the other hand, response based 
approaches focus on the behavioral and cognitive outcomes that occur due to a stressor. Both 
approaches neglect the role of individual differences in perceptions of stressors and resultant 
responses. However, transactional approaches (e.g., Lazarus & Folkman, 1984) suggest that 
stress is an interactive process whereby the magnitude of the stress response is determined 
by a combination of the details of the stressor, appraisals of the stressor, and availability of 
coping resources. This process can lead to differing responses to stressors, with anxiety being 
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an emotional response that is likely to occur if the stressor outweighs the perceived coping 
abilities (Woodman & Hardy, 2001; Spielberger 1989).  
Finally, anxiety can be defined as a negative and unpleasant emotion characterised by 
“consciously perceived feelings of tension and apprehension” (Spielberger, 1966, p. 17). It 
consists of two components, a cognitive component and a somatic component (Martens, 
Vealey & Burton, 1990). The cognitive component consists of concerns and worrying 
thoughts about the ability to perform, whereas the somatic component refers to the 
perceptions of physiological symptoms such as increased heart rate, sweaty palms (Martens 
et al., 1990). In the majority of research in this area, anxiety in high pressure situations is 
assessed, rather than specifically measuring perceived pressure.  Previous studies that have 
measured both suggest that cognitive anxiety and perceived pressure are overlapping 
constructs (Cooke, Kavussanu, McIntyre, Boardley & Ring, 2011; Balk, Adriannse, de 
Ridder & Evers, 2013). Therefore, in this thesis, I will follow the common research 
convention of considering the anxiety-performance, rather than perceived pressure-
performance relationship.  With these key terms defined, I next turn to a more detailed 
examination of the phenomenon of choking under pressure.  
Incidence of Choking in Naturalistic Contexts  
Statistical analyses performed on large archival datasets suggest that pressure does 
tend to have a negative effect on performance in real-world sport competitions (Baumeister 
& Steinhilber, 1984; Cao, Price & Stone, 2011; Hickman & Metz, 2015; Wells & 
Skowronski, 2012). For instance, Baumeister and Steinhilber (1984) found that in both 
basketball and baseball, the home team tended to win the first two games but lose the last 
(and decisive) game in these series. In support of the notion that the home team was choking 
in these games, they found that in baseball that the incidence of fielding errors for the home 
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team increased in the final games while in basketball free throw percentage decreased in the 
final games.  More recently, in an analysis of 2009 PGA Tour data, Wells & Skowronski 
(2012) found that professional golfers’ scores were higher (i.e., worse) in the final round of 
a tournament in comparison to the penultimate round. Furthermore, larger performance 
decrements were found for players who were closer to the top of the leaderboard immediately 
prior to commencing their final round. In a larger and more fine-grained analysis, Hickman 
& Metz (2015) examined the influence of pressure on the performance of over 23,500 golf 
putts that were performed on the final hole of US PGA Tour events between 2004 and 2012. 
Pressure was operationalised by the magnitude of monetary reward or loss that was 
dependant on whether the final putt was made or missed. Analyses again revealed that 
pressure negatively impacted performance; the regression coefficient indicated that, on 
average, players were 1% less likely to make a putt when the outcome determined the gain 
or loss of $56035 (~£36000) in prize money, all other things being equal. Larger effects were 
found for certain putt distances, with $20000 (~£13000) equating to a 1% reduction in the 
likelihood of successfully holing out from putt distances between 5 and 10 feet.  
These may not seem like large effects, however, it should be noted that the prize money 
available at each PGA Tour event is many times more than either of these amounts. To 
illustrate, the average prize money for tournament winners in the 2014-2015 season was 
approximately $1.1 million (~£710 thousand), with the average total prize money available 
at each tournament being approximately $6 million (~£3.86 million). Other archival studies 
have found that performance responses can vary across individuals (González-Díaz, Gossner 
& Rogers, 2012). 
 González-Díaz and colleagues (2012) conducted a point-by-point analysis of all men's 
US Open tennis matches taking place between 2004 and 2012. They calculated the 
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importance of each point in determining the outcome of each match, with highly important 
points assumed to invoke pressure. Results revealed individual differences in behavioral 
responses to important points, certain players consistently underperformed in highly 
important points whereas others excelled. Furthermore, the ability to consistently excel 
during important points was positively correlated with traditional tennis ratings and 
rankings, showing that this ability was important for career success. Taken together, these 
studies offer real-world evidence to suggest that pressure can influence performance. They 
also emphasise the importance of being able to robustly perform visual-motor skills in high-
pressure situations.  
A limitation of the aforementioned archival studies is that pressure was inferred rather 
than actually measured. Greater insight into the effects of pressure on performance may be 
gained from the considerable number of field studies that have examined the relationship 
between cognitive anxiety and performance in real-world competitive sport environments. 
A number of studies have suggested a positive relationship between cognitive anxiety and 
performance (e.g., Taylor, 1987), while others have suggested a negative relationship (e.g., 
Burton, 1988; Terry & Slade, 1995), and still others have found no relationship (e.g., 
Maynard & Cotton, 1993). Meta-analyses attempting to elucidate the nature of the 
relationship have also produced mixed results (Craft, Magyar, Becker & Feltz, 2003; 
Woodman & Hardy, 2003). Specifically, Woodman & Hardy (2003) found a small, negative 
overall relationship between cognitive anxiety and sport performance when analysing the 
results of 46 studies, whereas Craft et al. (2003) found no overall relationship. Both meta-
analyses did however find that the examined effect sizes were heterogonous, indicating a 
significant variation in the direction of the relationship between cognitive anxiety and 
performance across studies. This suggests that the nature of the relationship between 
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pressure and performance is complex – an effect that is encapsulated in models such as the 
inverted-U hypothesis and catastrophe theory (Hardy & Parfitt, 1991; Yerkes & Dodson, 
1908).  As the primary goal of this thesis was not to add to this literature on the pressure-
performance relationship a detailed discussion of these theories is outside the scope of this 
thesis. Instead, I next turn to the main interest of this thesis: understanding the processes that 
underlie pressure-performance effects. 
Attentional Mechanisms 
Attentional theories detail how pressure can change the cognitive and attentional 
processes that underlie visual-motor performance (Beilock & Gray, 2007). The theories 
presented here offer differing and sometimes conflicting views on how pressure can 
influence performance. The particularly contentious issue that distinguishes these theories is 
whether pressure serves to turn attention inwards, towards the body and skill execution, or 
outwards, towards the environment and irrelevant stimuli. 
Attentional Control Theory 
Attentional control theory (ACT; Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos & Calvo, 2007) offers 
a comprehensive theoretical framework that aims to explain the effects of anxiety on 
performance. While its scope was primarily limited to trait anxiety and cognitive task 
performance, it has readily been applied to explain the effects of both state anxiety and 
visual-motor performance. Two major predictions made by its precursor, processing 
efficiency theory (PET; Eysenck & Calvo, 1992), are subsumed within ACT. Firstly, like 
other interference theories (c.f. Sarason, 1988; Wine 1971), ACT assumes that anxiety 
occupies a portion of limited cognitive resources that are then less available for task-relevant 
activities. This dissipation of resources can lead to impaired overall performance. Secondly 
however, ACT also predicts that anxiety can act as a motivational function initiated by 
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concerns over substandard performance. This has the potential to lead to an increase in on-
task effort, potentially maintaining or even increasing performance. The discrepancy 
between performance outcome and invested effort is a key facet of ACT (and previously 
PET). Specifically, ACT predicts that processing efficiency, which is the ratio between 
invested effort and the performance outcome, is impaired to a greater extent than the 
effectiveness of performance. ACT builds on its predecessor’s predictions by taking a more 
precise stance on the specific mechanisms involved.  
The central tenets of ACT are positioned within evidence for the existence of two 
attentional sub-systems: a goal-directed system and a stimulus-driven system. For instance, 
in an influential review, Corbetta and Shulman (2002) propose that parts of the frontal cortex 
and dorsal posterior parietal are responsible for top-down attentional control. This sub-
system directs attention based on expectations, experience and task-knowledge. Its 
counterpart, located within areas of the temporoparietal and ventral frontal cortex, is 
responsible for bottom-up control and directs attention based on sensory events, particularly 
when they are unattended and salient. ACT suggests that anxiety leads to a disruption in the 
balance of these two systems, with the stimulus-driven system exerting increased control 
over attention than the goal-directed system. This overarching imbalance underpins a 
number of more specific predictions. Firstly, it is predicted that anxiety reduces inhibitory 
control, potentially causing attention to be directed towards prepotent or task-irrelevant 
stimuli, particularly if they are threatening. These task-irrelevant stimuli may either be 
internal (e.g., worrisome thoughts) or external (e.g., environmental distractions). Secondly, 
anxiety is predicted to impair the ability to efficiently shift attention between different tasks 
or operations within a single-task. Finally, anxiety is predicted to reduce the ability to update 
and monitor information in working memory.      
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Numerous studies within the cognitive psychology domain offer support for the 
predicted effects of anxiety on processing efficiency. High- and low-trait anxiety individuals 
have been shown to be capable of achieving similar levels of performance on cognitive tasks, 
but at the expense of lower processing efficiency (e.g., Calvo & Carreiras, 1993; Calvo, 
Eysenck, Ramos & Ramos & Jiménez, 1994). For example, overall reading comprehension 
performance has previously been shown to be unaffected by trait anxiety, however, high-
trait individuals required more reading regressions (re-reading of sentences) to achieve this 
comparable performance (Calvo et al., 1994). Considerable evidence for anxiety-induced 
processing efficiency deficits have also been shown in visual-motor tasks (for a 
comprehensive review, see Wilson, 2008) where processing efficiency has been 
operationalised in various ways. For instance, self-report ratings of mental effort have been 
shown to be higher for trait anxiety individuals where visual-motor performance was similar 
(e.g., Smith, Bellamy, Collins, Newell, 2001; Wilson, Smith & Holmes, 2007). 
Psychophysiological indices such as pupil dilation (Wilson, Smith, Chattington, Ford & 
Marple-Horvat, 2006) and event related potentials (Murray and Janelle, 2007) have also 
offered more objective evidence in support of impaired processing efficiency.  
Changes to gaze behavior have been unitised by a number of studies as a more direct 
measure of processing efficiency. For instance, studies have shown that anxiety leads to less 
efficient search strategies as indexed by an increase in search rate, which is defined as the 
total number of fixations divided by the average fixation duration (e.g., Murray and Janelle, 
2003; Nieuwenhuys, Pijpers, Oudejans & Bakker, 2008; Williams, Vickers & Rodrigues, 
2002; Wilson, et al., 2006). For example, Wilson and colleagues (2006) asked participants 
to perform a simulated rally driving task in neutral and anxiety conditions while wearing an 
eye-tracker. Trait anxiety scores were used to categorise participants into low- or high-trait 
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anxious groups based on a median split approach. Anxiety was also manipulated 
experimentally using a combination of monetary incentives and ego threatening instructions. 
Overall, performance suffered in anxiety conditions, with a larger decrease in performance 
being found for the high trait anxiety group. In support of processing efficiency deficits, 
search rate was significantly higher for the high-trait individuals, although experimentally 
manipulated state anxiety had no effect. A number of visual-motor studies have also utilised 
gaze behavior metrics to test other predictions of ACT. 
According to ACT, anxiety results in a disruption in the balance between the goal-
driven and stimulus-driven attentional systems. Simple laboratory tasks (e.g., antisaccade 
task) have supported this overarching prediction (e.g., Derakshan, Ansari, Hansard, Shoker, 
& Eysenck, 2009; Derakshan, Smyth, & Eysenck, 2009). In more complex visual-motor 
tasks, two lines of anxiety-induced effects have provided support: disruptions to ordinarily 
long fixations known as the ‘quiet eye’, and increased allocation of visual attention towards 
salient or goal-threatening stimuli. 
The quiet eye (QE) period has been defined as the duration of the final fixation on a 
location in the environment, that occurs before movement initiation (Vickers, 1996) and that 
lasts at least 100 ms; although more refined definitions have since been employed (c.f. Vine, 
Lee, Moore & Wilson, 2013). Briefly, the QE duration has been robustly linked to visual-
motor expertise in a wide range of sport tasks (Mann, Williams, Ward & Janelle, 2007), and 
interventionally increasing its duration has been linked with expedited skill acquisition (e.g., 
Moore, Vine, Cooke, Ring, & Wilson, 2012) and refinement (e.g., Vine, Moore, & Wilson, 
2011). Importantly in relation to ACT, the QE has been used as an index of effective 
attentional control, partially based on this link with skilled visual-motor performance. 
Specifically, a longer QE duration has been suggested by a number of authors (e.g., Causer, 
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Holmes, Smith & Williams, 2011; Wilson, Vine, & Wood, 2009) to minimise distraction 
from task-irrelevant cues (stimulus-driven control), and allow extended movement 
programming (goal-directed control). An impressive body of evidence has shown that 
naturally occurring QE durations (i.e., without any explicit QE instructions) are consistently 
diminished in anxious conditions (e.g., Behan & Wilson, 2008; Causer et al., 2011; Moore 
et al., 2012; Nibbeling, Oudejans & Daanen, 2012; Vickers & Williams, 2007; Vine et al., 
2013; Vine & Wilson, 2010; Vine & Wilson, 2011; Wilson, et al., 2009). This reduction has 
been used as confirmatory evidence for an increased influence of the stimulus-driven 
attentional system as predicted by ACT (Causer et al., 2011; Wilson et al., 2009). Changes 
to attentional allocation also support this prediction. 
A small number of studies have examined whether anxiety leads to changes in the 
allocation of visual attention within a scene (e.g., Wood & Wilson, 2010; Wilson, Wood, & 
Vine, 2009). For example, Wilson et al. (2009) asked university level footballers to complete 
a penalty kick task in neutral and anxiety conditions while wearing a head-mounted eye-
tracker. A goal-keeper stood in a standardised body position in the centre of the goal at the 
start of each trial. The objective was to score the penalty, with the goal-keeper representing 
a naturalistic, threatening stimulus. Results showed that in anxious conditions, visual 
attention was directed towards the goal-keeper both earlier, and for a longer duration. This 
research suggests that salient or goal-threatening stimuli capture attention to a greater extent 
in anxious conditions. A limitation of this research is that it has mainly focused on self-paced 
tasks, with little research examining the contemporary predictions of ACT in continuous 
visual-motor tasks. 
Lapses in attentional control may be particularly evident in complex continuous visual-
motor tasks, such as driving or flying an aircraft, due to the complexity, variety and speed 
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of stimuli in the visual scene. For example, a person driving on a busy city street has to 
monitor other vehicles to avoid a collision, while also locating and reading street signs and 
paying attention to traffic. Likewise, a pilot flying in foggy conditions has to extract 
information from relevant cockpit instruments in order to maintain or adjust the orientation 
of the aircraft, while also ignoring information presented on irreverent instruments. Due to 
the complexity of these situations, it is likely that effective attentional control (i.e., shifting, 
inhibiting, updating) is even more crucial for successful performance that in self-paced tasks 
like golf putting where maintaining attentional focus on particular areas seems to be critical.  
This suggests that the breakdown in attentional control under pressure predicted by ACT 
may result in even larger performance decrements for continuous visual-motor tasks. 
Examining gaze behavior in continuous visual-motor tasks offers a greater opportunity 
to examine not only changes to attentional allocation as a result of anxiety, but disruptions 
in the sequencing of visual attention. As stated previously, visual-motor ACT research has 
focused on scan rate, however, the rate of visual-scanning could be influenced by other 
concomitant factors that accompany anxiety, such as mental effort or arousal. So while its 
use as a general measure of inefficiency is valid, greater insight may be gleaned by 
examining the randomness of gaze behavior. To illustrate, imagine a tracking task that 
requires the use of a number of instruments, with each providing separate information on the 
state of the task. Rate measures, such as transition rate (i.e., number of gaze transitions 
between the instruments per second), simply indicate how quickly visual attention is being 
cycled through the instruments. However, measures of randomness indicate how predictable 
the next instrument to be attended is. In such a task, low randomness would be indicative of 
predictable, stereotyped gaze behavior (Ellis & Starks, 1986; Harris, Glover & Spady, 1984). 
Therefore in relation to ACT, anxiety-induced obstructions to goal-directed control should 
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be evidenced by less predictable transitions. The reasoning behind this suggestion is that the 
goal-directed attentional system will be predominantly responsible for predictable scanning, 
as it dictates which instrument will be attended next based on knowledge of the task and 
expectations of future changes.   
Attentional Narrowing 
In a seminal review article, Easterbrook (1959) proposed cue utilisation theory, which 
hypothesised that arousal or stress can lead to a reduction in the breadth of cues that can be 
utilised. Specifically, the theory predicted an inverse relationship between stress or arousal 
and the ability to use peripheral cues, due to “a shrinkage of the perceptive field” 
(Easterbrook, 1959, p. 189). ‘Attentional narrowing’ has therefore become a more generic 
and commonly used term that encompasses Easterbrook’s idea. Based on the theory’s 
predictions, performance on tasks which require a large breadth of cues should suffer in 
stressful conditions. On the other hand, performance may be maintained or improved in tasks 
which require a narrow breadth of cues. Early supportive evidence came from continuous 
tracking experiments (e.g., Bahrick, Fitts and Rankin, 1952; Bursill, 1958). For example, 
Bursill (1958) found that heat stress reduced participants’ ability to detect the intermittent 
onset of peripheral lights while performing a centrally located pursuit tracking task. In a 
similar experiment, Bahrick et al. (1952) found that stress, in the form of monetary 
incentives, decreased the detection of peripheral stimuli. More recently, a small number of 
studies have investigated the effects of pressure-induced attentional narrowing in more 
complex visual-motor tasks.   
 Janelle, Singer & Williams (1999) investigated attentional narrowing in a simulated 
indy-car racing task. The view from the simulated cockpit was displayed on a projector 
screen and coloured peripheral lights were positioned on the screen at the extremities of each 
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participants’ peripheral vision. Participants were instructed to drive as fast as possible while 
wearing a head-mounted eye-tracker. They were also required to indicate when certain 
peripheral lights illuminated by pressing a push-button. It was emphasised that both the 
driving and peripheral detection tasks were of equal importance. Following acclimatisation 
trials, pressure was induced using monetary incentives. Results were generally indicative of 
attentional narrowing effects, with pressure reducing the ability to accurately respond to 
peripheral stimuli. A greater number of saccades towards the peripheral stimuli were 
observed, suggesting that peripheral vision alone was no longer able to accurately detect the 
stimuli. 
 Studies that lend support for attentional narrowing effects commonly employ 
infrequent, less salient stimuli in order to assess peripheral vision, while a salient, continuous 
task is performed in central vision (Eysenck et al., 2007). Eysenck and colleagues (2007) 
argue that attentional narrowing effects may simply occur due to salience differences, with 
anxiety leading to a prioritisation of the salient continuous task at the expense of the less-
salient peripheral task. The previously mentioned research cannot determine whether 
attentional narrowing effects are found in tasks which require the processing of central and 
peripheral stimuli of similar salience. A more direct test for attentional narrowing effects 
may be found using techniques employed in a separate, but related, body of research which 
has examined the effects of various factors on the ‘functional’ or ‘useful’ field of view. 
Ironic Processes of Mental Control 
Wegner’s (1994) theory of ironic processes of mental control proposes that ironic 
performance errors are more likely to occur when cognitive load or anxiety is high. To 
illustrate, a golfer leading a tournament, standing with an out-of-bounds fence to their left, 
may desperately want to avoid jeopardising their lead by hitting a leftwards shot and losing 
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the ball. Ironically, they may hit a bad shot that achieves precisely that outcome. The theory 
suggests that mental control results from the interaction of two processes: an operating 
process and a monitoring process. The intentional operating process searches for mental 
contents that will produce a desired goal or state. Its counterpart, the monitoring process, 
unconsciously searches for mental contents that signal a failure to achieve this outcome. If 
failure signals are detected, attempts are made to reinitiate the operating process. Of most 
relevance to the current thesis, anxiety is suggested to consume the cognitive resources 
needed by the operating process. This then leads the monitoring process to gain mental 
control, meaning that mental contents indicating a failure are brought to the forefront.  
Numerous thought (e.g., Wegner & Erber, 1992; Wegner, Schneider, Carter & White, 
1987) and emotional suppression (e.g., Dalgleish, Yiend, Schweizer & Dunn, 2009; Wegner, 
Eber & Zanaoks, 1993) studies offer support for Wegner’s theory. In general, these studies 
show that participants are less able to supress specific target words, phrases, images (e.g., 
“don’t think about a white bear”), or emotions, when cognitive resources are pre-occupied. 
Other studies have found support for anxiety-induced ironic performance errors in visual-
motor tasks such as golf putting (e.g., Wegner, Ansfield & Pilloff, 1998; Woodman & Davis, 
2008) and football penalty kicks (e.g., Bakker, Oudejans, Binsch & Van der Kamp, 2006; 
Binsch, Oudejans, Bakker & Savelsbergh, 2010). 
Woodman & Davis (2008) hypothesised that individuals with a repressive coping style 
(i.e., low self-reported anxiety but high psychophysiological indications) would be most 
prone to ironic errors in anxious conditions, as this coping style has been shown to require 
more cognitive resources. Novice participants performed a golf putting task on a flat surface, 
the objective was to putt a golf ball so that it landed on an 11cm diameter target circle 
positioned two metres away. After completing baseline putts, they were then asked to 
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perform one putt in high-anxiety conditions, with the additional instruction to “be 
particularly careful not to hit the ball past the target”. Anxiety was manipulated using a 
monetary incentive, with every participant being given the chance to instantly win £50 if the 
ball landed on the target - a design choice that perhaps indicates the researchers’ confidence 
in the manipulation. Results supported their hypotheses, with a higher average ironic error 
being found for individuals exhibiting a repressive coping style. Penalty kick studies have 
also found evidence for ironic performance errors, with the added finding that ironic errors 
were accompanied by a reduced final fixation duration on the desired target area and either 
longer duration, or a higher frequency of, fixations on the to-be-avoided goalkeeper (Binsch 
et al., 2010).  
While the aforementioned studies offer support for Wegner’s theory, most have used 
explicit instructions on what performance outcome is to be avoided, therefore it is unclear 
how well the findings generalise to environments where explicit avoidance instructions are 
not provided. Also, it has been acknowledged that truly ironic errors in high-level sport are 
probably quite rare, and it is often difficult to distinguish between a generic error and ironic 
error per se (Woodman & Davis, 2008; Woodman, Barlow & Gorgulu, In Press). Finally, 
and as noted by Binsch et al. (2010), the results of a portion of these studies may equally be 
explained by Eysenck and colleagues’ ACT (outlined previously). Specifically, allocating 
an area of the visual scene as ‘to be avoided’ is essentially turning that area into a threating 
stimulus - the avoidance instruction emphasises a threat (e.g., the goalkeeper) to achieving 
a specific outcome (i.e., scoring a penalty). Therefore in line with ACT, it is possible that 
attention becomes more directed towards this threatening stimulus as a result of a disruption 
between goal-directed and stimulus-driven attentional subsystems.  
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It should be noted that both ACT and the ironic processes of mental control theory 
proposed that the primary mechanism through which pressure has its’s effect on performance 
is by reducing the cognitive resources available. Inherent in this prediction are two 
suggestions that have not been directly tested in previous ironic effects research.  First, the 
effects of pressure should be similar in nature to the effect of increasing cognitive load (e.g., 
the addition of an unrelated secondary task). Second, the effects of pressure and cognitive 
load may be additive. 
Self-Focus Theories 
Self-focus theories are collectively predicated on the view that pressure increases self-
consciousness (e.g., Baumeister, 1984), which leads focus of attention to be directed onto 
oneself and can in-turn impair learned movement patterns. Two of the most prominent 
theories, the theory of reinvestment and the explicit monitoring hypothesis, are reviewed 
here. It is worth noting that although these theories do overlap, their differences will be 
delineated.  
Theory of Reinvestment  
The theory of reinvestment was proposed by Masters (1992) and it suggests that 
pressure can cause individuals to attempt to control their movements using previously learnt 
rules or instructions, which in-turn leads to performance decreases. To illustrate, an expert 
golfer who is leading a tournament may begin to re-think about previously learnt rules or 
tips on how to execute their backswing (e.g., how far apart to place their feet, how their 
fingers should be positioned). They ‘reinvest’ in their knowledge base. In doing so however, 
they are interrupting or breaking-down a previously well-learnt movement pattern, which 
leads them to hit a poor shot. Reinvestment theory is closely aligned with cognitive theories 
of skill acquisition.  
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Cognitive theories of skill acquisition (Anderson, 1987; Fitts & Posner, 1967) are 
based around the distinction between two forms of knowledge. Explicit or declarative 
knowledge, is knowledge that can be articulated and manipulated within working memory. 
Its counterpart, implicit or procedural knowledge, is knowledge that is known but cannot be 
articulated. According to these theories, learners progress from the declarative knowledge 
stage to the procedural stage. The declarative stage is characterised by effortful, slow and 
poor performance, whereas the procedural stage is characterised by effortless, fast and 
superior performance (Hardy, Mullen & Jones, 1996). As stated previously, the crux of 
reinvestment theory is that performance will be impaired if individuals in the procedural 
stage begin to ‘reinvest’ in previous explicit knowledge about the task. Reinvestment has 
therefore been formerly defined as the ‘manipulation of conscious, explicit, rule based 
knowledge, by working memory, to control the mechanics of one’s movements during motor 
output’ (Masters & Maxwell, 2004, p. 208). The theory suggests that reinvestment is likely 
to occur in pressure situations as people realise the consequences of their actions and begin 
to control the process of performing (Masters & Maxwell, 2008). In order to test this 
viewpoint, a number of studies have investigated whether preventing the accumulation of 
explicit knowledge reduces the likelihood of failing under pressure.  
Masters’ (1992) original study investigated the role of explicit knowledge in choking 
under pressure in a golf-putting task. Participants were randomised into a number of groups, 
all of which completed 400 acquisition putts. Of central interest are the explicit and implicit 
groups; the explicit group were given instructions on the mechanics of the putting stroke, 
whereas the implicit group were asked to generate and vocalise random letters while putting 
in order to prevent the self-generation of explicit knowledge. At the end of learning, these 
groups completed a number of putts in pressurised conditions. Results showed that the 
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explicit group outperformed the implicit group across acquisition, as expected, they also 
accrued more explicit rules about the task. However, in pressure conditions the explicit 
group’s performance plateaued whereas the implicit group continued to improve. This study 
has been replicated and scrutinised a number of times (e.g., Hardy et al., 1996; Bright and 
Freedman, 1998; Mullen, Hardy, Oldham, 2007), and overall, the results show a similar 
pattern. In relation to choking under pressure, it is slightly problematic that pressure only 
caused performance of the explicit group to plateau rather than decrease. Specifically, it was 
expected that the explicit group’s performance would deteriorate under pressure if 
reinvesting in explicit knowledge is indeed a mechanism responsible for choking. It was 
however noted that the levels of pressure may not have been sufficient to invoke choking 
(Mullen et al., 2007).  
Taken together, these studies do seem to suggest a trade-off: choosing explicit learning 
gives superior performance that is potentially maintained under pressure, whereas implicit 
learning gives inferior performance which does however continue to improve under 
pressure. Other learning techniques (i.e., analogy instructions) have since been shown to 
provide the performance benefits of explicit learning without accruement of explicit rules, 
while also providing the pressure resistive benefits of implicit learning (c.f. Liao and 
Masters, 2001). These studies used acquisition paradigms where novices learn how to 
perform a task. The effects of specifically utilising explicit cues during pressure situations 
has however also been investigated using performance paradigms with skilled performers.  
It has been recognised that the accumulation of explicit knowledge does not 
necessarily lead to choking under pressure in itself, rather, the use of explicit knowledge 
under pressure is likely more critical (Jackson & Wilson, 1999). A number of studies have 
investigated whether utilising explicit cues is detrimental to skilled sportspeople’s 
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performance in pressure situations, with some studies supporting the link (e.g., Hardy, 
Mullen & Martin, 2001; Gucciardi & Dimmock, 2008), whereas others do not (e.g., Mullen 
& Hardy, 2000, 2010; Mullen, Hardy & Tatersall, 2005). For example, Gucciardi and 
Dimmock (2008) asked experienced golfers to perform a putting task in low and high 
pressure conditions, while either focusing on a number of explicit coaching points, task-
irrelevant words or a swing thought (‘smooth’). The results showed that explicit cues caused 
participants to choke under pressure, whereas the task irrelevant words and swing thought 
condition led to performance improvements. In a similar study, Mullen & Hardy (2010) 
again found that one ‘holistic’ swing cue resulted in improved performance under pressure, 
however one explicit cue led to performance being maintained rather than deteriorating. The 
authors accounted for these discrepant findings by suggesting that the number of explicit 
cues utilised may be a crucial and overlooked factor in the previous literature. Specifically, 
the utilisation of more than one explicit cue may be the cause of performance decreases in 
previous studies. Interestingly, certain individuals may be dispositionally more likely to 
reinvest in explicit knowledge, and in-turn choke under pressure.  
Individuals’ propensity to reinvest in their movements has been measured using the 
reinvestment scale (Masters, Polman & Hammond, 1993; Orell, Masters & Eves, 2009), 
which in its most recent revision encompasses two factors. Conscious motor processing, 
reveals the tendency to monitory and control movements, while movement self-
consciousness, reveals the tendency to be concerned with one’s movement style. Research 
has consistently shown dispositional reinvestment to be positively associated with poor 
performance under pressure (e.g., Chell, Graydon, Crowley, & Child, 2003; Jackson, 
Ashford & Norsworthy, 2006; Maxwell, Masters & Poolton, 2006). While this research is 
persuasive and suggests that ‘high-reinvesters’ are more likely to choke under pressure, it is 
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not without its limitations. By definition, reinvestment refers to the use of the explicit, rule-
based knowledge. However, when examining the content validity of the measure, it does not 
specifically assess whether explicit knowledge is involved in movement control. Instead, the 
subscales reflect a general propensity to monitor and think about movements. For example, 
the conscious motor processing scale contains items such as “I am aware of the way my 
mind and body works when I am carrying out a movement”. Accordingly, the previously 
mentioned studies are, at least partially, suggesting that merely monitoring movements is 
detrimental to performance under pressure. This point leads to the second self-focus theory 
which is reviewed below.  
Explicit Monitoring Hypothesis 
The explicit monitoring hypothesis (Beilock & Carr, 2001) again suggests that 
pressure increases self-consciousness about correctly performing visual-motor tasks 
(Baumeister, 1984). However, in contrast to reinvestment theory, it is suggested that pressure 
will more likely lead to heightened monitoring of movements, as opposed to stimulating the 
use of explicit rules in an attempt to control them. While subtle, this is an important 
distinction. A number of studies have explicitly manipulated attentional focus in order to 
investigate the effects of monitoring movements on performance. 
 Attentional manipulations designed to promote movement monitoring have been 
shown to impair experts’ performance in a number of different visual-motor tasks, including 
golf putting (e.g., Beilock, Carr, MacMahon & Starkes, 2002; Beilock & Gray, 2012), 
baseball batting (Gray, 2004), hockey (Jackson et al., 2006) and soccer dribbling (Ford, 
Hodges & Williams, 2005). For example, Beilock et al., (2002) asked novice and expert 
footballers to complete a soccer dribbling task, while simultaneously performing either: a 
word-monitoring task, or a skill-monitoring task which required them to report the side of 
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the foot that last made contact with the ball. Results showed that expert performance was 
impaired during the skill-monitoring task, whereas novice performance was impaired by the 
word-monitoring task. In a related body of research, Wulf and colleagues (reviewed in Wulf, 
2007, 2013; Wulf & Prinz, 2001) have shown that focusing attention on the effects of 
movements on the environment (i.e., an external attentional focus) enhances the learning of 
visual-motor tasks in comparison to more internal foci of attention. These studies support 
the view that focusing on movements may impair performance, however the relation with 
pressure was not manipulated.  
 Gray (2004, Experiment 3) more directly examined the effects of pressure on 
movement monitoring expert baseball batters. A dual-task paradigm was employed where 
participants were required to perform a batting task at the same time as either a skill-focused 
or extraneous secondary task. In the skill-focused task, participants were required to indicate 
whether their bat was moving up or down at the onset of a response prompt. Accuracy on 
this secondary task therefore provided an index of the participants’ awareness of their 
movements. In the dual-task condition they had to judge the pitch of an auditory tone. 
Pressure significantly impaired performance and this choking effect was accompanied by a 
significant improvement in response accuracy for the skill-focused secondary task. This 
finding provided direct evidence to suggest that pressure can lead to increased movement 
monitoring, which can in-turn impair performance.  
Behavioral Mechanisms 
Initial research investigating the effects of pressure on visual-motor tasks focused on 
performance outcomes, such as holing or missing golf putts, or scoring or missing penalty 
kicks in football. However, performance outcomes result from movement execution, 
therefore in order to empirically understand the mechanisms underlying choking under 
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pressure it is important to examine how movements are affected (Beilock & Gray, 2007). A 
greater understanding may also help to stimulate possible interventions – if specific 
movement tendencies emerge under pressure, these may be guarded against in training 
(Gray, 2011). A number of kinematic changes have been proposed and observed in a variety 
of tasks. In this section, evidence for freezing degrees of freedom will firstly be explored, 
then changes to movement variability will be examined. For a number of possible reasons, 
a considerable amount of research has examined the effects of pressure specifically on golf-
putting kinematics, this research will be examined last.  
Freezing Degrees of Freedom 
Bernstein (1967) suggested that stress or pressure may result in the freezing, or 
coupling of, degrees of freedom in order to simplify movement execution. Bernstein 
highlighted the extremely high degree of complexity that the motor system successfully and 
efficiently manages when performing any movement. For instance, the seemingly simple act 
of striking a nail with a hammer involves many joints, each with several degrees of freedom, 
all of which must be coordinated in order to successfully achieve the movement objective. 
When learning a new skill, attempts may be made to simplify the movement solution by 
restricting, or freezing, degrees of freedom or by coupling them into larger coordinated units. 
Throughout learning, the restriction or coupling of these degrees of freedom is relinquished. 
Vereijken, van Emmerik, Whiting & Newell (1992) examined the movement kinematics of 
participants learning a ski slalom task over a number of days. In support of Bernstein’s ideas, 
a restriction in joint angle ranges was found early in learning. Furthermore, cross correlations 
between certain joint angles were initially high and decreased throughout practice, indicating 
a gradual decoupling of different degrees of freedom. A small number of experiments have 
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examined whether pressure leads to a reversal of these processes (Collins, Jones, 
Fairweather, Doolan & Priestly, 2001; Higuchi, Imanaka, Hatayama, 2002).  
 Collins et al. (2001) examined the performance and movements of Olympic weight 
lifters in neutral and competitive conditions. They found that certain individuals choked 
under pressure, and that this performance effect was accompanied by an increase in the cross 
correlation between the hip and neck joint in competition, for certain individuals. Higuchi et 
al. (2002) offer further evidence for a coupling of degrees of freedom. The authors asked 
participants to learn a simple batting task, which involved controlling a virtual bat shown on 
a screen using a manipulandum. Initially, the timing of certain kinematic events (e.g., 
movement initiation, backswing peak velocity, foreswing peak velocity) were highly 
correlated, which the authors argued was indicative of a coupling of degrees of freedom. 
Throughout learning, the timing of kinematic events became decoupled but then became 
relatively more coupled during the stress condition. However, performance was not affected 
by the stress manipulation. It is possible that the freezing degrees of freedom process may 
emerge in an attempt to reduce movement variability, the results of Higuchi and colleagues 
study partially support this view as spatial variability was marginally lower in the stress 
condition than the previous block. However, no performance effects were found, and no 
attempts were made to relate kinematic measures to performance. Therefore it is unclear 
how these findings relate to performance changes under pressure. However, other studies 
have examined the possibility that pressure may specifically influence movement variability.  
Movement Variability  
Skilled performance is often associated with repeatable (i.e., low variability), 
consistent movement timing and spatial positioning (e.g., Franks, Weicker & Robertson, 
1985; McDonald, van Emmerik & Newell, 1989). Performance changes under pressure 
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might therefore be accompanied by changes in movement variability, with a number of 
studies supporting this view (e.g., Beuter & Duda, 1985, Beuter, Duda & Widule, 1989; 
Causer et al., 2011; Gray, 2004; Higuchi, 2000; Wilson et al., 2006). For example, Causer 
and colleagues (2011) asked elite level skeet shooters to perform a shooting task in 
counterbalanced low and high pressure conditions. Performance significantly deteriorated 
under pressure with less skeets being successfully hit. Analysis of movements revealed a 
tendency for faster, larger amplitude and more variable lateral gun movements under 
pressure. In a simulated baseball batting task, Gray (2004) found that expert baseball batters 
choked in a pressure conditions, and this was accompanied by an increased variability in the 
relative timing of different stages of their swing. Both these studies focused on discrete 
movements, however Wilson et al. (2006) found that pressure-induced performance 
decrements in continuous rally driving task were accompanied by more variable steering 
wheel and accelerator pedal displacements. Further insights into the underlying effects of 
pressure on performance have been determined by examining variability throughout 
different stages of the movement.  
Fast target-directed limb movements involve two control ‘phases’: a ballistic, pre-
planned phase, and an online control phase, where available visual and proprioceptive input 
is utilised for guidance (e.g., Elliott, Hansen, Grierson, Lyons, Bennett & Hayes, 2010; 
Woodworth, 1899). The operation of these two control processes can be inferred by 
examining the variability of movement trajectories at different stages of the movement (c.f. 
Khan, Franks, Elliott, Lawrence, Chua, Bernier, Hansen & Weeks, 2006). Lawrence, Khan 
& Hardy (2012) exploited this analysis technique and found that anxiety specifically affected 
the online control phase of movement execution. Specifically, in comparison to neutral 
conditions, anxiety led to both a decrease in outcome performance, and an increase in 
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movement variability in the latter portion (i.e., online control phase) of movement 
trajectories. This provides the most direct evidence to suggest that anxiety affects the online 
control of movements, a finding which relates to the previously mentioned self-focus 
theories. As alluded to previously, a common criticism of this study, and many of the 
previously mentioned studies in this section, is the absence of any analyses to relate choking 
under pressure to specific kinematic parameters. Although performance changes under 
pressure were accompanied by kinematic changes, this does not mean that these changes 
were related.  
Golf-Putting Kinematics  
A significant number of studies have examined the effects of pressure on golf-putting 
kinematics. It is unclear why there is a continued especial focus on golf-putting kinematics 
specifically, or indeed golf-putting as an experimental task more generally. The interest may 
be partially attributed to pragmatic reasons, such as the relative ease of data collection, and 
more recently, the accessibility of affordable and accurate measurement techniques, such as 
multi-axial accelerometers. Regardless, an important contribution of this research has been 
the identification of a number of kinematic parameters that may be related to performance 
changes under pressure.  
The first study to examine the effects of pressure on golf-putting kinematics was 
conducted by Mullen and Hardy (2000), who performed kinematic analyses in an 
exploratory manner. They asked experienced golfers with mid-level handicaps (range 12-
18) to putt along an inclined surface to a standard sized golf hole from a distance of 3m in 
neutral and pressure conditions. The golf handicapping system gives a general index of golf 
performance, therefore putting performance can vary widely between golfers with the same 
handicap. As a consequence, participants were further divided into high and low putting skill 
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groups based on a median split of baseline putting performance. Movement kinematics were 
measured and analysed using a camera system. In pressure conditions, the time to peak speed 
in the downswing occurred earlier. A number of other kinematic parameters were also 
analysed but no significant differences were found and pressure had no overall effect on 
performance.  
More recently, a number of studies have employed similar methodologies and 
kinematic measurement techniques and found preliminary evidence to suggest that pressure 
leads to a reduction in: movement time, backswing displacement and downswing 
displacement (Tanaka & Sekiya, 2010; 2011). For instance, Tanaka & Sekiya (2011) asked 
novice golfers to learn a putting task that resembled Mullen and Hardy’s. Participants were 
transferred to a pressure condition after acquisition. Although manipulation checks were 
only partially validated (heart rate increased, but self-reported anxiety did not), kinematic 
analyses revealed that the angular displacement of the clubhead and arm decreased in both 
the backswing and downswing, while the average acceleration in the downswing increased. 
However, pressure again had no effect on performance and these kinematic changes were 
not correlated with performance change from pre-test to pressure conditions. 
Establishing the kinematic changes that correlate with pressure-induced performance 
changes in golf putting has proved somewhat difficult. Triaxial accelerometer based studies 
with novice golfers (i.e., no golf handicap and no formal playing experience) have been the 
most successful (e.g., Cooke, Kavussanu, McIntyre & Ring, 2010; Moore, Vine, Wilson & 
Freeman, 2012). Cooke et al. (2010) asked novice participants to putt from three different 
distances in low, medium and high pressure conditions. The medium and high pressure 
conditions led to a reduction in the number of putts holed. Analyses showed that side-to-side 
acceleration of the clubhead (acceleration of clubhead movement in the sagittal plane of the 
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golfer) increased under high-pressure and that this change partially mediated the 
performance effects.  
Moore and colleagues (2012) also asked novice golfers to perform putts from one set 
distance in pressurised conditions. Participants were first randomly assigned to one of two 
groups where the experimental instructions were designed to frame the task as either a 
challenge or a threat. The threat group achieved a significantly higher average error, and also 
reported significantly higher cognitive anxiety. Mediation analyses revealed that club head 
acceleration in all three axes, as well as the first order derivative of acceleration in the 
backswing-downswing axis (clubhead movement in the coronal plane of the golfer), was 
responsible for this performance difference. This seems to indicate that the movements of 
the threat group were all-together poorer than the challenge group, and this was responsible 
for the observed performance differences. However, similar studies investigating expert or 
experienced golfers have not been as successful in establishing kinematic variables that are 
responsible for performance changes under pressure (e.g., Cooke, Kavussanu, Gallicchio, 
Willoughby, McIntyre & Ring, 2014), even when significant outcome performance 
differences have been found (e.g., Moore et al., 2013).  
An important limitation of this previous research is that all putts were commonly made 
from a constant distance, apart from Cooke and colleagues (2010) who did not report any 
analyses with putt distance as a factor. Previous research has shown that expert and novice 
golfers differ in the way they adjust their putting stroke to suit different putt distances (Delay, 
Nougier, Orliaguet & Coello, 1997). Specifically, expert golfers control the club head 
velocity at impact across different distances by substantially varying the downswing 
amplitude, whereas novices employ similar amplitude movements and vary other aspects of 
their swing. Previous related research (Beilock & Gray, 2012) has shown that attentional 
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manipulations have the potential to influence the relationship between downswing amplitude 
and putt distance. Therefore it is possible that the relationship between putt distance and 
downswing amplitude could be an important kinematic parameter that may be affected by 
pressure. This is particularly important given the null findings specifically in expert 
populations.  
Synopsis of Thesis 
Understanding why performance pressure can cause changes to visual-motor 
performance is important from both a practical and theoretical viewpoint. For instance, from 
a practical point of view, achieving clarity on the mechanisms that lead to performance 
changes may help to inform interventions aimed at maximising performance under pressure. 
The current thesis investigates kinematic (chapter two) and attentional (chapters three, four 
and five) mechanisms that may underpin performance changes under pressure. Otten (2007) 
has previously suggested that the occurrence of both performance improvements, and 
deteriorations, under pressure could result in a lack of any group-level effects. Therefore, 
throughout each experimental study in this thesis, performance changes under pressure are 
correlated with changes in specific mechanistic variables in order to account for the 
possibility that responses to pressure may vary across individuals. Other specific limitations 
of previous research have been presented previously, these are now linked with the 
subsequent experimental chapters.  
Study one (chapter two) examined the effects of pressure on golf-putting kinematics 
in expert golfers. In order to remedy limitations of previous research, putt distance was 
manipulated and inherently included in the analysis procedure. A novel analysis approach 
was used in order to investigate the relationship between movement amplitude and putt 
distance. It was predicted that the strength of the relationship between movement amplitude 
30 
 
and putt would weaken under pressure for certain individuals, and that the change in 
relationship may correlate with performance changes. 
Study two (chapter 3) investigated attentional narrowing during a golf-putting task. 
Limitations of previous research are accounted for by utilising a novel useful field of view 
task that was performed separately from the golf-putting task. The useful-field of view task 
also purposely presented equally salient stimuli to central and peripheral vision. Taken 
together, if evidence for attentional narrowing is found using this methodology, it is less 
likely to be due to an imbalance in salience of visual stimuli. It was predicted that pressure 
would lead to a reduction in the useful field of view and that this would be correlated with 
performance changes under pressure.  
Study three (chapter 4) investigated the effects of cognitive anxiety on attentional 
control. In order to remedy a limitation of previous ACT research, the contemporary 
predictions of ACT were examined in a continuous visual-motor task. Specifically, 
participants were asked to perform an aviation instrument landing task in which several 
instruments were required in order to achieve optimal task performance. A novel measure, 
scanning entropy, was utilised as an index of attentional control. Based on the predictions of 
ACT, it was therefore hypothesised that anxiety would lead to an increase in scanning 
entropy and that this would correlate with performance changes under pressure. 
Study four (chapter 5) aimed to replicate and extend upon the results of study three, 
and test the predicted links between pressure, cognitive load and performance described 
above. The study therefore examined the effects of both cognitive anxiety and cognitive load 
in the previously utilised aviation instrument landing task. It was predicted that the effects 
of cognitive anxiety on attentional control would be exacerbated when cognitive load was 
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high. If this was the case, evidence should be found for an interaction between cognitive load 





Anderson, J. R. (1987). Skill acquisition: Compilation of weak-method problem solutions. 
Psychological Review, 94, 192–210. http://doi.org/10.1037 
Bahrick, H. P., Fitts, P. M., & Rankin, R. E. (1952). Effect of incentives upon reaction to 
peripheral stimuli. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 44(6), 400–406. 
http://doi.org/10.1037/h0053593 
Bakker, F. C., Oudejans, R. R. D., Binsch, O., & van der Kamp, J. (2006). Penalty shotting 
and gaze behavior: Unwanted effects of the wish not to miss. International Journal of 
Sport Psychology, 37(3), 265–280. 
Balk, Y. A., Adriaanse, M. A., Ridder, D. T. D. De, & Evers, C. (2013). Coping Under 
Pressure : Employing Emotion Regulation Strategies to Enhance Performance Under 
Pressure. Journal of Sport & Excercise Psychology, 35, 408–418. 
Baumeister, R. F. (1984). Choking under pressure: self-consciousness and paradoxical 
effects of incentives on skillful performance. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 46(3), 610–620. http://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.46.3.610 
Baumeister, R. F., & Showers, C. J. (1986). A review of paradoxical performance effects: 
Choking under pressure in sports and mental tests. European Journal of Social 
Psychology, 16(4), 361–383. http://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.2420160405 
Baumeister, R. F., & Steinhilber, A. (1984). Paradoxical effects of supportive audiences on 
performance under pressure: The home field disadvantage in sports championships. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 47(1), 85–93. 
http://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.47.1.85 
Behan, M., & Wilson, M. (2008). State anxiety and visual attention: the role of the quiet 
eye period in aiming to a far target. Journal of Sports Sciences, 26(2), 207–215. 
http://doi.org/10.1080/02640410701446919 
Beilock, S. L., & Carr, T. H. (2001). On the fragility of skilled performance: what governs 
choking under pressure? Journal of Experimental Psychology. General, 130(4), 701–
725. http://doi.org/10.1037/0096-3445.130.4.701 
Beilock, S. L., Carr, T. H., MacMahon, C., & Starkes, J. L. (2002). When paying attention 
becomes counterproductive: impact of divided versus skill-focused attention on 
novice and experienced performance of sensorimotor skills. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology. Applied, 8(1), 6–16. http://doi.org/10.1037/1076-898X.8.1.6 
33 
 
Beilock, S. L., & Gray, R. (2007). Why do athletes “Choke” under pressure? In G. 
Tenenbaum & R. C. Eklund (Eds.), Handbook of Sport Psychology (3rd ed., pp. p. 
425–444). New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons. 
Beilock, S. L., & Gray, R. (2012). From attentional control to attentional spillover : A skill-
level investigation of attention, movement, and performance outcomes. Human 
Movement Science, 31(6), 1473–1499. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.humov.2012.02.014 
Bernstein, N. A. (1967). The coordination and regulation of movements. Oxford, UK: 
Permagon Press. 
Beuter, A., & Duda, J. L. (1985). Analysis of the Arousal/Motor Performance Relationship 
in Children Using Movement Kinematics. Journal of Sport Psychology, 7, 229–243. 
Beuter, A., Duda, J. L., & Widule, C. J. (1989). The effects of arousal on joint kinematics 
and kinetics in children. Research Quarterly for Exercise and Sport, 60(2), 109–116. 
http://doi.org/10.1080/02701367.1989.10607425 
Binsch, O., Oudejans, R. R. D., Bakker, F. C., & Savelsbergh, G. J. P. (2010). Ironic 
effects and final target fixation in a penalty shooting task. Human Movement Science, 
29(2), 277–288. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.humov.2009.12.002 
Bright, J. E., & Freedman, O. (1998). Differences between implicit and explicit acquisition 
of a complex motor skill under pressure: an examination of some evidence. British 
Journal of Psychology, 89(2), 249–263. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.2044-
8295.1998.tb02683.x 
Bursill, A. E. (1958). The restriction of peripheral vision during exposure to hot and humid 
conditions. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 10(3), 113–129. 
http://doi.org/10.1080/17470215808416265 
Burton, D. (1988). Do anxious swimmers swim slower? Reexamining the elusive anxiety-
performance relationship. Journal of Sport and Exercise Psychology, 10, 45–61. 
Calvo, M. G., & Carreiras, M. (1993). Selective influence of test anxiety on reading 
processes. British Journal of Psychology, 84, 375–388. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.2044-
8295.1993.tb02489.x 
Calvo, M. G., Eysenck, M. W., Ramos, P. M., & Jiménez, A. (1994). Compensatory 




Cao, Z., Price, J., & Stone, D. F. (2011). Performance Under Pressure in the NBA. Journal 
of Sports Economics, 12(3), 231–252. http://doi.org/10.1177/1527002511404785 
Causer, J., Holmes, P. S., Smith, N. C., & Williams, A. M. (2011). Anxiety, movement 
kinematics, and visual attention in elite-level performers. Emotion, 11(3), 595–602. 
http://doi.org/10.1037/a0023225 
Chell, B. J., Graydon, J. K., Crowley, P. L., & Child, M. (2003). Manipulated stress and 
dispositional reinvestment in a wall-volley task: an investigation into controlled 
processing. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 97(2), 435–448. 
Collins, D., Jones, B., Fairweather, M., Doolan, S., & Priestley, N. (2001). Examining 
anxiety associated changes in movement patterns. International Journal of Sport 
Psychology, 32(3), 223–242. 
Cooke, A., Kavussanu, M., Gallicchio, G., Willoughby, A., Mcintyre, D., & Ring, C. 
(2014). Preparation for action: Psychophysiological activity preceding a motor skill as 
a function of expertise, performance outcome, and psychological pressure. 
Psychophysiology, 51(4), 374–384. http://doi.org/10.1111/psyp.12182 
Cooke, A., Kavussanu, M., McIntyre, D., Boardley, I. D., & Ring, C. (2011). Effects of 
competitive pressure on expert performance: Underlying psychological, 
physiological, and kinematic mechanisms. Psychophysiology, 48(8), 1146–1156. 
http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-8986.2011.01175.x 
Cooke, A., Kavussanu, M., McIntyre, D., & Ring, C. (2010). Psychological, muscular and 
kinematic factors mediate performance under pressure. Psychophysiology, 47(6), 
1109–1118. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-8986.2010.01021.x 
Corbetta, M., & Shulman, G. L. (2002). Control of goal-directed and stimulus-driven 
attention in the brain. Nature Reviews. Neuroscience, 3(3), 201–215. 
http://doi.org/10.1038/nrn755 
Craft, L. L., Magyar, M., Becker, B. J., & Feltz, D. L. (2003). The relationship between the 
Competitive State Anxiety Inventory-2 and sport performance : A meta-analysis. 
Journal of Sport & Excercise Psychology, 25, 44–65. 
Dalgleish, T., Yiend, J., Schweizer, S., & Dunn, B. D. (2009). Ironic effects of emotion 




Delay, D., Nougier, V., Orliaguet, J.-P., & Coello, Y. (1997). Movement control in golf 
putting. Human Movement Science, 16(5), 597–619. http://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-
9457(97)00008-0 
Derakshan, N., Ansari, T. L., Hansard, M., Shoker, L., & Eysenck, M. W. (2009). Anxiety, 
inhibition, efficiency, and effectiveness: An investigation using the Antisaccade task. 
Experimental Psychology, 56(1), 48–55. http://doi.org/10.1027/1618-3169.56.1.48 
Derakshan, N., Smyth, S., & Eysenck, M. W. (2009). Effects of state anxiety on 
performance using a task-switching paradigm: an investigation of attentional control 
theory. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 16(6), 1112–1117. 
http://doi.org/10.3758/PBR.16.6.1112 
Donegan, L. (2011, December 16). Rory McIlroy: The year I choked and cried was also 
the year I grew up. The Guardian. Retrieved from: 
http://www.theguardian.com/sport/2011/dec/16/rory-mcilroy-interview 
Easterbrook, J. A. (1959). The effect of emotion on cue utilization and the organization of 
behavior. Psychological Review, 66(3), 183–201. http://doi.org/10.1037/h0047707 
Elliott, D., Hansen, S., Grierson, L. E. M., Lyons, J., Bennett, S. J., & Hayes, S. J. (2010). 
Goal-directed aiming: two components but multiple processes. Psychological 
Bulletin, 136(6), 1023–1044. http://doi.org/10.1037/a0020958 
Ellis, S. R., & Stark, L. (1986). Statistical dependency in visual scanning. Human Factors, 
28(4), 421–438. http://doi.org/10.1177/001872088602800405 
Eysenck, M. W., & Calvo, M. G. (1992). Anxiety and Performance: The Processing 
Efficiency Theory. Cognition & Emotion, 6(6), 409–434. 
http://doi.org/10.1080/02699939208409696 
Eysenck, M. W., Derakshan, N., Santos, R., & Calvo, M. G. (2007). Anxiety and cognitive 
performance: attentional control theory. Emotion, 7(2), 336–353. 
http://doi.org/10.1037/1528-3542.7.2.336 
Fitts, P. M., & Posner, M. I. (1967). Human performance. Belmont, CA: Brooks/Cole 
Publishing Co. 
Ford, P., Hodges, N. J., & Williams, A. M. (2005). Online attentional-focus manipulations 
in a soccer-dribbling task: implications for the proceduralization of motor skills. 




Franks, I. M., Weicker, D., & Robertson, D. G. E. (1985). The kinematics, movement 
phasing and timing of a skilled action in response to varying conditions of 
uncertainty. Human Movement Science, 4(2), 91–105. http://doi.org/10.1016/0167-
9457(85)90005-3 
González-Díaz, J., Gossner, O., & Rogers, B. W. (2012). Journal of Economic Behavior & 
Organization Performing best when it matters most : Evidence from professional 
tennis. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 84(3), 767–781. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2012.09.021 
Gray, R. (2004). Attending to the execution of a complex sensorimotor skill: expertise 
differences, choking, and slumps. Journal of Experimental Psychology. Applied, 
10(1), 42–54. http://doi.org/10.1037/1076-898X.10.1.42 
Gray, R. (2011). Links Between Attention, Performance Pressure, and Movement in 
Skilled Motor Action. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 20(5), 301–306. 
http://doi.org/10.1177/0963721411416572 
Gucciardi, D. F., & Dimmock, J. a. (2008). Choking under pressure in sensorimotor skills: 
Conscious processing or depleted attentional resources? Psychology of Sport and 
Exercise, 9(1), 45–59. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.psychsport.2006.10.007 
Hardy, L., Mullen, R., & Jones, G. (1996). Knowledge and conscious control of motor 
actions under stress. British Journal of Psychology, 87(4), 621–636. 
http://doi.org/10.1111/j.2044-8295.1996.tb02612.x 
Hardy, L., Mullen, R., & Martin, N. (2001). Effect of task-relevant cues and state anxiety 
on motor performance. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 92(3), 943–946. 
Hardy, L., & Parfitt, G. (1991). A catastrophe model of anxiety and performance. British 
Journal of Psychology, 82, 163–178. 
Harris, R. L., Glover, B. L., & Spady, A. A. (1986). Analytic techniques of pilot scanning 
behavior and their application (NASA Tech. Rep. No. 2525). Hampton, VA: Langley 
Research Center. 
Hickman, D. C., & Metz, N. E. (2015). Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization The 
impact of pressure on performance : Evidence from the PGA TOUR. Journal of 
Economic Behavior and Organization, 116, 319–330. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2015.04.007 
Higuchi, T. (2000). Disruption of kinematic coordination. Japanese Psychological 
Research, 42(3), 168–177. 
37 
 
Higuchi, T., Imanaka, K., & Hatayama, T. (2002). Freezing degrees of freedom under 
stress: Kinematic evidence of constrained movement strategies. Human Movement 
Science, 21(5-6), 831–846. http://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-9457(02)00174-4 
Jackson, R. C. (2013). Babies and bathwater: Commentary on Mesagno and Hill’s 
proposed re-definition of “choking.” Inernational Journal of Sport Psychology, 44(4), 
281–284. 
Jackson, R. C., Ashford, K. J., & Norsworthy, G. (2006). Attentional focus, dispositional 
reinvestment, and skilled motor performance under pressure. Journal of Sport & 
Exercise Psychology, 28(1), 49–68. 
Jackson, R. C., & Wilson, R. J. (1999). Using “swing thought” to prevent paradoxical 
performance effects in golf putting. In M. R. Farrally & A. J. Cochran (Eds.), Science 
and Golf III: Proceeding of the 1998 World Scientific Congress of Golf. Leeds, UK: 
Human Kinetics. 
Janelle, C. M., Singer, R. N., & Williams, M. A. (1999). External distraction and 
attentional narrowing: Visual search evidence. Journal of Sport & Excercise 
Psychology, 21, 70–91. 
Khan, M. a., Franks, I. M., Elliott, D., Lawrence, G. P., Chua, R., Bernier, P. M., … 
Weeks, D. J. (2006). Inferring online and offline processing of visual feedback in 
target-directed movements from kinematic data. Neuroscience and Biobehavioral 
Reviews, 30(8), 1106–1121. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2006.05.002 
Lawrence, G. P., Khan, M. A., & Hardy, L. (2012). The effect of state anxiety on the 
online and offline control of fast target-directed movements. Psychological Research, 
77(4), 422–433. http://doi.org/10.1007/s00426-012-0440-1 
Lazarus, R. S., & Folkman, S. (1984). Stress, appraisal and coping. New York: Springer. 
Liao, C. M., & Masters, R. S. (2001). Analogy learning: a means to implicit motor 
learning. Journal of Sports Sciences, 19(5), 307–319. 
http://doi.org/10.1080/02640410152006081 
Linden, W. (1984). Development and initial validation of a life event scale for students. 
Candian Counsellor, 18(3), 106–110. 
Mann, D. T. Y., Williams, A. M., Ward, P., & Janelle, C. M. (2007). Perceptual-Cognitive 




Martens, R., Vealey, R. S., & Burton, D. (1990). Competitive anxiety in sport. Champaign, 
IL: Human Kinetics. 
Masters, R., & Maxwell, J. (2008). The theory of reinvestment. International Review of 
Sport and Exercise Psychology, 1(2), 160–183. 
http://doi.org/10.1080/17509840802287218 
Masters, R. S. W. (1992). Knowledge, knerves and know-how: The role of explicit versus 
implicit knowledge in the breakdown of a complex motor skill under pressure. British 
Journal of Psychology, 83, 343–358. 
Masters, R. S. W., & Maxwell, J. P. (2004). Implicit motor learning, reinvestment and 
movement disruption: What you don’t know won’t hurt you? In A. M. Williams & N. 
J. Hodges (Eds.), Skill Acquisition in Sport: Research, Theory and Practice (pp. 207–
228). London: Routledge. 
Masters, R. S. W., Polman, R. C. J., & Hammond, N. V. (1993). “Reinvestment”: A 
dimension of personality implicated in skill breakdown under pressure. Personality 
and Individual Differences, 14(5), 655–666. http://doi.org/10.1016/0191-
8869(93)90113-H 
Maxwell, J. P., Masters, R. S. W., & Poolton, J. M. (2006). Performance Breakdown in 
Sport : The Roles of Reinvestment and Verbal Knowledge. Research Quarterly for 
Exercise and Sport, 77(2), 271–276. http://doi.org/10.1080/02701367.2006.10599360 
Maynard, I. W., & Cotton, P. C. J. (1993). An Investigation of Two Stress-Management 
Techniques in a Field Setting. The Sport Psychologist, 7(4), 375–387. 
McDonald, P. V, van Emmerik, R. E., & Newell, K. M. (1989). The effects of practice on 
limb kinematics in a throwing task. Journal of Motor Behavior, 21(3), 245–264. 
http://doi.org/10.1080/00222895.1989.10735480 
Mesagno, C., & Hill, D. M. (2013). Definition of Choking in Sport: Re-conceptualization 
and Debate. International Journal of Sport Psychology, 44(4), 267–277. 
Moore, L. J., Vine, S. J., Cooke, A., Ring, C., & Wilson, M. R. (2012). Quiet eye training 
expedites motor learning and aids performance under heightened anxiety: The roles of 
response programming and external attention. Psychophysiology, 49(7), 1005–1015. 
http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-8986.2012.01379.x 
Moore, L. J., Vine, S. J., Wilson, M. R., & Freeman, P. (2012). The effect of challenge and 
threat states on performance: An examination of potential mechanisms. 
39 
 
Psychophysiology, 49(10), 1417–1425. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-
8986.2012.01449.x 
Moore, L. J., Wilson, M. R., Vine, S. J., Coussens, A. H., & Freeman, P. (2013). Champ or 
chump? : Challenge and threat states during pressurized competition. Journal of Sport 
& Excercise Psychology, 35, 551–562. 
Mullen, R., & Hardy, L. (2000). State anxiety and motor performance: testing the 
conscious processing hypothesis. Journal of Sports Sciences, 18(10), 785–799. 
http://doi.org/10.1080/026404100419847 
Mullen, R., & Hardy, L. (2010). Conscious processing and the process goal paradox. 
Journal of Sport & Exercise Psychology, 32(3), 275–297. 
Mullen, R., Hardy, L., & Oldham, A. (2007). Implicit and explicit control of motor actions: 
revisiting some early evidence. British Journal of Psychology, 98(Pt 1), 141–156. 
http://doi.org/10.1348/000712606X114336 
Mullen, R., Hardy, L., & Tattersall, A. (2005). The Effects of Anxiety on Motor 
Performance: A Test of the Concsious Processing Hypothesis. Journal of Sport and 
Exericise Psychology, 27, 212–225. http://doi.org/10.1080/026404100419847 
Murray, N. P., & Janelle, C. M. (2003). Anxiety and performance: A visual search 
examination of the processing efficiency theory. Journal of Sport & Exercise 
Psychology, 25(2), 171–187. 
Murray, N. P., & Janelle, C. M. (2007). Event-related potential evidence for the processing 
efficiency theory. Journal of Sports Sciences, 25(2), 161–171. 
http://doi.org/10.1080/02640410600598505 
Nibbeling, N., Oudejans, R. R. D., & Daanen, H. A. M. (2012). Effects of anxiety, a 
cognitive secondary task, and expertise on gaze behavior and performance in a far 
aiming task. Psychology of Sport and Exercise, 13(4), 427–435. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.psychsport.2012.02.002 
Nieuwenhuys, A. J., Pijpers, J. R., Oudejans, R. R. D., & Bakker, F. C. (2008). The 
influence of anxiety on visual attention in climbing. Journal of Sport & Exercise 
Psychology, 30, 171–185. 
Orrell, A. J., Masters, R. S. W., & Eves, F. F. (2009). Reinvestment and movement 




Otten, M. (2009). Choking vs. clutch performance: a study of sport performance under 
pressure. Journal of Sport & Exercise Psychology, 31(5), 583–601. 
Palmer, P. (1985). Do clutch pitchers exist? The National Pastime, 4, 5–6. 
Palmer, P. (1990). Clutch hitting one more time. By the Numbers, 2, 6–7. 
Sarason, I. G. (1984). Stress, anxiety, and cognitive interference: reactions to tests. Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology, 46(4), 929–938. http://doi.org/10.1037/0022-
3514.46.4.929 
Smith, N. C., Bellamy, M., Collins, D. J., & Newell, D. (2001). A test of processing 
efficiency theory in a team sport context. Journal of Sports Sciences, 19(5), 321–332. 
http://doi.org/10.1080/02640410152006090 
Spielberger, C. D. (1966). Theory and research on anxiety. In C. D. Spielberger (Ed.), 
Anxiety and behavior (pp. 3–20). New York: Academic press. 
Spielberger, C. D. (1989). Stress and anxiety in sports. In D. Hackfort & C. D. Spielberger 
(Eds.), Anxiety in Sports: An international perspective. New York: Hemisphere. 
Staal, M. A. (2004). Stress, Cognition, and Human Performance: A Literature Review and 
Conceptual Framework. Hanover, MD: National Aeronautics & Space 
Administration. 
Tanaka, Y., & Sekiya, H. (2010). The influence of audience and monetary reward on the 
putting kinematics of expert and novice golfers. Research Quarterly for Exercise and 
Sport, 81(4), 416–424. http://doi.org/10.5641/027013610X13088600029139 
Tanaka, Y., & Sekiya, H. (2011). The influence of monetary reward and punishment on 
psychological, physiological, behavioral and performance aspects of a golf putting 
task. Human Movement Science, 30(6), 1115–1128. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.humov.2011.04.008 
Taylor, J. (1987). Predicting Athletic Performance with Self- Confidence and Somatic and 
Cognitive Anxiety as a Function of Motor and Physiological Requirements in Six 
Sports. Journal of Personality, 55(1), 139–153. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-
6494.1987.tb00432.x 
Terry, P. C., & Slade, A. (1995). Discriminant effectivness of psychological state measures 
in predicting performance outcome in karate competition. Perceptual and Motor 
Skills, 82, 371–377. 
41 
 
Vereijken, B., van Emmerik, R. E. A., Whiting, H. T. A., & Newell, K. M. (1992). 
Free(z)ing degrees of freedom in skill acquisition. Journal of Motor Behavior, 24(1), 
133–142. 
Vickers, J. N. (1996). Visual control when aiming at a far target. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology. Human Perception and Performance, 22(2), 342–354. 
http://doi.org/10.1037/0096-1523.22.2.342 
Vickers, J. N., & Williams, A. M. (2007). Performing under pressure: the effects of 
physiological arousal, cognitive anxiety, and gaze control in biathlon. Journal of 
Motor Behavior, 39(5), 381–394. http://doi.org/10.3200/JMBR.39.5.381-394 
Vine, S. J., Lee, D., Moore, L. J., & Wilson, M. R. (2013). Quiet eye and choking: Online 
control breaks down at the point of performance failure. Medicine and Science in 
Sports and Exercise, 45(10), 1988–1994. 
http://doi.org/10.1249/MSS.0b013e31829406c7 
Vine, S. J., Moore, L. J., & Wilson, M. R. (2011). Quiet eye training facilitates competitive 
putting performance in elite golfers. Frontiers in Psychology, 2(Jan), 1–9. 
http://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2011.00008 
Vine, S. J., & Wilson, M. R. (2010). Quiet Eye Training : Effects on Learning and 
Performance Under Pressure. Journal of Applied Sport Psychology, 22, 361–376. 
http://doi.org/10.1080/10413200.2010.495106 
Vine, S. J., & Wilson, M. R. (2011). The influence of quiet eye training and pressure on 
attention and visuo-motor control. Acta Psychologica, 136(3), 340–346. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.actpsy.2010.12.008 
Wegner, D. M. (1994). Ironic processes of mental control. Psychological Review, 101(1), 
34–52. http://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.101.1.34 
Wegner, D. M., Ansfield, M., & Pilloff, D. (1998). The Putt and the Pendulum: Ironic 
Effects of the Mental Control of Action. Psychological Science, 9(3), 196–199. 
http://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9280.00037 
Wegner, D. M., & Erber, R. (1992). The Hyperaccessibility of Suppressed Thoughts. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 63(6), 903–912. 
http://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.63.6.903 
Wegner, D. M., Erber, R., & Zanakos, S. (1993). Ironic process in the mental control of 
mood and mood-related thought. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
65(6), 1093–1104. http://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.65.6.1093 
42 
 
Wegner, D. M., Schneider, D. J., Carter, S. R., & White, T. L. (1987). Paradoxical effects 
of thought suppression. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 53(1), 5–13. 
http://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.53.1.5 
Wells, B. M., & Skowronski, J. J. (2012). Evidence of Choking Under Pressure on the 
PGA Tour. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 34(2), 175–182. 
http://doi.org/10.1080/01973533.2012.655629 
Williams, A., Vickers, J., & Rodrigues, S. (2002). The effects of anxiety on visual search, 
movement kinematics, and performance in table tennis: A test of Eysenck and Calvo’s 
processing efficiency theory. Journal of Sport & Exercise Psychology, 24(4), 438–
455. 
Wilson, M. (2008). From processing efficiency to attentional control: a mechanistic 
account of the anxiety–performance relationship. International Review of Sport and 
Exercise Psychology, 1(2), 184–201. http://doi.org/10.1080/17509840802400787 
Wilson, M. R., Vine, S. J., & Wood, G. (2009). The influence of anxiety on visual 
attentional control in basketball free throw shooting. Journal of Sport & Exercise 
Psychology, 31(2), 152–168. 
Wilson, M. R., Wood, G., & Vine, S. J. (2009). Anxiety, attentional control, and 
performance impairment in penalty kicks. Journal of Sport & Exercise Psychology, 
31(6), 761–775. 
Wilson, M., Smith, N. C., Chattington, M., Ford, M., & Marple-Horvat, D. E. (2006). The 
role of effort in moderating the anxiety-performance relationship: Testing the 
prediction of processing efficiency theory in simulated rally driving. Journal of Sports 
Sciences, 24(11), 1223–1233. http://doi.org/10.1080/02640410500497667 
Wilson, M., Smith, N. C., & Holmes, P. S. (2007). The role of effort in influencing the 
effect of anxiety on performance: Testing the conflicting predictions of processing 
efficiency theory and the conscious processing hypothesis. British Journal of 
Psychology, 98, 411–428. http://doi.org/10.1348/000712606X133047 
Wine, J. (1971). Test anxiety and direction of attention. Psychological Bulletin, 76(2), 92–
104. http://doi.org/10.1037/h0031332 
Wood, G., & Wilson, M. R. (2010). A moving goalkeeper distracts penalty takers and 




Woodman, T., Barlow, M., & Gorgulu, R. (In Press). Don’t miss, don’t miss, d’oh! 
Performance when anxious suffers specifically where least desired. The Sport 
Psychologist. 
Woodman, T., & Davis, P. (2008). The role of repression in the incidence of ironic effects. 
The Sport Psychologist, 22, 183–196. 
Woodman, T., & Hardy, L. (2001). Stress and anxiety. In R. N. Singer, H. A. Hausenblas, 
& C. M. Janelle (Eds.), Handbook of Sport Psychology (2nd ed., pp. 290–318). New 
York: John Wiley & Sons. 
Woodman, T., & Hardy, L. (2003). The relative impact of cognitive anxiety and self-
confidence upon sport performance: a meta-analysis. Journal of Sports Sciences, 
21(6), 443–457. http://doi.org/10.1080/0264041031000101809 
Woodworth, R. S. (1899). The accuracy of voluntary movement. Psychological Review, 
3(Monograph supplement), 1–119. 
Wulf, G. (2007). Attentional focus and motor learning: A review of 10 years of reserach. 
Bewegung and Training, 1, 1–11. 
Wulf, G. (2013). Attentional focus and motor learning : a review of 15 years. International 
Review of Sport and Exercise Psychology, 6(1), 77–104. 
http://doi.org/10.1080/1750984X.2012.723728 
Wulf, G., & Prinz, W. (2001). Directing attention to movement effects enhances learning: 
a review. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 8(4), 648–660. 
http://doi.org/10.3758/BF03196201 
Yerkes, R. M., & Dodson, J. D. (1908). The relation of strength of stimulus to rapidity of 









Changes in Putting Kinematics Associated with Choking and Excelling Under 
Pressure 
 
The effects of performance pressure on the putting kinematics of 13 expert golfers was 
investigated. Golfers varied substantially in their response to pressure, with three having 
significantly increased putting errors (i.e., choking), three having significantly decreased 
putting errors (i.e., clutch performance) and the remainder showing no significant effect of 
pressure. Putting performance was significantly related to several kinematic variables. In 
particular, the relationship between downswing amplitude (DA) and putting distance was 
weaker for those golfers that choked under pressure as compared to clutch performers. The 
change in the DA-distance relationship associated with the introduction of pressure was 
significantly correlated with the change in accuracy (r = -0.58). These effects of pressure on 
putting kinematics are qualitively similar to the effects produced by directing attention to 
skill execution with a secondary task (Beilock & Gray, 2012) and thus provide support for 






Over the past 30 years the question of why some athletes fail under pressure while 
others thrive has remained one of the most popular research topics in sports science. Choking 
under pressure (i.e., “choking”) is defined here as performing more poorly than expected 
given one’s skill level i.e., a significant decrease in performance relative to pre-pressure 
levels (Masters, 1992). For a discussion of alternative definitions of “choking” see Mesagno 
& Hill (2013). As reviewed in Beilock and Gray (2007), the phenomenon of choking has 
been studied from multiple different angles investigating mechanisms including attentional 
control, biomechanics and kinematics, anxiety, effort, and social threat. Despite this 
considerable body of research, an understanding of exactly how pressure exerts its effects 
on performance in terms of how the perceptual-motor control of the performer changes in 
high pressure situations is still lacking (Gray, 2011). 
How does pressure change the movements and kinematics associated with complex 
motor skills? As discussed in detail by Gray (2011), there are important theoretical and 
practical reasons for investigating this largely unresolved question. Previous research 
examining the effect of pressure on performance has primarily measured performance 
outcomes. While performance effects are obviously the most immediate concern of an 
athlete or coach, movement effects may provide a more reliable and direct index. Anyone 
who has participated regularly in sport knows that good execution does not always lead to a 
successful outcome (and poor execution does not always lead to failure). There are many 
additional variables (e.g., the reactions of opponents and environmental conditions) which 
determine whether the execution of a sports skill will be successful. Therefore, measurement 
of movement effects and kinematic changes (which are more directly influenced by attention 
than performance effect) are key to developing a theoretical account of skilled motor action. 
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It is also of practical importance. Identifying problems at the level of movement execution 
will improve the ability of a coach to help an athlete remedy performance failures - one can 
only get so far by instructing a performer to “stop trying too hard” when faced with a pressure 
situation. The focus of the present study was golf putting therefore we next review previous 
research that has investigated the pressure-kinematics relationship in this context. 
The Effects of Pressure on Putting Kinematics  
Mullen and Hardy (2000) conducted the first exploratory analysis of the effects of 
pressure on kinematics in golf putting for high and low skill golfers (as defined by a median 
split based on baseline putting data). Golfers ranged in handicap from 12-18 and it was noted 
that in a pilot study golfers with a handicap lower than 12 showed no effect of the pressure 
manipulations used (a combination of monetary reward for performance and telling 
participants their performance would be evaluated by a golf professional). Putts were always 
made from a distance of 3m. The only significant effect of anxiety on putting kinematics 
was that under pressure conditions the time to peak speed (TTPS) of the putter head occurred 
earlier in the downswing as compared to the pre-test condition. There were no significant 
effects of pressure on any of the other kinematic variables measured which included range 
of motion, velocity and acceleration variables. However, it should also be noted that the 
pressure manipulation used in the study did not have a significant effect on putting 
performance. 
Cooke, Kavussanu, McIntyre and Ring (2010) examined the effect of pressure on the 
putting kinematics of 48 novice golfers. The putting distances were 1.2, 1.8 and 2.4m, 
pressure was induced via monetary rewards for performance and socially evaluative 
instructions. Anxiety ratings were significantly higher, and the number of putts holed was 
significantly lower under pressure. In terms of kinematics, there was an increase in the lateral 
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acceleration of the putter head during the downswing which led to an associated increase in 
the variability of the putter face angle at the point of contact. 
Tanaka and Sekiya (2010) investigated the effects of pressure on the kinematics of six 
professional golfers and five novices. Following a training period, pressure was induced via 
the presence of a small audience and a cash prize for performance. All putts were made from 
a distance of 4m. Although there were no significant changes in state anxiety or putting 
performance as a result of pressure, there were some significant kinematic effects. For both 
novices and experts the amplitude of backswing and downswing was significantly smaller 
and the velocity of the downswing was significantly slower under pressure. The authors 
propose that these changes reflect a general motor strategy used to increase the accuracy 
movements, that is moving a shorter distance and at a slower velocity (Schmidt, Zelaznik, 
Hawkins, Frank & Quinn, 1979). 
In a follow up study, Tanaka and Sekiya (2011) asked 20 novice golfers to perform 
under pressure conditions in which they either received a cash reward or cash punishment 
for performance. All putts were made from a distance of 1.5m and a 3-D kinematic analysis 
was used. There were again no significant changes in performance or state anxiety associated 
with the pressure manipulations, however there was a significant increase in heart rate (HR). 
Consistent with their previous findings of reduced amplitudes of the backswing and 
downswing, this study found that pressure led to significantly decreased rotational 
movements (i.e., pronation-supination of wrists). It also reported increased acceleration of 
the elbows during the downswing (DS) phase, and decreased movement time during the 
backswing (BS) and DS phases of the pressure test. In other words, participants who showed 
greater increases in HR exhibited short, quick and rigid putting strokes as opposed to the 
long smooth strokes used by the other participants. 
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An important limitation of these previous studies is that all putts were made from a 
constant distance, apart from Cooke et al. (2010) who did not report any analyses with putt 
distance as a factor. Previous research has shown that the manner in which a golfer adapts 
their putting stroke to different putting distances is one of the key characteristics that 
distinguish expert from novice golfers. As first proposed by Delay, Nougier, Orliaguet and 
Coello (1997), expert golfers achieve the optimal force at putter head/ball contact by 
programming the movement amplitude of the backswing (and the resulting downswing) 
according to the hole distance. In other words, to putt the ball further experts substantially 
increase the length of their putting stroke while keeping the velocity of the movement 
roughly constant across distance (see also Sim & Kim, 2010). Less skilled golfers, on the 
other hand, do not show this tight coupling between swing amplitude and putting distance 
and instead vary other aspects of the backswing and downswing (either movement time or 
velocity). Noted golf instructor Dave Pelz (2000) explains the disadvantage associated with 
the strategy used by less-skilled golfers. 
We tested the putting stroke of some 150 amateurs at the DuPont World 
Amateur Tournament. The averaged results show that the length of their 
backswings varied only about 6 inches, while the length of the putts produced 
varied 6 to 30 feet. This means their backswing, the power generator of the 
putting stroke, varied only 6 inches for 24 feet...Think of the pressure that puts 
on every putt. These amateurs must be able to sense and feel a difference of 
less than one inch to produce putts of 12 and 15 feet, respectively. (p. 117)  
He further explains the advantage of the expert putting strategy observed by Delay and 
colleagues: “backswings change to control the distance our putts roll....This means that there 
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is more room for adjustments when producing putts of different lengths.” (Pelz, 2000, p. 
120).  
Given that this downswing amplitude/putting distance relationship is a characteristic 
difference between elite and novice performers it might also be one that changes under 
pressure. We have recently provided evidence consistent with this idea in a study examining 
the effects of attentional control on putting kinematics (Beilock & Gray, 2012). In this study, 
attentional control was manipulated via two different secondary tasks: a dual-task condition, 
in which participants judged the frequency of a tone presented during their stroke and a skill-
focused condition, in which participants judged whether the tone occurred closer to the 
starting or end point of the swing segment in which the tone was presented. For experts, 
putting performance decreased in the skill-focused condition relative to baseline and the 
dual-task condition. This decline in accuracy was significantly mediated by a reduction in 
the strength of the relationship between downswing amplitude (DA) and distance (and a 
significant increase in the strength of the relationship between movement time and distance). 
In other words, when attention was directed to skill execution, experts switched to using the 
novice motor control strategy for putting from different distances. 
It is suggested that similar effects may occur in pressure situations. This is anticipated 
because one of the primary theories of “choking” is that pressure prompts skilled performers 
to shift their attention inwards so that the focus is on movement execution, in much the same 
manner as the skill-focused task described above. These “self-focus” theories have been 
proposed in various forms by many authors (e.g., Baumeister, 1984; “Reinvestment Theory” 
Masters, 1992; “The Constrained Action Hypothesis” reviewed in Wulf & Prinz, 2001) and 
supported by abundant evidence (e.g., Beilock, Carr, MacMahon & Starkes, 2002). 
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Unfortunately, because putting distance was not varied or examined in previous research, 
the effect of pressure on the DA/putting distance relationship cannot be evaluated. 
Another limitation of previous research in this area is that, with the exception of the 
Cooke et al. (2010) study, the pressure manipulations used have not led to significant 
changes in putting performance. Therefore, it is difficult to determine whether the reported 
kinematic changes under pressure actually underlie the phenomenon of “choking” or are just 
irrelevant changes. As proposed by Craig, Delay, Grealy, and Lee (2000), for experts the 
downswing movement of the club is continuously adjusted in response to the value of the 
optical variable departure where this variable is defined as the optical angle between the 
current club head location and the location of the end of the swing (i.e., final follow-through 
position of the club head) divided by the rate of change of this angle. Perhaps the majority 
of kinematic changes observed in previous studies are simply variations in the putting stroke 
that are corrected in this final continuous control phase of the stroke. The lack of effect on 
the actual putting error or number of putts holed suggests that this is likely the case. Previous 
research on perceptual-motor control in sports has demonstrated that variations early in the 
execution of movements are frequently irrelevant to performance outcomes because they can 
be compensated for by subsequent online corrections (e.g., Bootsma & van Wieringen, 1990; 
Lee, Lishman & Thompson, 1982). 
Another possible explanation for the lack of performance effects in this previous 
research is that performance changes are masked by individual differences in the effects of 
pressure. It is well known to anyone who watches sports regularly that not all athletes 
respond in the same way to performance pressure: while some ‘choke’, defined as 
“performance decrements under pressure situations” (Baumeister, 1984, p. 610), others seem 
to excel or be ‘clutch’, defined as “superior performance that occurs under pressure 
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circumstances” (Otten, 2009, p. 584). Perhaps if participants were separated on the basis of 
their performance outcome under pressure, different kinematic effects will be observed for 
those that fail and those that succeed. This may allow the identification of more relevant 
kinematic changes.  
Aims of the Present Study 
 The goal of the present study was to investigate the effect of pressure on the ability 
of expert golfers to modulate the force of their stroke appropriately for putts made from 
different distances. In particular, we sought to test the prediction described above that 
pressure would serve to decrease the strength of the relationship between downswing 
amplitude and putting distance, that is it would cause a change in the perceptual-motor 




 A total of 13 (11M, 2F) golfers enrolled in the Applied Golf Management Studies 
degree at the University of Birmingham participated in the study. Their mean age, mean 
handicap and mean number of years competitive playing experience were 20.7 (SE = 0.5) 
years, 3.3 (SE = 0.5) strokes, and 7.6 (SE = 0.7) years respectively.  
Apparatus 
 A McGregor M220™ 35 inch (88.9 cm) right handed putter and Wilson Ultra™ golf 
balls (diameter 4.27 cm) were used.  The artificial putting mat had a width of 1.4 m and a 
length of 4.6 m. The putting task required participants to putt a golf ball as accurately as 
possible to a red square-shaped target (10.5 cm2) marked on the surface of the green, on 
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which the ball was supposed to stop. A target on the green surface, rather than a standard 
hole, was used in order to gain a continuous measure of putting error rather than a 
dichotomous “hit/miss” score. Previous research has demonstrated similar performance 
outcomes using either a target or a hole (Beilock & Carr, 2001). Putts were made from 
distances of 2, 2.5 and 3 m to a target 1.03 m from the end of the putting surface. The x/y/z 
location and angle of the putter head was recorded by mounting a Fastrak (PolhemusTM) 
position tracker sensor weighing 10g on the back side of the putter.   
Anxiety Questionnaire Measure 
The Immediate Anxiety Measures Scale (IAMS; Thomas, Hanton & Jones, 2002) 
assessed participants’ intensity and direction of cognitive anxiety, somatic anxiety and self-
confidence. The questionnaire is composed of three items measuring the extent to which 
participants feel cognitively anxious (I was cognitively anxious), somatically anxious (I was 
somatically anxious), and self-confident (I was self-confident). Responses are made on a 7-
point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely). Participants then indicate 
whether they regard this anxiety and self-confidence as helpful or hurtful to performance 
with ratings made from -3 (very debilitative/hurtful) to +3 (very facilitative/helpful). To 
ensure responses are reflective of each state, the IAMS provides participant friendly 
definitions of each construct to enable individuals to fully understand the meaning of each 
one. Thomas et al. (2002) demonstrated the IAMS to be a valid and reliable measure of 
anxiety and self-confidence with the items significantly correlating with the corresponding 
subscales of the Competitive State Anxiety Inventory-2 (CSAI-2; Martens, Burton, Vealey, 
Bump, & Smith, 1990). Consequently, the IAMS has now become a frequently used measure 
of state anxiety and self-confidence within studies due to being quick and easy to administer 




 The experiment was divided into three phases: practice, pre-pressure and pressure. 
In the practice phase, participants made 24 practice putts (eight from each distance following 
the distance progression 2, 2.5, 3, 2.5, 2…). The distance from the centre of the marker to 
the ball was recorded after each putt, before the ball was returned to the participant for their 
next putt. After a 10 minute break, participants next completed 18 putts (following the same 
progression in distance) that were used to evaluate pre-pressure performance. After another 
10 minute break participants completed the pressure phase which was comprised of the same 
18 putts. Prior to beginning putting, participants were next read the following script: 
We’re now moving into a competition phase. Your objective in the 
competition is still to putt the ball as close to the marker as possible. However, 
throughout the experiment you have so far accumulated 180 points. A small 
ring will be placed around the marker on the green. For every putt that finishes 
outside the ring, you will lose 10 points. Your point total (and that of the top 
participants in the study) will be displayed on a leader board that will be 
updated after each putt. Prize money of £50, £25 and £10 is up for grabs, for 
1st, 2nd and 3rd Place. How many points you manage to hold on to determines 
your position on the leader board. All the results will be e-mailed out to 
everyone who takes part in the study, and will be displayed on the notice board 
in the school atrium. So everyone will know how everyone else performs. No 
pressure then<<said sarcastically>>..........good luck!1 
1As suggested by one reviewer our inclusion of the expression “no pressure” in the 
pressure block script may have indicated to participants that they should feel pressure rather 
than allowing them to subjectively interpret our pressure manipulation.  It will be important 
for future research to determine whether similar effects occur when this “priming” phrase 
is not used. 
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In the pressure condition, a 16.5 cm diameter ring was placed around the target. The 
leader board was displayed on a 61 cm (24”) computer monitor positioned beside the putting 
green. For every participant, the leader board displayed the names and scores of four 
fictitious players. The point scores were 150, 130, 90 and 50 points. The participant’s last 
name and point total of 180 appeared at the top of the leader board at the beginning of the 
pressure phase and was dropped down as their point total fell below the other players listed. 
No matter how they performed the participant never fell below 5th place on the leader board.  
Upon completion of the 18-putt pre-pressure phase and the 18-putt pressure phase, 
participants completed the IAMS.  
Data Analysis 
Questionnaire responses. Intensity and direction data from each of the IAMS 
subscales were submitted to separate paired sample t-tests. 
Putting accuracy. The mean distance from the target for each participant (averaged 
across the six repeats) were submitted to a 2 (block: pre-pressure, pressure), x 3 (putting 
distance: 2, 2.5 and 3 m) repeated measures ANOVA.  
Putting kinematics. As described above, our main dependent variable of interest for 
putter movement was the relationship between downswing amplitude (DA) and putting 
distance.  Mean values of DA were submitted to a 2 (pre-pressure, pressure), x 3 (putting 
distance: 2, 2.5 and 3 m) repeated measures ANOVA.  
We also analysed several other movement variables including backswing MT (BMT), 
downswing velocity (DSV), time to peak speed (TTPS), and velocity at impact (VI) using 
2x3 repeated measures ANOVAs. These particular variables were chosen because previous 
research has shown that they were the primary variables which distinguished novice and 
55 
 
expert performance (Delay et al., 1997) and/or were significantly influenced by attention 
manipulations (Beilock & Gray, 2012; Mullen & Hardy, 2000). 
Results 
Manipulation Check 
A paired samples t-test revealed a significant difference in cognitive anxiety ratings 
between pre-pressure (M = 2.31, SE = .37) and pressure (M = 3.23, SE = .48) conditions; 
t(12) = - 2.65, p = .021. Similarly, a significant difference was found for ratings of somatic 
anxiety between pre-pressure (M = 1.92, SE = .31) and pressure conditions (M = 3.15, SE = 
.45); t(12) = -2.70, p = .019. Confidence ratings did not significantly differ (p = .42) between 
pre-pressure (M = 4.46, SE = .42) and pressure conditions (M = 4.77, SE = .47). All analyses 
on directional aspects of cognitive anxiety, somatic anxiety and self-confidence were non-
significant (p all > .3) and are therefore not reported. 
Putting Accuracy 
 The 2x3 repeated measures ANOVA revealed non-significant main effects of block 
and putting distance (p both > 0.5). The Block x Distance interaction was also not significant. 
As illustrated below and as expected (see above), further inspection of the data indicated that 
this lack of significant effects was due to the fact that the different participants in the study 
responded very differently to the pressure. Therefore, we chose to analyse the data at the 
level of individual participants. 
 Since each participant performed the identical set of 18 putts in the pre-pressure and 
pressure blocks we first calculated the difference in putting error for each of the 18 putts for 
each golfer. We next scaled these differences by the distance of each putt. Figure 2.1A shows 
the mean pre-pressure to pressure difference for each of the 13 participants. To analyse these 
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data we next performed separate paired samples t-tests for each golfer using Bonferroni 
correction for type I error (critical p = 0.004). These t-tests revealed that putting errors were 
significantly larger under pressure for participants 1 [t(17) = -4.03, p < 0.001], 3 [t(17) = -
3.4, p < 0.004], and 7 [t(17) = -3.6, p < 0.004] and were significantly lower under pressure 
for participants 6 [t(17) = 3.4, p < 0.004], 8 [t(17) = 3.4, p < 0.004], and 11 [t(17) = 3.6, p < 
0.004]. For the remaining participants there were no significant differences between putting 
errors pre-pressure to pressure (p all > 0.004).   
 As an additional means of quantifying performance we calculated the number of 
putts that stopped inside the ring in the pressure block for each golfer. Figure 2.1B plots the 
means of this variable. Across participants there was a significant negative correlation 
between the number of putts inside the ring and the pre-pressure to pressure difference in 






Figure 2.1. Putting performance for each participant. (A) Change in mean putting error 
(pressure – pre-test) for each participant.  Data are averages for the three putting distances. 
Error bars are standard errors. (B) Total number of putts in which the ball stopped inside 










































































 As described above, our main dependent variable of interest for putter movements 
was the downswing amplitude (DA), in particular how it varied as a function of putting 
distance. For each golfer we first plotted the DA as a function of putting distance, fit a linear 
function, and then calculated the slope. This was done separately for the pre-pressure and 
pressure data. Thus, a total of 26 plots were analysed (13 golfers x 2 blocks). In Figure 2.2, 
example plots are shown for participants at each of the performance continuum: a golfer that 
“choked” under pressure (Figure 2.2A, Participant 3) and a golfer that was “clutch” under 
pressure (Figure 2.2B, Participant 6).  
 
Figure 2.2. Calculation of change in downswing amplitude x distance slopes. Left Panel: 
DA x distance functions for a participant that “choked” under pressure (participant 3). 
Right Panel: DA x distance functions for a participant that was “clutch” under pressure 
(participant 6).  
 
 
Finally, we calculated the change in slope from the pre-pressure to pressure block for each 
participant (see Figure 2.2 for example calculations). Figure 2.3A plots the change in DA x 
Distance Slope as a function of change in putting error. Note that a negative change indicates 
 
y = 0.17x + 0.2017































slope = 0.01 - 0.17 = -0.16
y = 0.12x + 0.27

































slope = 0.12 - 0.13 = -0.01
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a decrease in the DA/distance slope. Note that a steep DA/distance slope is typically seen 
for expert golfers whereas a shallow slope is typical of novice golfers (Beilock & Gray, 
2012; Delay et al., 1997), therefore a decrease in the DA/distance slope can be seen as a 
regression towards novice performance. There was a significant negative correlation 
between these variables: r = -0.58, t(11) = -2.36, p < 0.05. There was also a significant 
relationship between the change in DA/distance slope and the number of putts that ended 







Figure 2.3. Relationship between change in downswing amplitude x distance slope and 
putting performance. (A) Change in slope vs. mean change in putting error. (B) Change in 
slope vs. total number of putts for which the ball stopped inside the ring in the pressure 
condition. 
 
We also found significant relationships between putting performance under pressure 
and two other kinematics variables. Figure 2.4A shows the change in the backswing 













































































the mean change in putting error. There was a significant negative correlation between 
BSMT vs. putting error, r = -0.60, t(11) = -2.5, p < 0.05. The correlation between change in 
BSMT and number of putts in the ring was marginally significant: r = 0.50, t(11) = -1.9, p = 
0.07. Figure 2.4B shows the change in the club-head velocity at impact (VI) from pre-
pressure to pressure block as a function of the mean change in putting error. There was a 
significant positive correlation between change in VI and change in putting error: r = 0.74, 
t(11) = 3.6, p < 0.01. Note that novice golfers typically exhibit higher VI values than experts 
because they contact the ball at the point of maximum velocity in the putting stroke whereas 
the club head is still accelerating at the point of contact for expert golfers (Delay et al., 1997). 
Therefore, an increase in VI under pressure can be thought of as a regression to novice 
performance levels. The relationship between change in VI and the number of putts in the 
ring was not significant: r = -0.49, t(11) = -1.8, p = 0.09. Figure 2.4C shows the change in 
the time to peak speed (TTPS) from the pre-pressure block to the pressure block, as a 
function of the mean change in putting error. There was a significant negative correlation 
between change in TTPS and change in mean putting error, r = -0.57, t(11) = -2.3, p < 0.05, 
and a significant negative correlation between change in TTPS and change in number of 
putts in the ring r = 0.64, t(11) = -2.8, p < 0.01. There were no significant correlations 






Figure 2.4. (A) Relationships between change in BSMT vs. mean change in putting error. 




















































































































An understanding of the specific mechanisms through which attention influences 
skilled motor performance is needed to better inform individuals how to perform optimally 
and to protect against performance breakdowns under pressure (i.e., choking). The goal of 
the present research was to examine how pressure changes putting kinematics (i.e., the 
motion of the club during the putting stroke) and how these changes are related to the 
performance under pressure of individual golfers. To extend previous research on this topic 
we investigated how pressure changes the manner in which golfers regulate their putting 
stroke for different hole distances. 
As predicted, the addition of pressure resulted in a significant decrease in the strength 
of the relationship between DS amplitude and putting distance overall. In other words, under 
pressure golfers in the present study used a smaller range of stroke amplitudes to putt over 
the same range of distances – an effect identical to the difference between highly-skilled and 
less skilled golfers described in the quotation by golf coach Dave Pelz presented above (see 
also Delay et al., 1997). This effect of pressure is highly similar to the effect of directing 
attention to skill execution (via the addition of a skill-focused secondary task) on the DS 
amplitude/distance relationship (Beilock & Gray, 2012). Taken together these findings 
provide further support for explicit monitoring (and related) theories of choking under 
pressure in which it is proposed that attention serves to cause inward shift in attention 
towards skill execution resulting a perceptual-motor control strategy typical of an earlier 
stage of skill acquisition.  
It should be noted that evidence in support of the explicit monitoring theory can be 
weaker when skills are studied outside of the laboratory in more ecological contexts. For 
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example, in a study involving a questionnaire given to athletes in a variety of sports 
Oudejans, Kuijpers, Kooijman and Bakker (2011) found that the frequency of skill-focus 
thoughts is actually quite low. Therefore, it will be important for future studies to examine 
pressure-induced changes in putting kinematics in more naturalistic settings, possibly using 
portable motion tracking technology. 
Unlike the majority of pressure-related kinematic changes reported in previous 
research on golf putting (e.g., Tanaka & Sekiya, 2010; 2011), in the present study we found 
significant relationships between the changes in the strength of the DS amplitude/distance 
relationship and putting performance. Overall, golfers that had a greater decrease in this 
relationship under pressure had significantly larger putting errors and had significantly fewer 
putts that stopped in the target ring as compared to golfers who had a lesser decrease in this 
relationship. This is evidenced by significant correlations between these performance 
variables and the DS amplitude/distance slopes (see Figure 2). Furthermore, the three players 
in our study that were ‘clutch’, actually showed increases in the DS amplitude/distance slope 
under pressure. Conversely, the three golfers that showed a significantly “choking” effect 
had decreased slopes. Taken together these findings suggest that performance failures under 
pressure in golf putting are mediated by changes in the way in which golfers control the 
force of their stroke by programming DS amplitude (Delay et al., 1997). 
If golfers are not using swing amplitude to vary stroke force, which motor control 
strategy are they using? Consistent with some previous research findings (Mullen & Hardy, 
2000; Tanaka & Sekiya, 2011) the results of the present study suggest that this is achieved 
by varying backswing movement times and by using a more symmetrical putting stroke in 
which the peak speed occurs earlier in the stroke (see Figure 3). Why might golfers revert to 
a more “novice” control strategy for regulating putting force under pressure? Unlike typical 
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“reinvestment” type effects (Masters, 1992) it is not the case that the behavior observed 
under pressure (i.e., the symmetrical putting stroke with variable movement times) is taught 
at early stage of learning to putt (Pelz, 2000). One possibility is that it could be an attempt 
by the golfer to avoid leaving putts short of the hole. Anecdotal evidence suggests that this 
is a common concern in pressure situations. For example, under the extreme pressure of 
having a 10 foot putt to record the first score of 59 in the history of the PGA tour, Al 
Geiberger thoughts were “whatever you do, don’t leave it short” (Cohn, 2001, p. 51). As 
described by Pelz, one of the problems associated with learning to use large amplitude 
putting strokes is that initially it feels to the golfer as if they have no power: “When you first 
try it, you will probably feel insecure, as if you can’t get the ball to the hole, so you will 
probably leave every putt short” (Pelz, 2000, pg. 118). Therefore, perhaps the observed 
changes in movement kinematics are an attempt to prevent an ironic error under pressure. 
An ironic error in this instance would be telling oneself to not leave the putt short, but then 
proceeding to leave the putt short (Wegner, Ansfield & Pilloff, 1998). Participants may 
therefore be overcompensating (see Binsch, Oudejans, Bakker & Savelsbergh, 2009; De La 
Pena, Murray & Janelle, 2008), by changing their putting technique, in order to avoid these 
ironic effects.  
Increased muscular tension may offer an alternative explanation for the observed 
kinematic changes. Increases in electromyographic (EMG) activity have previously been 
reported when performing motor tasks under pressure (e.g., Cooke et al., 2010; Weinberg & 
Hunt, 1976; Yoshi, Kudo, Murakoshi & Ohtsuki, 2009). For example, Cooke et al. (2010) 
showed that novice golfers exhibit elevated extensor carpi radialis activity when performing 
a similar golf putting task under pressure, with this change partially mediating a deterioration 
in performance. In a separate but related body of literature, changes to a performer’s focus 
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of attention have also been shown to influence EMG activity, with an internal focus of 
attention being associated with higher levels of muscle activity in comparison to an external 
focus (e.g., Lohse, Shewrood & Healy, 2010; Vance, Wulf, Töllner, McNevin & Mercer, 
2004; Zachry, Wulf, Mercer & Bezodis, 2005).  
It has been suggested that the decreased EMG activity associated with an external 
focus of attention may be related to greater movement amplitudes (Zachry et al., 2005). 
Therefore using a similar line of reasoning, an internal focus of attention may be associated 
with increased muscle activity and reduced movement amplitudes. This suggestion dovetails 
well with the observed decrease in downswing amplitudes found as a result of both 
attentional focus manipulations (Beilock & Gray, 2012) and the current pressure 
manipulation. While we did not measure EMG activity, tentative support for this suggestion 
lies within the IAMS somatic anxiety subscale in which “tense muscles” is a component of 
its definition provided to participants. The increase in somatic anxiety scores may therefore 
partially reflect increased EMG activity in muscles associated with the stroke. An obvious 
direction for future research would be to explicitly examine whether the changes in 
downswing amplitude found in the current study are a result of a direct effect of pressure on 
muscle activity, or an indirect effect of pressure mediated by an inward focus of attention 
(as suggested by explicit monitoring theories).  
Two alternative explanations for decreased movement amplitudes centre around 
changes in strategy in order to maximise certain inherent features of perceptual-motor 
control. Firstly, in agreement with suggestions made by Tanaka et al. (2010) it is possible 
that participants may seek to reduce movement amplitudes in order to reduce movement 
variability in accordance with Schmidt and colleagues’ impulse variability model (Schmidt, 
Zelaznik, Hawkins & Frank, 1978; Schmidt et al., 1979). Secondly, current theories of motor 
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control in golf putting suggest that the backswing of a golf putt is pre-programmed, whereas 
the downswing movement is continually adjusted on the basis of visual information during 
movement execution (Coello, Delay, Nougier & Orliaguet, 2000; Craig et al., 2000). 
Reflexive online control processes that are responsible for the visual regulation of limb 
movements have recently been shown to be impaired in anxious conditions, leading to 
decrements in overall task performance (Lawrence, Khan, & Hardy, 2012). Therefore 
experts who have a dispositional tendency towards choking under pressure, may pre-
program shorter backswing amplitudes under pressure in an attempt to reduce the reliance 
on online control processes during the downswing movement of the putt.  
This study further highlights the importance in considering the level of analysis when 
examining performance under pressure (see Beilock & Gray, 2007). To illustrate, previous 
between-subjects analyses of archival final round scores for PGA tour players resulted in a 
lack of evidence to suggest that choking under pressure actually occurs (Clark, 2002). 
However, Wells and Skowronski (2012) found clear choking effects when conducting 
within-subject analyses on similar PGA tour data, by examining individual differences 
between third and fourth round scores. The strength of the choking effect was related to the 
position on the leaderboard, that is being closer to the lead was associated with larger 
choking effect. In the current study, no effects were found when examining performance 
across all individuals. Analysis at the individual level however clearly showed that this was 
caused by the occurrence of both clutch and choking performances, thus nullifying each 
other. Future research may benefit from examining choking in a similar fashion to the current 
study. Alternatively, techniques that allow the concurrent examination of different levels of 
analysis may be employed, such as hierarchical linear modelling (e.g., Beattie, Lief, 
Adamoulas & Oliver, 2011). Regardless of the method employed, by continuing to 
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investigate performance under pressure at a group level, researchers may be missing the 
factors that separate ‘chokers’ and ‘clutch’ individuals. 
There are some important limitations of the present study. First, in employing the 
IAMS as a manipulation check we only used single items to assess cognitive and somatic 
anxiety. It will be important for future research to provide a more complete assessment of 
the effects of pressure in our conditions using a multiple-item assessment of state anxiety 
such as the Competitive State Anxiety Inventory-2 (CSAI-2; Martens et al., 1990). Second, 
the present study involved a relatively small and highly homogeneous (in terms of age, 
gender, and playing experience) group of participants. It will be important for future studies 
to investigate whether similar effects occur for golfers with a wider range of demographics.  
Third, it is possible that the utilised repeated measures experimental design may have 
led to the masking of pressure induced performance effects as a result of learning. In other 
words, practice effects may have counteracted the negative effects of pressure on 
performance, thus leading to a null effect. Whilst this possibility cannot be ruled out, it is 
suggested that  learning effects should have been relatively low for the homogenous group 
of expert participants used in the current experiment. However, it is acknowledged that either 
a counterbalanced repeated-measures design, or a between-subjects design would allow a 
stronger rebuttal of this potential limitation in future studies. Finally, the putting tasks used 
in the present study (putting to a small target or ring on the green) have some distinct 
differences from normal putting. Therefore, it will be important for future research to 
determine whether similar effects are observed when putting into a hole.  
In conclusion, the present study extended previous work that has explored the effects 
of performance pressure on putting kinematics by examining the kinematic changes that 
occur across different putting distances. We have shown that the relationship between 
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downswing amplitude and putting distance was weaker for golfers who experienced 
“choking” when compared to clutch performances. While the specific mechanisms are yet 
to be explored, the changes to movement kinematics suggest a regression to earlier levels of 
skill. By relating the current findings to evidence suggesting that similar effects occur as a 
result of directing attention to skill execution with a secondary task, we suggest that the 
results are consistent with the explicit monitoring theory of choking under pressure.  
The findings from the current experimental chapter suggest that pressure influences 
the relationship between putt distance and downswing amplitude. Visual information has 
previously been shown to be a crucial factor in the regulation of the downswing portion of 
the putting stroke ( Refs ). Interestingly, the visual, ‘online’, regulation of limb movements 
has recently been shown to be negatively affected by pressure (Lawrence, Khan & Hardy, 
2012). It is possible that changes in the ability to utilise visual information may have led to 
the changes in putting performance and downswing amplitude observed in the present study. 
The proceeding experimental chapter therefore aims to examine if changes to indices of 
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Effects of Performance Pressure on the Useful Field of View: Attentional 
Narrowing and Putting Performance 
 
Performance pressure can negatively influence the execution of visual-motor skills. 
The current study examined changes to the useful field of view as a potential underlying 
mechanism behind performance changes under pressure. Twenty four participants 
performed a golf-putting task in neutral conditions, with interleaved pauses in order to 
undertake a computer-based useful field of view (UFOV) tests. Half the participants then 
performed the putting task in conditions designed to induce performance pressure, while the 
other half continued in neutral conditions. Results indicated that the size of the UFOV 
significantly reduced when under pressure. Furthermore, changes in UFOV were 
significantly correlated with changes in putting performance. These results extend previous 





The ability to perform visual-motor skills in high pressure situations is critical for 
success in many different domains, ranging from sport to aviation. In competitive sport, 
performing below one’s level of expertise in such situations is obviously an unwanted 
outcome that is commonly termed ‘choking under pressure’. “Choking” has defined as 
suboptimal performance, despite strong performance-contingent incentives that are of 
personal importance (Baumeister, 1984; Beilock and Gray, 2007). Several theories of the 
underlying causes of have been proposed including; explicit monitoring theory (Beilock & 
Carr, 2001), reinvestment theory (Masters, 1992) or attentional control theory (Eysenck, 
Derakshan, Santos & Calvo, 2007). While these particular theories have been applied to 
sport in several recent studies (reviewed in Beilock & Gray, 2007 and Nieuwenhuys & 
Oudejans, 2012), the concept of attentional narrowing (Easterbrook, 1959) has received 
surprisingly little research attention in sport (Janelle, Singer & Williams, 1999). 
Attentional narrowing effects were first compiled in a seminal review article by 
Easterbrook (1959). Easterbrook proposed that arousal or stress causes a reduction in the 
breadth of cues that can be utilised. Specifically, as the level of stress increases, the ability 
to use peripheral cues decreases, due to “a shrinkage of the perceptive field” (Easterbrook, 
1959, p. 189). Errors are therefore likely to occur when tasks require a wide range of cues to 
be utilized. This effect can however allow the performance of central tasks to be improved 
or maintained, until the level of stress reaches a certain threshold. In other words, 
performance may actually benefit from attentional narrowing effects when tasks do not 
necessarily require the use of peripheral stimuli (Mendl, 1999). One line of evidence that 
provided initial support for these propositions came from continuous tracking experiments 
(e.g., Bahrick, Fitts and Rankin, 1952; Bursill, 1958). Bahrick et al. (1952) for example, 
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asked participants to follow a moving target using a stylus, while attempting to correctly 
identify when randomly presented peripheral stimuli were activated (i.e., illumination of 
lights, or movement of an instrument needle). Monetary bonuses were offered at certain 
points throughout the experiment. Overall, results showed that monetary incentives 
decreased the detection of peripheral stimuli, which was seen as evidence for a stress-
induced attentional narrowing effect. More recently, a small number of studies have 
investigated pressure-induced attentional narrowing effects in more complex sensorimotor 
tasks.  
Janelle et al. (1999) investigated attentional narrowing in a simulated indy-car racing 
task. Coloured LEDs served as peripheral stimuli, and were first positioned around the edge 
of the simulator screen at locations customised for each individual. Their positions were set 
by determining the maximum visual angle at which five accurate colour discriminations 
could occur consecutively. Overall performance was based on both the average driving speed 
around a circuit, and the speed and accuracy of responses to randomly presented peripheral 
stimuli. Following acclimatisation sessions, pressure was induced via monetary incentives. 
Results were generally supportive of attentional narrowing effects, with pressure causing a 
reduction in the ability to accurately respond to the peripheral stimuli. Furthermore, an 
increase in the number of saccades to these stimuli was observed, as peripheral vision alone 
no longer allowed accurate discriminations (for similar results see Murray & Janelle, 2003).  
One limitation of the aforementioned studies is that they involved presentation of 
infrequent and less salient stimuli to peripheral vision, while a continuous, cognitively 
demanding and more salient task is performed in central vision (Eysenck et al., 2007). 
Eysenck et al. (2007) have argued that this salience difference can explain the previous 
results which appeared to support attentional narrowing effects. Specifically, the authors 
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suggest that anxiety causes participants to direct attention to the continuous, salient task (in 
central vision) at the expense of the less-salient task (in peripheral vision). Whether 
attentional narrowing effects would occur in situations in which the processing of central 
and peripheral stimuli is of similar importance cannot be addressed from this previous 
research. However, a separate but related research area has examined the predictors and 
correlates of the ‘functional’ or ‘useful field of view’, and may offer an alternative 
methodology to assess attentional narrowing while resolving this limitation. 
The useful field of view (UFOV) is defined as the total visual field area in which 
information can be obtained in a single glance without eye or head movements (Ball, Beard, 
Roenker, Miller and Griggs, 1988; Sanders, 1970). It is distinct from clinical measures of 
the visual field which ascertain the physical capabilities of the retina to detect stimuli, in 
terms of luminance sensitivity at maximum visual angles (Ball, Owsley & Beard, 1990; 
Williams, Davids and Davids, 1999). The UFOV is instead a measure of the ability to 
accurately detect, identify and localise, rapidly presented suprathreshold targets (Ball et al., 
1990). This tests the ability to process and use peripheral visual information, rather than 
merely detect its presence. Therefore, while the UFOV will be partially based on physical 
limitations (e.g., Ball & Keeton, 1995), it is also a measure of higher-order visual processing 
skills (Das, Bennet, & Dutton, 2007). As many activities rely on these processing skills, it is 
unsurprising that UFOV has been associated with the performance of such visual-motor 
tasks.  
Measures of the UFOV have been consistently linked to both simulated (e.g., 
Belanger, Gagnon, Yamin, 2010) and real-world driving performance (e.g., Ball, Owsley, 
Sloane, Roaenker and Bruni, 1993; Ross, Vance, Ball, Cak, Ackerman, Benz & Ball, 2011; 
Wood, Chaparro, Lacherez, Hickson, 2011). A recent meta-analysis investigated the 
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cumulative relationship between UFOV and various driving performance outcomes, such as 
at-fault crashes and instructor ratings (see Clay, Wadley, Edwards, Roth, Roenker & Ball, 
2005). A large combined effect size was found (Cohen’s d = 0.945), with poorer driving 
outcomes being consistently linked to poorer UFOV scores across different laboratories. 
Poorer UFOV scores have also been linked to increases in bumps while walking, even after 
adjusting for tests of visual acuity, standard visual field tests and other attention tests 
(Broman, Westm Munoz, Bandeen-Roche, Rubin and Turano, 2004).  
Despite its potential applicability, UFOV has been left relatively unexplored in sport 
(see Alves, Voss, Root, Deslandes, Cossich, Salles & Kramer, 2013). To our knowledge, 
there have been only two studies that have investigated the UFOV in sporting contexts. 
Appelbaum, Schroeder, Cain, and Mitroff (2011) recently demonstrated that sport-specific 
visual training (using stroboscopic eyewear) resulted in a significant improvement in the 
divided attention component of the UFOV test. Gray, Cumming, Quinton and Wilkins 
(submitted) examined the relationship between the UFOV and sports performance (soccer 
and basketball) in young athletes. It was found that, the divided attention and processing 
speed components of a novel sport UFOV test explained a significant amount of variance in 
the performance of soccer dribbling/passing tests, while the selective attention and 
processing speed components were significantly related to basketball dribbling performance. 
The preceding discussion highlights the link between UFOV and the performance of 
both complex (i.e., driving and sport) and less complex (i.e., walking) visual-motor skills. 
Of central interest to the current study however, Mackworth (1965) proposed that the area 
of the UFOV can change based on a number of factors, which is a suggestion closely aligned 
with attentional narrowing. The size of the UFOV has been shown to be influenced by a 
number of acute factors, including, the cognitive or visual complexity of tasks presented to 
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central vision (e.g., Ikeda & Takeuchi, 1975; Murata, 2004; Salvemini, Stewart & Purcell, 
1996; Reynolds, 1993; Williams, 1988, 1995) and sleep deprivation (e.g., Ho & Wang, 
2010). For example, Murata (2004) presented numerical calculations of varying complexity 
levels to participants’ foveal vision. At the same time, a stimulus was presented for two 
seconds to a random location in peripheral vision. Results showed that increasing calculation 
complexity led to decreases in peripheral detection. The specific methodology used to assess 
the UFOV has however differed between studies, with a wide variance in the central and 
peripheral stimuli employed (Williams, 1988). Recently, standardised UFOV tests are 
available for use on personal computers (Edwards, Vance, Wadley, Cissel, Roenker & Ball, 
2005), and involve the simultaneous presentation of equally salient stimuli, to both foveal 
and peripheral vision. Foveal stimuli are presented in all subsets of these tests, however 
different subsets also present one peripheral stimulus alone (divided attention subset), or 
embed a stimulus within distracters (selective attention subset). The task is performed using 
binocular vision, with peripheral targets being presented at various azimuth and elevations 
from the central target. The characteristics of these tests therefore seem to be a promising, 
alternate and unexplored method in which to detect attentional narrowing effects under 
pressure.  
The present study investigated the effects of pressure on UFOV in a sporting context, 
using a golf-putting task to create competitive pressure. In accordance with Easterbrook’s 
(1965) attentional narrowing hypothesis, we predicted that competitive pressure would 





Twenty four (17 male, 7 female) self-reported right-handed adults (mean age 23.3, 
SD = 2.78) completed the study. All participants were considered novice golfers as they did 
not have an official golf handicap or any history of formal putting experience (Cooke, 
Kavussanu, McIntyre & Ring, 2010). Written informed consent was gained from all.  
Apparatus 
Putting Task 
A McGregor M220™ 35 inch (88.9 cm) right handed putter and Wilson Ultra™ golf 
balls (diameter 4.27 cm) were used.  The artificial putting mat had a width of 1.4 m and a 
length of 4.6 m. The putting task required participants to putt a golf ball as accurately as 
possible to a red square-shaped target (10.5 cm2) marked on the surface of the green, on 
which the ball was supposed to stop. A target on the green surface, rather than a standard 
hole, was used in order to gain a continuous measure of putting error rather than a 
dichotomous “hit/miss” score. Previous research has demonstrated similar performance 
outcomes using either a target or a hole (Beilock & Carr, 2001). Putts were made from 
distances of 2.0, 2.5, 3.0, 3.0 m to a target 1.03 m from the end of the putting surface. 
Absolute radial error from the position the ball stopped after each putt to the centre of the 
target square served as a measure of putting performance.  
Sport-specific UFOV Task 
The UFOV test used custom-designed software and was displayed on a 28-inch 
(71cm) TFT monitor from a viewing distance of 57 cm. It was a modified version of the 
sport-specific UFOV test developed by Gray et al. (Submitted). The test was comprised of 
two separate subtests corresponding to the divided and selective attention components of the 
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commercially available UFOV test (Edwards et al., 2005). Both subtests began with the 
presentation of a fixation cross for 1.5 sec. After a 200ms delay an image of a golf hole 
including a small portion of the green and the flag (size 3.6 x 2.7 degrees) was displayed in 
the centre of the screen (central task). The image had two possible alternatives (a green 
sloped to the left as shown in Figure 3.1A or to the right as shown in Figure 3.1B), chosen 
randomly on each trial. The display time for the central target was determined using a 
staircase procedure described below. Participants were required to make a forced choice 
judgment about the green slope direction by pressing one of two keys on the keyboard. The 
two subtests of the test were as follows: 
 Divided attention subtest. In this subtest, a black flag was presented on the screen 
at the same time (and for the same duration) as the central target. The flag could appear at 
one of 24 different locations on the screen representing all possible combinations of 3 
eccentricities (10, 15 or 20 degrees measured from the centre of the display) and 8 directions 
(N, NE, E, SE, S, SW, W, and NW). As shown in Figure 3.1A, peripheral flags were 
presented in small black squares that were located on radial arms extending from the centre 
of the display  
Participants were asked to make two judgments on every trial: a 2AFC judgment 
about the slope direction of the central target using the keyboard and to use the computer 
mouse to click on the location of the peripheral flag. There were informed that they should 
make always make the judgment about the central target first followed by peripheral 
judgment.  The presentation duration was varied according to the staircase procedure used 
in the UFOV test developed by Ball et al. (1993). Namely, after two correct responses, 
stimulus presentation time for the next trial was shortened, whereas stimulus presentation time 
for the next trial was lengthened if the response was incorrect. This was continued until six 
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reversals occurred. The threshold presentation time (equivalent to 75% correct) was calculated 
by taking the mean of the final four reversals. Correct responses for both the central and 
peripheral tasks were required before the duration was shortened. Three separate staircases 
(corresponding to the 3 peripheral target eccentricities were randomly interleaved). 
Peripheral target direction was chosen randomly on each trial. The test was completed once 
a minimum of six reversals occurred for each of the three staircases. The initial presentation 
duration for each staircase was 150 ms. The initial step size was 10ms and was halved after the 
first two reversals. 
  Selective attention subtests. The second subtest was exactly the same as the first 
except that, as illustrated in Figure 3.1B, two distracters (white flags) were added to the 
display. The eccentricity and direction of the distracters was varied randomly from trial to 






Figure 3.1. UFOV subtests. (A) Divided attention. (B) Selective attention.  
 
Immediate Anxiety Measures Scale (IAMS) 
Cognitive and somatic state anxiety was measured using the Immediate Anxiety 
Measures Scale (IAMS; Thomas, Hanton & Jones, 2002). The scale assesses both the 
intensity and directional interpretation of each anxiety construct. A definition of cognitive 
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and somatic anxiety is provided. Participants then rate the intensity of their anxiety 
symptoms on a 7 point likert scale anchored at the extremes by 1(Not at all) and 
7(Extremely). They subsequently indicate whether they regard their level of anxiety to be 
debilitative or facilitative to performance on a 7 point likert scale ranging from -3(Very 
debilitative) to +3(Very facilitative). The IAMS has been used previously in similar 
research (e.g., Moore, Vine, Wilson & Freeeman, 2012), with Thomas and colleagues 
(2002) providing initial validation of the scale as an expedient tool for assessing anxiety 
before and during competition. 
Procedure  
The experiment was divided into three phases: practice, pre-pressure and pressure. 
In all phases, participants were asked to putt to the target square from three different 
distances in the following recurring order: 2.0, 2.5, 3.0, 3.0, 2.5, 2.0 m. In the practice phase, 
participants completed two blocks of 18 practice putts. After the twelfth putt in each block, 
the UFOV tests were performed. The data collection procedure was identical for both the 
pre-pressure and pressure phase. 18 putts were performed, with participants completing the 
IAMS and both subsets of the UFOV after 6 and 12 putts. These data collection points are 
entitled pre-pressure one, pre-pressure two, pressure one and pressure two.  
To ensure that any changes to UFOV were the result of pressure rather than repetitive 
testing, participants were randomised into an experimental group or a control group upon 
entering the lab. In the pressure phase, the control group continued to putt as normal. For the 
experimental group, the pressure phase began with the experimenter reading the following 
script: 
We’re now moving into a competition phase. Your objective in the 
competition is still to putt the ball as close to the marker as possible. However, 
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throughout the experiment you have so far accumulated 180 points. A small 
ring will be placed around the marker on the green. For every putt that finishes 
outside the ring, you will lose 10 points. Your point total (and that of the top 
participants in the study) will be displayed on a leader board that will be 
updated after each putt. Prize money of £50, £25 and £10 is up for grabs, for 
1st, 2nd and 3rd Place. How many points you manage to hold on to determines 
your position on the leader board. All the results will be e-mailed out to 
everyone who takes part in the study, and will be displayed on the notice board 
in the school atrium. So everyone will know how everyone else performs. No 
pressure then (said sarcastically)..........good luck!   
A 16.5 cm diameter ring was placed around the target. An interactive leader board was 
presented on a 61cm computer monitor, which was positioned conspicuously next to the 
putting mat. Four fictitious players were displayed on the leader board, whose scores were: 
150, 130, 90 and 50 points. The participant’s last name was displayed at the top of the 
leaderboard with next to a point total of 180. As indicated in the script above, 10 points were 
lost for every putt that landed outside the ring. Their name fell down the leader board when 
based on their new point total.  Note that we previously used an identical manipulation in a 
study investigating the effect of pressure on putting kinematics (Gray, Allsop & Williams, 
2013).   
Data Analysis 
In order to examine the effectiveness of the pressure manipulation, both the intensity 
and directional components of the cognitive and somatic anxiety data were submitted to 
separate 2 group (Experimental and Control) x 4 phase (Pre-test one, Pre-test two, Pressure 
one and Pressure two) ANOVAs with repeated measures on the second factor. To examine 
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the effects of performance pressure on UFOV performance, mean stimulus presentation data 
from both the divided and selective attention subsets were submitted to separate 2 group 
(Experimental and Control) x 4 phase (Pre-test one, Pre-test two, Pressure one and Pressure 
two) x 3 Peripheral target eccentricity (10, 15, 20 degrees) ANOVAs with repeated measures 
on the final two factors. Putting performance data was analysed using a 2 Group 
(Experimental, Control) x 2 Phase (Pre-test and Pressure) repeated measures ANOVA with 




The ANOVA conducted on the cognitive anxiety intensity data revealed a significant 
main effect for phase, F(3,66) = 19.7, p < .001, ηp
2  = .47, and group, F(1,22) = 12.0, p = .002, 
ηp
2  = .35, however these effects were superseded by a significant Phase x Group interaction 
F(3,66) = 20.4, p < .001, ηp
2  = .47. Tukey’s HSD tests showed that the intensity of cognitive 
anxiety symptoms increased for the experimental group between the pre-test phase and the 
pressure phase, whereas no change was found for the control group (See figure 3.2). No 
significant effects (all p’s > .16) were found for the direction component (Experimental 
group – Pre-test phase 1: 0.75, SD = 1.21; Pre-test phase 2: 0.67, SD = .89; Pressure phase 
1: -0.83, SD = 2.02; Pressure phase 2: 0.1, SD = 2.04. Control group – Pre-test phase 1: 0.83, 
SD = 1.34; Pre-test phase 2: 1.0, SD = 1.12; Pressure phase 1: 0.82, SD = 1.19; Pressure 




Figure 3.2. Cognitive (left panel) and somatic (right panel) anxiety intensity ratings across 
time points for the experimental (solid line) and control (dashed line) groups. Error bars 
represent standard errors of the mean.  
 
Somatic anxiety 
The ANOVA conducted on the somatic anxiety intensity data revealed significant 
main effects for phase F(3,66) = 3.43, p = .022, ηp
2  = .14, group, F(1,22) = 6.94, p = .015, 
ηp
2  = .24, and a Phase x Group interaction, F(3,66) = 7.70, p < .001, ηp
2  = .26. Breakdown 
of this interaction revealed that somatic anxiety increased for the experimental group from 
the pre-test to the pressure phase, whereas somatic anxiety intensity remained the same for 
the control group (See figure 3.2). The ANOVA conducted on the somatic anxiety direction 
data revealed non-significant main effects for phase, F(3,66) = 1.66, p = .18, ηp
2  = .07, and 
group, F(1,22) = 1.60, p = .22, ηp
2  = .07. There was however an interaction between phase 
and group, F(3,66) = 3.04, p = .035, ηp
2  = .12. Breakdown of this interaction using Tukey’s 
HSD tests showed that the directional interpretation of somatic anxiety symptoms remained 




































































was found between pre-test phase 2 and pressure phase 2 (Experimental group - Pre-test 
phase 1: 0.33, SD = 1.15; Pre-test phase 2: 0.58, SD = 1.24; Pressure phase 1: -0.08, SD = 
1.83; Pressure phase 2: -.33, SD = 1.56. Control group – Pre-test phase 1: .75, SD = 1.22; 
Pre-test phase 2: .67, SD = 1.23; Pressure phase 1: .76, SD = 1.20; Pressure phase 2: .83, SD 
= 1.15).  
Useful Field of View  
The ANOVA conducted on the divided attention subset of the UFOV test revealed a 
significant main effect for group, F(1,22) = 40.1, p < .001, ηp
2  = .65, phase, F(3,66) = 5.89, 
p = .001, ηp
2  = .21, and eccentricity, F(2,44) = 80.6, p < .001, ηp
2  = .79. These main effects 
were qualified however by significant phase x group F(3, 66) = 10.6, p < 0.001, ηp
2  = .33, 
eccentricity x group F(2, 44) = 22.0, p < 0.001, ηp
2  = .5, and the phase x eccentricity x group 
F(6, 132) = 2.22, p = 0.04, ηp
2  = .1 interactions. The phase x eccentricity interaction was 
marginally significant, F(6, 132) = 2.1, p = 0.05, ηp
2  = .09. 
To further analyse the significant three-way phase x eccentricity x group interaction, 
for each eccentricity we performed separate 2x4 mixed ANOVAs with group and phase as 
factors. For an eccentricity of 20 degrees, there were significant main effects of group, F(1, 
22) = 46.5, p < 0.001, ηp
2  = .68, and phase F(3, 66) = 4.9, p = 0.04, ηp
2  = .18, and a significant 
group x phase F(3, 66) = 9.0, p < 0.001, ηp
2  = .29 interaction. As can be seen in Figure 3.3, 
this significant interaction occurred because the UFOV time increased from the pre-test 
phase to the pressure phase for the experimental group, while no similar increases were 
found for the control group across the same period.  For the 10 and 15 degrees eccentricities 




Figure 3.3. Mean stimulus duration (ms) for the divided attention subset of the UFOV test 
across time points for the experimental (solid line) and control groups (dashed line). Error 
bars represent standard errors of the mean. 
 
Similar results were obtained for the selective attention UFOV subtest. The ANOVA 
conducted on these data revealed a significant main effect for group, F(1,22) = 53.8, p < 
.001, ηp
2  = .99, phase, F(3,66) = 4.44, p = .007, ηp
2  = .17, and eccentricity, F(2,44) = 135.6, 
p < .001, ηp
2  = .86. These main effects were qualified however by significant phase x group, 
F(3, 66) = 8.1, p < 0.001, ηp
2  = .27, eccentricity x group F(2, 44) = 34.9, p < 0.001, ηp
2  = .61, 
and the phase x eccentricity x group F(6, 132) = 2.46, p = 0.02, ηp
2  = .1 interactions. The 
phase x eccentricity interaction was not significant, p = 0.33. 
To further analyse the significant three-way phase x eccentricity x group interaction, 
for each eccentricity we performed separate 2x4 mixed ANOVAs with group and phase as 
factors. For an eccentricity of 20 degrees, there were significant main effects of group F(1, 
22) = 112.2, p < 0.001, ηp
2  = .9, and phase, F(3, 66) = 10.3, p = 0.04, ηp
2  = .32, and a 
significant group x phase interaction, F(3, 66) = 43.3, p < 0.001, ηp
2  = .66.  As can be seen 



















































the pre-test phase to the pressure phase for the anxiety group, while no similar increases were 
found for the control group across the same period.  For the 10 and 15 degrees eccentricities 
none of the main effects or interactions were significant (p’s all > 0.05).  
 
Figure 3.4. Mean stimulus duration (ms) for the selective attention subset of the UFOV 
test across time points for the experimental (solid line) and control (dashed line) groups. 
Error bars represent standard errors of the mean. 
 
Putting Performance 
The ANOVA conducted on the putting performance data (see Figure 3.5) revealed 
non-significant effects for phase, F(1,22) = 1.01, p = .33, ηp
2  = .04, group, F(1,22) = 1.86, p 
= .19, ηp
2  = .08, or an interaction between phase and group, F(1,22) = 1.01, p = .19, ηp
2  = .01. 
This suggests that when examined at a group level, putting performance for these novice 






















































Figure 3.5. Mean putting error across experimental phases for experimental group (solid 
line) and the control (dashed line) groups. Error bars represent standard error of the mean. 
 
As a supplementary analysis to examine individual responses to pressure (see Gray, 
Allsop & Williams, 2013), change scores were calculated for both putting performance and 
the two subsets (divided and selective attention) of the UFOV test. Note for the latter 
calculation we only used data for 20 degrees eccentricity. Specifically, we calculated the 
difference in mean putting error and mean stimulus duration from the pre-test phase to the 
pressure phase for each participant in the experimental group. Therefore a positive change 
in putting performance and UFOV score indicates poorer putting performance and poorer 
useful field of view performance respectively.  
As shown in Figure 3.6, a significant positive correlation was found between change 
in putting performance and change UFOV score for the divided attention subset of the UFOV 
test, r(10) = .60, p = .04. However, the correlation between change in putting performance 
and mean stimulus duration for the selective attention subset of the UFOV test only 
approached significance, r(10) = .53, p = .08. These relationships suggest that participants 
who performed poorly under pressure (i.e., choked), had associated declines in divided 

































(p’s > .4) when performed on the control group data, indicating that individual responses to 
pressure were most likely responsible for the development of these relationships.  
 
Figure 3.6. Experimental participants’ change in mean stimulus duration (ms) for the 




 For the UFOV data described so far participants were always required to perform the 
central task first. This is a potential limitation since it may have implied to the participant 
that the central task was more important than the peripheral task thus creating a difference 
in the saliency. To address this possibility we collected data for additional 12 participants 
with a reversed response order. All of these participants were subjected to the pressure 
manipulation. The results for this group of participants were highly similar to the 
experimental group described above. For 20 degrees eccentricity, there was a significant 
effect of block on UFOV score for both the divided attention, F(3, 33) = 27.2, p < 0.001, ηp
2  
= .61, and selective attention, F(3, 33) = 18.1, p < 0.001, ηp
2  = .41, subtests. There were also 
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scores for both subtests: divided attention, r(10) = .59, p = 0.04; selective attention, r(10) = 
0.63, p = 0.03. 
Discussion 
 The main aim of the present study was to investigate Easterbrook’s (1959) attentional 
narrowing hypothesis in a sporting context. We extended upon previous research by 
measuring attentional narrowing using a sport-specific UFOV test. We predicted that 
competitive pressure would cause a reduction in the ability to use peripheral stimuli, as 
indicated by poorer UFOV performance (in particular for the largest peripheral target 
eccentricities). Competitive pressure was successfully manipulated. The intensity of both 
cognitive and somatic anxiety symptoms significantly increased according to self-report data 
from the IAMS. The interpretation of cognitive anxiety symptoms remained unaffected by 
the pressure manipulation, however somatic anxiety symptoms were interpreted as being 
more debilitative in the latter parts of the pressure phase.  
 In line with our hypothesis, UFOV performance significantly decreased under 
pressure. Specifically, the average presentation duration required to accurately detect, and 
locate a peripheral stimulus, was significantly higher in pressure conditions. This effect was 
found when the stimulus was presented both alone (divided attention UFOV subtest), or 
when embedded within distracters (selective attention UFOV subtest). It is also important to 
note that the introduction of pressure did not result in a general decline in these abilities (i.e., 
performance was maintained at small eccentricities). Unlike most previous studies 
investigating Easterbrook’s (1959) hypothesis, the measure of attentional narrowing was 
performed separately to the main task (i.e., golf putting). Therefore, it cannot be argued that 
the reduction in the ability to use peripheral cues was due to participants directing attention 
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to the task of central importance, at the expense of peripheral tasks. Furthermore, the UFOV 
test presents similar stimuli, concurrently to both central and peripheral vision and there was 
no significant effect of reversing task order. This suggests that the present results are unlikely 
to have occurred through the effect of stimuli salience. Comparable studies using central and 
peripheral stimuli of the same salience have produced differing results (Shapiro & Johnson, 
1987; Shapiro & Lim, 1988).  
Shapiro & Johnson (1987) asked participants to respond to either a peripheral or 
central stimulus as quickly as possible. The stimuli were identical small green circles and 
the peripheral stimulus was presented at 10 degrees of visual angle from the central stimulus. 
One group was given random electric shocks in order to manipulate arousal, while a control 
group simply performed the task. The control group consistently responded faster to the 
central stimulus, whereas this effect was attenuated for the arousal group. Similar effects 
were found when music (Stravinsky’s ‘The rite of Spring’) was used to create anxiety 
(Shaprio & Lim, 1988). It is possible from an attentional narrowing point of view, that 
increased anxiety should have caused a bias towards the central stimulus. However, it is also 
possible that the visual angle was not great enough to detect such effects. This suggestion 
may explain the discrepancy of these studies with the current findings, as the visual angle 
for peripheral stimulus presentation in the UFOV test ranged from 10 – 20 degrees. 
Differences in the nature of the stress manipulation may also explain contradictory findings 
(Furst & Tenenbaum, 1985). However, it is suggested that the current results do support 
Easterbrook’s (1959) proposal, with pressure causing a generalised reduction in the ability 
to process and use peripheral stimuli. This suggestion is supported by results from studies 
which have investigated Andersen & Williams’ (1988) multicomponent stress-injury model.  
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In the stress-injury model attentional narrowing has been implicated as a mediating 
mechanism between life stress and athletic injury. Rogers, Alderman and Landers (2003) 
tested high-school American football players’ peripheral vision using a perimeter test, both 
before a practice session and before a competitive game. Results showed that the field of 
vision significantly narrowed before a competitive game. Most interestingly however, 
individuals with high levels of positive life-event stress experienced significantly greater 
attentional narrowing than those with lower levels. Examples of positive life-stress include 
being given an award or a scholarship. It is therefore possible that these athletes experienced 
more pressure to perform well in front of their teammates during competitive games. Using 
a similar time-to-event paradigm, Rogers & Landers (2005) again showed that attentional 
narrowing occurred before a competitive game, with life stress producing greater narrowing 
effects. Attentional narrowing was also linked with the incidence of self-reported athletic 
injuries. These studies lend support to the idea of generalised attentional narrowing effects, 
and provide tentative evidence that these effects can influence athletic outcomes. 
The current study also investigated the influence of competitive pressure on putting 
performance. When examined at a group level, putting performance was not influenced by 
the introduction of pressure. This is not surprising, as previous studies with novice golfers 
have also found null effects when using mean error as a performance outcome (Cooke et al., 
2010). Therefore, similar to Gray et al. (2013), we performed supplementary analyses to 
examine individual responses to pressure. Interestingly, we found that changes in putting 
performance under pressure were positively related to changes in UFOV performance. 
Specifically, participants who had larger reductions in UFOV under pressure, performed 
worse under pressure than those who had smaller reductions. Examining the perceptual-
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motor processes that underpin the execution of the putting stroke may offer an explanation 
for this finding.  
It has previously been shown that visual information is used to regulate the downswing 
of the stroke, in order to ensure the correct force is delivered to the ball for a given distance 
(Coello, Delay, Nougier, & Orliaguet, 2000; Craig, Delay, Grealy, & Lee, 2000). It has been 
proposed that this regulation is achieved based on the optical variable departure, which is the 
angle between the current putter-head location and the desired follow-through position, 
divided by its rate of change. It is possible that the observed disruptions to peripheral vision 
associated with the pressure manipulation in the present study may have impacted upon the 
quality of the visual information needed to regulate the stroke. These changes to the stroke 
would then obviously impact on outcome performance measures. Recent evidence supports 
this assertion, as anxiety has been shown to detrimentally influence the reflexive online-
control processes responsible for visually regulating limb movements (Lawrence, Khan & 
Hardy, 2012). Further exploration could be achieved by measuring both UFOV and online 
control processes in pressure situations. Changes to the locus of attention under pressure 
may offer an alternative explanation for the correlation between pressure-induced changes 
in UFOV and performance. 
 The relationship between measures of visual attention and the performance of novel 
motor tasks has recently been shown to be moderated by locus of attention (Kasper, Elliott 
& Giesbrecht, 2012). Kasper et al. (2012) measured visual attention using the Attention 
Network Task (ANT; Fan et al., 2002), some aspects of the ANT correlate with measures of 
UFOV (Weaver, Bedard, McAuliffer and Parkkari, 2009). Before performing a novel golf 
putting task, participants were placed into either internal or external locus of attention 
groups. Participants in the internal group were given putting instructions directed towards 
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their arms, while the external group were given instructions directed towards the club or the 
ball. Results showed that measures of visual attention only correlated with performance on 
the putting task when an external focus of attention was adopted. The authors suggest that 
an internal focus of attention may disrupt the processing of visual information. This would 
negate the possibility of relationships occurring between dispositional measures of visual 
attention and task performance. With relation to the current study, choking under pressure 
has been consistently linked with increases in skill focused (i.e., internal) attention (e.g., 
Beilock and Carr, 2001; Gray, 2004, Experiment 3). Therefore combining these lines of 
reasoning, it is possible that participants experiencing larger increases in pressure-induced 
internal attention experienced concomitant; decreases in visual processing (indicated by 
UFOV performance) and decreases in putting performance.  
 In summary, the current study aimed to investigate Easterbrook’s (1959) attentional 
narrowing hypothesis using a previously unexplored methodology, the UFOV test. In line 
with this hypothesis, results showed that pressure causes a decrease in the ability to 
accurately detect and use peripheral stimuli. Furthermore, changes in UFOV performance 
under pressure correlated with changes in putting performance. The proceeding experimental 
chapter aims to again examine the effects of pressure on visual attention. The present, and 
previous, experimental chapters have attempted to elucidate the mechanisms behind 
pressure-induced performance changes in discrete golf putting tasks. Surprisingly less 
research has previously examined the effects of pressure on continuous tasks. Given the 
plethora of complex, but routine, visual-motor tasks that are continuous in nature (e.g., 
driving, cycling), understanding the relationship between pressure and performance during 
the performance of such tasks is, at least, of equal importance. Therefore, chapter four 
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examines the effects of pressure during the performance of a continuous, as opposed to 
discrete, visual-motor task.  
The results of the current chapter suggest that pressure negatively affected the UFOV, 
a specific index of visual attention. In continuous tasks, the timing and sequencing of gaze 
behaviour across the visual scene has previously been shown to be critical for task 
performance (Land, 2006). Based on the current chapter, it is expected that pressure will 
again negatively affect performance-critical indices of visual attention. specifically, this will 
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Flying Under Pressure: Effects of Anxiety on Attention and Gaze Behavior in 
Aviation 
 
 Landing an aircraft is a complex task that requires effective attentional control in 
order to be successful. The present study examined how anxiety may influence gaze behavior 
during the performance of simulated landings. Participants undertook simulated landings in 
low visibility conditions which required the use of cockpit instruments in order to obtain 
guidance information. Landings were performed in either anxiety or control conditions, with 
anxiety being manipulated using a combination of ego-threatening instructions and monetary 
incentives. Results showed an increase in percentage dwell time towards the outside world 
in the anxiety conditions. Visual scanning entropy, which is the predictability of visual 
scanning behavior, showed an increase in the randomness of scanning behavior when 
anxious. Furthermore, change in scanning randomness from the pre-test to anxiety 
conditions positively correlated with both the change in cognitive anxiety and change in 
performance error. These results support the viewpoint that anxiety can negatively affect 




A human operator’s emotional state has been linked to performance outcomes in a 
range of dynamic systems, including aviation (e.g., Causse, Dehais, Peran, Sabtini, Pastor, 
2013; Mortimer, 1995) and driving (e.g., Taylor, Deane, & Podd, 2008; Underwood, 
Chapman, Wright & Crundall, 1999). The inherent nature of these tasks means that the 
consequences for performance errors are high, often for both the operator and other 
individuals. Given the potential consequences, understanding the underlying changes that 
occur as a result of emotional fluctuations is of both practical and theoretical importance. 
Anxiety is an emotion that can be invoked by high-pressure or stressful situations (Staal, 
2004). It has been defined as a negative emotional and motivational state that can occur when 
a current goal is under threat (Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos & Calvo, 2007), or when physical 
harm is perceived to be imminent (Stokes and Kite, 1997). Anxiety has been proposed to 
cause negative changes to attentional and psychomotor skills while performing such 
dynamic tasks, including aviation (e.g., Stokes and Kite, 1997). The negative changes in 
attentional control that can occur alongside adverse mental states have been linked to 
numerous aviation accidents, including “controlled flight into terrain” incidents (Shappell & 
Wiegman, 2003). However, relatively few studies have examined the specific influence of 
anxiety on visual attention during the control of complex, dynamic systems. This study aims 
to fill this research void by examining the attentional changes that occur when performing 
an aviation landing task in anxious conditions.  
Attentional control theory (Eysenck et al., 2007) has recently outlined a number of 
specific attentional changes that may occur as a result of anxiety1. The central tenets of 
Attentional Control Theory (ACT) are based upon evidence for the existence of two 
attentional sub-systems: a goal-directed system and a stimulus-driven system (see Corbetta 
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& Shulman, 2002). The goal-directed system directs attention based upon task knowledge, 
expectations and current goals. In contrast to this ‘top-down’ control, the stimulus-driven or 
‘bottom-up’ system is influenced by salient and (currently) unattended sensory events. In an 
aviation context, the goal-directed system will be influenced by a pilot’s mental model, 
knowledge and phase of flight. The stimulus-driven system could be influenced by other 
aircraft coming into view, or flashing cockpit instruments. ACT proposes that anxiety 
disrupts the balance between these two sub-systems, with the stimulus-driven system taking 
precedence over the goal-directed system. This overarching imbalance underpins a number 
of more specific predictions that are made by ACT. Firstly, it is predicted that anxiety 
reduces inhibitory control, thereby causing attention to be directed towards prepotent 
responses or task-irrelevant stimuli. This effect is amplified when the irrelevant stimuli are 
threatening, or are perceived to threaten a current goal. Secondly, it is predicted that anxiety 
causes a reduction in the ability to shift attention efficiently between separate tasks. Since 
many real world tasks require the ability to shift attention or multi-task, this prediction seems 
particularly relevant in the current context. Thirdly, anxiety causes a reduction in the ability 
to update and monitor information in working memory. The final predictions are derived 
from processing efficiency theory (PET; Eysenck & Calvo, 1992) which is the predecessor 
to ACT.  
ACT has subsumed the major predictions made by PET. Specifically, PET proposes 
that anxiety reduces the processing and storage capabilities of the working memory system. 
However, a key component of PET is that this reduction can be partially or fully offset by 
an increase in on-task effort. PET therefore predicts that anxiety is more detrimental to 
processing efficiency (i.e., the ratio between performance outcome and effort) than 
performance outcomes. A number of studies have provided support for the effort/outcome 
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predictions made by PET, in both simple (e.g., Ikeda, Iwanaga & Seiwa, 1996), and more 
complex perceptual-motor tasks, such as driving (e.g., Murray & Janelle, 2003; Wilson, 
Smith, Chattington, Ford & Marple-Horvat, 2006). The associated predictions made by ACT 
(i.e., decrements in inhibition, attentional shifting and working memory capacity) have been 
examined in relatively simple laboratory tasks (e.g., Coombes, Higgins, Gamble, Cauraugh 
& Janelle, 2009; Derakshan, Smyth & Eysenck, 2009). For example, support for the 
deleterious influence of anxiety on inhibitory functions has been found in an anti-saccade 
task (Derakshan, Ansari, Hansard, Shoker & Eysenck, 2009). Briefly, this task requires a 
fixation upon a central location while peripheral stimuli are unexpectedly presented to either 
the left or right side in a random manner. When the stimulus appears, participants are 
required to quickly direct their gaze to the opposite side of the screen. In order to achieve 
this, precise top-down control is needed in order to inhibit a reflexive saccade towards the 
stimulus. Derakshan et al. (2009) found that the reaction time for saccades in the correct 
direction was slower for participants high in trait anxiety in comparison to their low anxiety 
counterparts, providing evidence for less efficient goal-directed control. It is acknowledged 
that such simple tasks allow a localised and process-pure approach to examining specific 
predictions (see Derakshan & Eysenck, 2009), however the overarching predictions have 
also been shown to be applicable to more complex real-world tasks (e.g., Causer, Holmes, 
Smith, & Williams, 2011; Wilson, Vine & Wood, 2009).   
The goal of the present study was to expand previous PET and ACT research into the 
context of aviation. Aviation is a particularly relevant domain to explore attentional changes 
for two main reasons. Firstly, the effective orientating of visual attention is essential for 
adequate performance (Talleur & Wickens, 2003). Secondly, a precise mental model is 
needed in order to effectively master the complex inter-related flight dynamics (Wickens, 
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1999; Wickens, 2002). Specifically, fixed wing aircraft have three primary flight axes – 
pitch, roll and yaw, which are inter-related with three positional variables: altitude, lateral 
deviation from flight path and position along a flight path (Wickens, 2002). Their inter-
related nature means that pilots must monitor multiple variables when making any input to 
the primary flight axes. For example, initiating a roll will cause a decrease in pitch, as a 
consequence of the change in direction of the lift vector. Secondly, when direct perception 
of the environment is unavailable (in low visibility conditions, termed instrument 
meteorological conditions) flying is a radically different and more challenging task (Gibb, 
Gray & Scharff, 2010; Schvaneveldt, Beringer, Lamonica, Tucker & Nance, 2000). In these 
conditions, pilots must derive the values of the aforementioned flight variables from discrete, 
spatially separated cockpit instruments. The pilot’s mental model of the system (see Kieras 
& Bovair, 1984, or Rouse & Morris, 1985, for a discussion of the development of mental 
models) drives the visual scanning of these instruments in order to direct visual attention 
towards the correct instrument at the correct time, in order to obtain the required information 
(Bellenkes, Wickens & Kramer, 1997; Brown, Bautsch, Wetzel & Anderson, 2002). As 
mentioned previously, such control will require the goal-directed (top-down) system to take 
precedence over the stimulus-driven (bottom-up) system. It is proposed that that the 
sequencing of visual attention will be negatively affected if the stimulus-driven system is 
not subservient to the top-down control of the mental model. While previous aviation 
research has not explored the attentional changes that occur as a result of increased anxiety, 
a considerable number of studies from this body of research have investigated visual 
scanning and attentional control.  
 Bellenkes et al. (1997) examined differences in visual scanning between novice and 
expert pilots. The average instrument flight experience was one hour and 80 hours, for 
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novice and experts, respectively. A desktop flight simulator task was employed that required 
participants to complete a number of flight maneuvers while wearing a head-mounted eye 
tracker. Results revealed that lateral axis control was similar for novice and expert pilots, 
whereas novices were less able to accurately control vertical and longitudinal flight 
parameters. The analysis of eye movement data revealed a number of interesting results. 
Specifically, novices tended to exhibit longer dwell durations on each instrument, whereas 
experts visited instruments more frequently. Tentative evidence for a more refined mental 
model in expert pilots was also found. In maneuvers where both a heading (roll) and altitude 
(pitch) change was required, experts exhibited more dwells to the vertical velocity indicator. 
This suggests that experts are more aware of the cross-coupling between roll and pitch. They 
therefore attempted to make early corrections to rectify the loss of lift brought about by 
initiating a roll. The authors also found that the sequencing of dwells was more homogenous 
for novices than experts; this finding will be expanded upon later. A large number of studies 
have examined the effect of increased workload, in the form of secondary tasks, on visual 
scanning and attentional control (e.g., Hameluck, 1990; Itoh, Hayashi, Tsukui & Saito, 1990; 
Tole, Stephens, Harris & Ephrath, 1982; Wickens, Hellenberg & Xu, 2002).  
Tole et al (1982) asked pilots of varying skill level (specific demographic information 
was not provided) to perform a straight and level instrument flight task while performing an 
auditory secondary task. A particularly interesting finding in relation to the current study 
was that increases in workload (achieved by decreasing the inter-stimulus interval of a 
secondary task) were linked with increases in scanning randomness for some pilots. This 
suggests that the sequencing of fixations may be a viable way of assessing top-down 
attentional control in aviation. This is further supported by Ellis & Stark (1986), who 
investigated the sequencing of visual fixations in expert pilots. The pilots were asked to 
110 
 
make judgments on the outcome of air-traffic encounters, which were viewed on a cockpit 
display of traffic information. The primary purpose of the study was to investigate whether 
the sequencing of visual fixations is statistically dependent. This was achieved by 
constructing a first-order Markov matrix for each pilot. Put simply, these provide the 
probabilities of transitioning to an area of interest (AOI) based on the AOI previously 
viewed. These probabilities were compared with models that were based on an alternative 
assumption, that the transitions probabilities were simply based on the percentage of time 
that each AOI was viewed, rather than being based on the previous fixation point. The 
comparison clearly showed that the sequencing of visual fixations was statistically 
dependent, thus suggesting that scanning behavior was driven by mental models detailing 
the relationships between different areas of interest. Task knowledge of this sort 
complements the goal-directed, top-down attentional subsystem. Changes in statistical 
dependencies may therefore be a valid way of examining changes in goal-directed control in 
anxious conditions. Specifically, if the goal-directed system is negatively affected by 
anxiety, it should be evidenced by less statistically dependent fixation sequences. Closely 
related to this point, Ellis & Stark (1986) suggested that “measures of statistical 
dependency….may provide useful indices of workload or stress” (p 431).  
In summary, the present study aimed to examine how attentional control and 
performance are affected by anxiety. Participants were asked to perform a simulated aviation 
landing task in instrument meteorological conditions where visibility was low. Participants 
were then transferred to a condition in which one flight was performed in anxiety-inducing 
conditions. The study was designed to test the following hypotheses: 
 (1) In anxiety conditions there would be a significantly greater dwell time towards the 
external world, and consequently, reduced dwell time on the instrument panel. The rationale 
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here was that the external world is ordinarily the prepotent source of guidance information 
for navigating. However, in instrument meteorological conditions the external view contains 
very little task-relevant guidance information until the last moments of the approach. 
According to ACT, anxiety will lead to decreased inhibitory functioning with attention then 
being directed to prepotent responses, such as the external view.  
(2) In anxiety conditions there would be a significant reduction in the statistical 
dependency of visual scanning (i.e., more random visual scanning transitions) as a result of 
less effective goal-directed attentional control and reduced ability to efficiently shift 
attention.  
(3) There would be a positive relationship between the level of anxiety and scanning 




 X-Plane version 9 (Laminar Research) was used to simulate all landings. Participants 
flew a Cirrus Vision SF50 with both the landing gear and flaps extended. The instrument 
panel was edited to display seven electromechanical style instruments (airspeed indicator, 
attitude indicator, altimeter, instrument landing system course deviation indicator, turn 
coordinator, heading indicator and vertical speed indicator), spaced in order to ensure 
accurate and expedient eye-tracker calibration (see Figure 4.1). The panel and external visual 
scene were displayed on a 24-inch (61 cm) TFT monitor (screen resolution 1920 x 1080). 
The monitor was positioned 1 m away from the participant and a chin-rest was employed to 




Figure 4.1. Example screenshot of the instrument panel and the runway 
 
Auto throttles maintained airspeed at 105 knots. A head-mounted eye tracking (Model 501, 
Applied Science Laboratory, USA) system was used to record participants’ eye movements 
(precision < 0.5). Horizontal and vertical point of gaze coordinates were recorded alongside 
flight data at a rate of 60 Hz. This was achieved via a custom-made Python plugin for X-
plane, which interfaced between the simulator and the eye-tracking system via a serial link. 
Dependent variables 
Flight performance  
As has been used in our previous studies (e.g., Gibb, Schvaneveldt & Gray; 2008; Gray 
et al., 2008) flying performance was operationalised by calculating the root mean square 
error (RMSE) of the vertical deviations of the aircraft from the ideal landing flight path 
called the glideslope. The glideslope is a 3 slope extending from the proximal end of the 
runway. RMSE was derived directly from data displayed on the instrument landing system 
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course deviation instrument and was measured in dots. In X-plane, one glideslope dot 
represents a 0.28 error from the ideal vertical path.  
Manipulation check 
Cognitive anxiety was measured using the Competitive State Anxiety Inventory 2-
revised (CSAI-2R; Cox, Martens & Russell, 2003) which was administered during the pre-
test and anxiety phases of the experiment. The questionnaire has two subscales which 
provide typical thoughts and feelings associated with cognitive (5 items) and somatic anxiety 
(7 items). Given our research aims, only the cognitive anxiety scale was employed in the 
current study. An example item from the cognitive anxiety subscale is “I’m concerned about 
performing poorly”. Participants are then asked to rate, on a scale of 1 (not at all) to 4 (very 
much so), whether each item is indicative of their thoughts and feelings. The cognitive 
anxiety score was obtained by summing item responses, dividing by the number of items, 
and multiplying by 10 (Cox et al., 2003). 
Heart rate served as an index of sympathetic nervous system activity and was measured 
using a heart rate receiver unit (Polar Electro S625X, Polar CIC inc, USA), which was 
connected to a transmitter (Polar Electro coded 31, Polar CIC inc, USA) with moistened 
electrodes positioned across the lower-mid thorax. Average heart rate was calculated for the 
pre-test and anxiety phases.  
Gaze behavior 
 Raw vertical and horizontal gaze coordinates were converted into fixations using 
custom-made software employing a dispersion-threshold identification algorithm (c.f. 
Salvucci & Goldberg, 2000). Dispersion based techniques employ a minimum threshold 
duration of between 100 and 200 ms, in order to alleviate equipment variability (Salvucci & 
Goldberg, 2000). The fixation threshold was therefore set to 150 ms, which is in accordance 
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with similar visual scanning research (e.g., Heumer, Hayashi, Renema, Elkins, McCandless, 
McCann, 2005). This software also used participants’ calibration data to allocate each 
fixation to one of six relevant AOIs; correct fixation allocation was also confirmed manually. 
These AOIs were: external view, attitude indicator, altimeter, instrument landing system 
course deviation indicator, heading indicator and vertical speed indicator. This enabled the 
derivation of dwell frequencies for each AOI, as used in similar flight simulation studies 
(e.g., Bellenkes et al., 1997). In order to examine whether there was a general change in 
attentional allocation between the external world and the instruments, the instrument AOIs 
were combined into a single instrument panel AOI. Percentage dwell time was calculated 
for this AOI and the external world AOI. 
Transitions between the 6 AOIs were characterised by calculating first-order transition 
frequency matrices of p(i to j), where i represents the ‘from’ AOI and j represents the ‘to’ 
AOI. Separate matrices were calculated for each participant and for all flights performed in 
pre-test and anxiety phases. An average matrix of these separate matrices was created for the 
experimental group in order to provide a brief descriptive analysis of the three most 
frequently observed transitions in each of these phases. The separate transition frequency 
matrices were converted into conditional transition-probability matrices of p( 𝑗|𝑖 ), which 
gives a 1st order Markov process where the probability of fixating on the jth AOI is based on 
the current dwell on the ith AOI. As recommended by a number of authors (e.g., Ellis & 
Stark, 1986; Harris, Glover & Spady Jr, 1986; Holmqvist, Nystrom, Andersson, Dewhurst, 
Jarodzka & van de Weijer, 2011; Schieber & Gilland, 2008), scan behavior was quantified 
using an entropy metric originating from information theory (Shannon, 1948). When applied 
to the conditional transition-probability matrices, entropy indicates the randomness, or 
alternatively the predictability, of a participant’s scan behavior (Harris et al., 1986). This 
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measure is therefore highly applicable for identifying changes in scanning behavior as a 
result of anxiety. The observed entropy of the matrices was calculated using Stark and Ellis’ 
(1986) adaptation of Brillouin’s (1962) conditional information equation: 
Entropy =  − ∑ p(𝑖) [∑ p(𝑗|𝑖)log2p(𝑗|𝑖)
n
𝑗=1




Where p(i) is the zero order probability of fixating upon the ith AOI based on the 
percentage of time spent fixating upon it, p(𝑗|𝑖) is the conditional probability of viewing 
AOI j based on a current dwell on AOI i, and n is the number of AOIs.  
Participants 
25 university students (20 male, 5 female; mean age = 20.2, SD = 1.99) voluntarily 
took part in the study. All participants were right handed, reported normal or corrected vision 
and had no previous experience of real or simulated flight. Participants were randomly 
assigned to an experimental group (n = 14) or a control group (n = 11). Ethical approval was 
granted by the university ethics committee and informed consent was gained from all. 
Procedures 
 Flight Task 
 All flights began with the aircraft positioned 5.55 km (3 nautical miles) away from 
the simulated runway (for example, see Figure 1). Participants were required to achieve and 
maintain a flight path along the extended runway centerline and correct 3 glideslope. The 
task was performed in one of two meteorological conditions: visual meteorological 
conditions or instrument meteorological conditions. For visual meteorological conditions 
(VMC), simulator visibility was set to 40 km. For instrument meteorological conditions 
(IMC), visibility was set to 0.7 km. Wind speed and turbulence was set to zero across all 
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conditions. The lateral and vertical starting location of the aircraft was varied throughout the 
experiment. Specifically, vertical and lateral locations both ranged between 1.6 dots above 
and below, and to the left and right, of the ideal glideslope and runway centerline, 
respectively. This variation was employed to ensure that participants had to use the 
information provided by the instruments, rather than simply adopting a similar movement 
strategy for each flight. The experiment was split into three phases which are detailed below. 
 Practice phase: The main aim of this phase was to develop the participants’ ability 
to fly the aircraft along the ideal 3 glideslope using only the cockpit instruments in low 
visibility, IMC. This phase took place over three visits to the laboratory (each visit lasted 
approximately 1 hour) and required the completion of 57 landings; a similar number of visits 
have been employed in similar previous experiments (e.g., McKinely, McIntire, Schmidt, 
Repperger & Caldwell, 2011). The maximum duration allowed between visits was one week, 
and visual feedback of their flight profile was displayed on the monitor after each landing. 
At the start of the first session, participants were given an information sheet that gave details 
and pictorial representations of both the flight task and cockpit instruments. Participants then 
observed two demonstrations of the flight task, one in VMC and one in IMC. This was 
followed by a five-minute free-flight where participants were asked to execute a number of 
flight maneuvers in order to acclimatise to the simulator and aircraft control properties. Pilot 
experiments showed task difficulty to be high if IMC flights were performed before VMC 
flights. Therefore, participants followed a practice schedule that progressed from flights in 
VMC to IMC.  
The practice schedule required participants to first perform nine landings in VMC in 
session one. The rest of the training phase alternated between flights in VMC and IMC. Ten 
further flights, following this alternating pattern, were performed in session one. Session two 
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began with 18 flights. The remaining training flights required participants to wear the eye-
tracker and heart rate monitor to allow acclimatisation before pre-test measurements. A 
mock calibration was performed when the eye-tracker was first worn; this was also to 
alleviate any observer effects during the pre-test phase. Session two then consisted of 10 
further flights. Session three consisted of a further 10 flights before moving straight into the 
pre-test phase.  
 Pre-test phase: The aim of this phase of the experiment was to establish a baseline 
level of performance for the flight task in IMC for each participant. All participants were 
instructed that due to a technical fault, the eye-tracker needed to be re-calibrated and further 
training in IMC was required. Participants then filled out the anxiety questionnaire and 
completed a flight in IMC. Heart rate was recorded for the duration of the flight. 
 Anxiety phase: During this phase, participants completed the anxiety questionnaire 
and then completed one further IMC flight, with heart rate again being recorded. For the 
control group, this flight simply appeared to be the second flight of the pre-test phase. 
However, participants in the experimental group were subjected to a multidimensional 
anxiety manipulation before completing the flight. This between-subject design was chosen 
over a counterbalanced within-subject design (e.g., Wilson et al., 2009) based on pilot 
experiments. These experiments showed that participants who firstly experienced the 
anxiety phase suspected further manipulations in the pre-test phase, which led to anxiety 
after-effects. The anxiety manipulation involved a combination of evaluative and ego-
threatening instructions, monetary incentives and immediate consequences for performance 
failures. Similar manipulations have been shown to successfully increase anxiety in a variety 
of contexts, including, aviation (e.g., Stokes & Raby, 1989), surgery (e.g., Malhorta, 
Poolton, Wilson, Ngo & Masters, 2012) and sport (e.g., Gray & Allsop, 2013).  
118 
 
The evaluative instructions firstly consisted of a script that described how the flight 
results in the next phase would be e-mailed to everyone else taking part in the experiment. 
They were also informed that the person with the best overall performance would win £50 
(~$75). Secondly, a video camera was placed in front of participants, but out of view while 
performing the task. This was set to record at the start of the flight, and participants were 
informed that the recordings may be used in upcoming psychology lectures dependant on 
whether their performance was significantly below average. Thirdly, participants were 
informed that they would now be flying in an online flight environment called the Virtual 
Air Traffic Simulation Network. The experimenter then loaded a custom-made program that 
allowed a mock log-in to be performed. After ‘logging-in’ to the program, a screen was 
displayed on the monitor showing a top-down view of the airport and surrounding area. The 
area was populated with a number of aircraft and extended trail history indicators. 
Statistical Analyses 
Performance, cognitive anxiety, heart rate and scanning entropy data were analysed 
using 2 group (experimental, control) x 2 experimental phase (pre-test phase, anxiety phase) 
ANOVAs with repeated measures on the second factor. To examine whether anxiety had an 
overall effect on attentional allocation, percentage dwell time data was submitted to a 2 
group (experimental, control) x 2 experimental phase (pre-test, anxiety) x 2 AOI (external, 
instruments) ANOVA with repeated measures on the last two factors. Significant effects 
were broken down using Tukey’s HSD post hoc procedures (p < .05). Previous research has 
shown that there can be large individual differences in the response to anxiety during 
complex visual-motor tasks (e.g., Gray, Allsop & Williams, 2013; Malhorta et al., 2012). To 
evaluate possible individual differences for the experimental group in the present study, we 
used the analysis employed in this previous research, namely calculating pre-test phase to 
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anxiety phase change scores for different dependent measures then computing Pearson 
product moment correlations between these change scores. 
Results 
Flight Performance 
Pre-test and Anxiety Phase 
The mean glideslope RMSE for the experimental group was 1.01 (SD = 0.41) and 0.87 
(SD = 0.29) in the pre-test and anxiety phases, respectively. The mean glideslope RMSE for 
the control group was 0.93 (SD = 0.29) and 0.80 (SD = 0.33) in the pre-test and anxiety 
phases, respectively.  The ANOVA conducted on this glideslope data revealed a non-
significant main effect for group, F(1, 23) = .49, p = .49, ηp
2= .02, a non-significant effect of 
experimental phase, F(1,23) = 3.02, p = .10, ηp
2= .12, and a non-significant interaction, 
F(1,23) = .01, p = .99, ηp
2= .00. Overall, flight performance was maintained in anxious 
conditions and the experimental group had comparable levels of performance to the control 
group. 
Manipulation Check  
Cognitive Anxiety 
Mean cognitive anxiety data is shown in Figure 4.2. The ANOVA performed on the 
cognitive anxiety data revealed a significant main effect for group F(1, 23) = 7.32, p = .01, 
ηp
2= .24, and a marginally significant main effect for experimental phase F(1, 23) = 4.07, p 
= .06, ηp
2= .16. More importantly however, there was a significant Group x Experimental 
phase interaction, F(1, 23) = 17.32, p < .001, ηp
2= .38. Breakdown of this interaction revealed 
a significant increase in cognitive anxiety between the pre-test phase and the anxiety phase 
120 
 
for the experimental group, showing that the anxiety manipulation was successful. Cognitive 
anxiety did not significantly differ across the same time period for the control group.  
 
Figure 4.2. Mean cognitive anxiety scores for the experimental group and control group in 
the pre-test and anxiety phases. Error bars represent standard errors of the mean. 
Heart Rate 
Mean heart rate data is shown in Figure 4.3. For three participants (experimental 
group: one; control group: two), heart rate data was unavailable for the whole duration of 
both flights due to an equipment malfunction; data analysis was therefore performed on the 
remaining participants. Regardless, the ANOVA revealed a significant main effect for group 
F(1, 20) = 6.73, p = .02, ηp
2= .25, and a significant main effect for experimental phase F(1, 
20) = 6.99, p = .02, ηp
2= .26. More importantly however, there was a significant Group x 
Experimental phase interaction, F(1, 20) = 15.43, p = .001, ηp
2= .44. Breakdown of this 
interaction revealed a significant increase in heart rate from the pre-test phase to the anxiety 



























Figure 4.3. Mean heart rate for the experimental and control groups in the pre-test and 
anxiety phases. Error bars represent standard errors of the mean. 
Gaze Data 
Percentage Dwell Time  
Figure 4.4 shows the mean percentage dwell time data. The analysis revealed a 
significant Group x Experimental Phase x AOI interaction, F(1,23) = 4.57, p = .03, ηp
2= .17. 
To interpret this interaction, we performed separate, 2 experimental phase (pre-test, anxiety) 
x 2 AOI (external, instruments) repeated measures ANOVAs, for the experimental and 
anxiety groups. For the experimental group, the analysis revealed a significant interaction 
between experimental phase and AOI, F(1,13) = 8.00, p = .01, ηp
2= .38. Breakdown of this 
interaction (see Figure 4.4A) showed that percentage dwell time on the external world was 
significantly higher, and percentage dwell time on the instruments was significantly lower, 
in the anxiety phase when compared to the pre-test phase. For the control group (see Figure 
































Figure 4.4. Mean percentage dwell time on the external world and the generalised 
instrument panel AOIs, for the experimental group (Panel A) and the control group (Panel 


















































































Figure 4.5 shows the mean scanning entropy data. The ANOVA revealed a non-
significant main effect for group F(1, 23) = 2.43, p = .13, ηp
2= .10, and a non-significant 
main effect for experimental phase F(1, 23) = 1.24, p = .28, ηp
2= .05. As expected, there was 
a significant Group x Experimental phase interaction, F(1, 23) = 6.31, p = .02, ηp
2= .22. 
Breakdown of this interaction revealed a significant increase in scanning entropy from the 
pre-test phase to the anxiety phase for the experimental group. No significant differences 
were found for the control group across the same period.  
 
Figure 4.5. Mean scanning entropy for the experimental and control groups in the pre-test 
and anxiety phases. Error bars represent standard errors of the mean. 
 
 
The three most frequently observed transitions remained consistent for the anxiety 
group across the pre-test and anxiety phases. These were, in descending order: vertical speed 
indicator to instrument landing system course deviation indicator (pre-test phase mean: 17.2; 























anxiety phase mean: 14.1) and instrument landing system course deviation indicator to 
vertical speed indicator (pre-test phase mean: 14.1; anxiety phase mean: 13.4). 
Change Scores 
In line with hypothesis 3 described above, we examined the relationship between 
change in scanning entropy and change in cognitive anxiety for the experimental group. A 
strong positive correlation was found between these two variables, r(12) = .70, p = .01. This 
suggests that participants who experienced a larger increase in cognitive anxiety after the 
experimental manipulation also had larger increases in scanning entropy. Interestingly, a 
strong positive correlation was also found between change in glideslope error and change in 
scanning entropy, r(12) = .59, p = .03. This suggests that participants who experienced larger 
increases in scanning entropy also performed worse in the anxiety phase. For the control 
group, the correlation between change in cognitive anxiety and change in scanning entropy 
was non-significant, r(9) = .39, p = .22. Similarly, the correlation between change in 
glideslope error and change in scanning entropy was also non-significant, r(9) = .02, p = .95. 
These analyses further suggest that the significant change correlations found for the 
experimental group resulted from the experimental manipulation. 
Discussion 
 This study examined the influence of anxiety on the gaze behavior and performance 
of operators as they control a dynamic system. Participants were asked to perform a 
simulated aviation landing task in low visibility, instrument meteorological conditions 
(IMC). Participants in the experimental group were then transferred to an anxiety phase 
where they were asked to perform an IMC landing in anxiety-inducing conditions. The 
predictions were based around attentional control theory (ACT; Eysenck et al., 2007). A 
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number of novel contributions emerged from this study. Firstly, anxiety caused an increase 
in the percentage of dwell time directed towards the external world. Secondly, anxiety 
caused visual scanning to become more random (i.e., less statistically dependant). Finally, 
the change in visual scanning randomness from the pre-test to anxiety phase was positively 
correlated with both the change in cognitive anxiety and performance error. These findings 
are explored in greater detail below.   
 Both self-report questionnaires and physiological measures indicated that anxiety 
was successfully invoked by the manipulation that was employed in the current study. Heart 
rate and cognitive anxiety significantly increased for flights performed after the anxiety-
manipulation. This adds weight to the abundance of evidence suggesting that a combination 
of ego-threatening instructions and financial consequences can effectively manipulate 
anxiety (e.g., Stokes & Raby, 1989; Malhorta et al., 2012). It is acknowledged that the 
magnitude of anxiety is likely to be greater in real-life situations. However, the observed 
increase allows the examination of predictions made by ACT. According to ACT, anxiety 
causes the stimulus-driven attentional subsystem to take precedence over the goal-directed 
subsystem. This prediction is supported by an anxiety-induced increase in both the 
percentage of dwell time and number of dwells towards the external world.  
An increased number of dwells to the external world in visual meteorological 
conditions (VMC) provides the operator with relevant visual information that can be used to 
execute a successful landing. For example, it has been previously shown that optical splay 
angle is a critical perceptual variable that can be used to accurately align an aircraft with the 
runway centerline (Beall & Loomis, 1997) whereas the runway length-width ratio can be 
used to regulate altitude (e.g., Mertens, 1981). Therefore in such conditions, the outside 
world provides task-relevant visual information that can aid performance. However, this is 
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not the case for flights in IMC. In the IMC conditions used in the current experiment, the 
external world contained very little task-relevant information. The analysis of percentage 
dwell time showed an increase in dwells to the outside world in the anxious phase of the 
experiment. This suggests that anxiety caused lapses of attentional control as a result of a 
reduced influence of the goal-directed system. Reduced inhibitory functioning offers a 
specific, parsimonious explanation for the observed changes in attentional allocation 
towards the cockpit window.  
ACT predicts that anxiety causes inhibitory functioning to decline, such that attention 
is less likely to be inhibited from being directed towards “incorrect prepotent or dominant 
responses ... or on to task irrelevant stimuli” (Eysenck et al., 2007, p. 344). Since direct 
perception of the environment is the dominant form of guidance when navigating, a 
reduction in inhibitory functioning may have caused participants to allocate attention to the 
external world in an attempt to pick-up perceptual variables. Therefore it is suggested that 
anxiety caused a decreased influence of the goal-directed system and poorer inhibitory 
functioning. This resulted in more attention being directed towards the prepotent source of 
navigational information. The analysis of visual scanning randomness provided further 
evidence for a reduction in the goal-directed attentional system.  
The analysis of scanning entropy data revealed that visual scanning became more 
random during the anxiety phase. Expressed alternatively, this essentially means that the 
location of the present dwell location, based upon the previous dwell location, became more 
uncertain. In IMC, visual scanning must be effectively controlled by the top-down 
attentional system in order to direct attention to the appropriate gauge at the appropriate time 
(Bellenkes et al., 1997). The entropy results therefore suggest that anxiety interfered with 
this top-down control. Results from the change score analyses further support this line of 
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reasoning. Specifically, it was found that the change in scanning entropy was positively 
correlated with changes in cognitive anxiety. This suggests that participants who 
experienced a greater increase in cognitive anxiety also had larger increases in visual 
scanning entropy. A positive relationship was also found between scanning entropy and 
performance error, which emphasises the importance of ordered scanning behavior in 
supporting performance for flights in IMC. The observed increase in scanning entropy 
dovetails well with predictions made by ACT, by giving strong evidence that anxiety can 
negatively influence the top-down control of attention. There are a number of possible 
explanations as to how top-down control may have been specifically influenced. 
 It has previously been proposed that the sequencing of dwells between the cockpit 
instruments may be based around either open-loop or closed-loop control mechanisms 
(Bellenkes et al., 1997; Brown et al., 2002; Ellis & Stark, 1986; Hameluck, 1990). Closed-
loop control suggests that the information gathered from the current dwell location drives 
the next dwell location. By comparison, open-loop control suggests that the next dwell 
location is independent of the information gathered, and is instead driven by the operator’s 
mental model. These two control mechanisms give rise to different explanation for how top-
down control may have been influenced. From the open-loop standpoint, it is possible that 
anxiety interfered with the operator’s mental model. ACT predicts that anxiety can cause a 
decrease in the ability to efficiently shift between multiple tasks, or operations within a task. 
This seems particularly relevant, as the aviation landing task requires the ability to shift 
attention between spatially separate instruments in order to control multiple axes of control. 
It is possible that decreased shifting ability caused interference in the mental model’s ability 
to manage multiple sub-tasks and direct attention accordingly. Alternatively, based on the 
closed-loop viewpoint, it is possible that anxiety interfered with the processing or combining 
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of information that was gathered at the current dwell location. This explanation relates with 
Endsley’s (1995) three-level model of situational awareness. 
Situational awareness is defined by Endsley (1995) as “the perception of the elements 
in the environment within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning 
and the projection of their future status” (p. 36). Briefly, Endsley (1995) describes three 
levels of situational awareness. The first level merely involves perceiving the current state 
of relevant elements in the environment. The second level involves an overall understanding 
and combining of significant individual elements based on current goals. The third level 
involves predicting the future state of the elements based on current and desired control 
inputs. Developing and maintaining situational awareness is resource intensive, with a 
considerable portion of working memory being required (Wickens, 2002). Anxiety has also 
been suggested to occupy working memory resources (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992). Therefore, 
it is possible that the working memory space required to maintain and develop level two 
situational awareness was compromised in the anxiety phase of the experiment. This change 
would then have resulted in more random allocation of attention in order to find level one 
elements, as individual elements could not be combined into an overall picture. For example, 
Dijk, Merwe & Zon (2011) found similar increases in scanning entropy after an instrument 
failure was introduced while performing a simulated flight task. This increase occurred 
alongside decreases in subjective situational awareness ratings. Future experiments should 
seek to determine whether it is the open-loop or closed-loop standpoint that offers a 
satisfactory explanation for the increase in scanning entropy and compromised top-down 
control.  
The scanning entropy results also lend credence to Ellis & Starks’ (1986) suggestion 
of using measures of scanning entropy as a passive and objective indicator of an operator’s 
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stress or anxiety levels. These findings are particularly novel as previous research has only 
examined changes in scanning entropy as a result of increased workload, such as secondary 
tasks (e.g., Tole et al., 1982; Schieber & Gilland, 2008). These studies have found that 
secondary workload tasks cause decreases in scanning entropy. For example, Schieber & 
Gilland (2008) asked young and older adults to drive on a real-world rural highway while 
performing various secondary tasks. They found that visual-spatial secondary tasks caused 
a greater decrease in visual entropy for older drivers than younger drivers. The present results 
suggest that anxiety will cause an opposite change in visual scanning entropy. Manipulations 
of both workload and anxiety could be employed in future in order to examine the specificity 
of visual scanning entropy.  
Practical Applications 
There are a number of possible practical applications that could stem from the current 
findings. Scanning entropy could be computed ‘online’, during the performance of various 
dynamic or supervisory control tasks. The present scanning entropy results suggest that this 
measurement could be used to detect an operator’s emotional state, or as a general marker 
of a divergence from an operator’s optimal state. Future studies should aim to examine the 
specificity of the entropy measure as a diagnostic tool. As stated previously, this could be 
achieved by manipulating both workload and anxiety. This online monitoring could be 
designed to be relatively passive, by employing gaze detection methodologies that can be 
placed in-cockpit, in-car, or on a system operator’s control panel. By incorporating the 
monitoring of the aforementioned variables within operator warning systems, it is possible 
that negative performance outcomes may be prevented before they occur. Changes in the 
sequencing of fixation patterns could be potentially more useful than other measures of 
stress, such as cardiac measures, as fixation patterns are more closely related to actual task 
130 
 
performance. For example, in the automotive domain, passive measures of steering entropy 
(see Nakayama, Futami, Nakamura & Boer, 1999) have been implicated and developed as a 
detection method for driver inattention, distraction or micro-sleeps (Paul, Boyle, Boer, 
Tippin & Rizzo, 2006). 
Limitations 
This study revealed a number of interesting findings on how anxiety may influence 
gaze behavior and performance. However, there are some limitations that should be 
addressed in future research. First, the participants were not experts. It is felt that the 
extensive training on the task partially compensates for this limitation, with performance 
being comparable to other instrument flight studies (c.f. Hasbrook & Rasmussen, 1971). It 
is therefore suggested that the results may at least generalise to individuals early in their 
training (e.g., student pilots). However, future studies should seek to validate whether these 
results generalise across different levels of expertise. Second, the training schedule 
progressed from VMC flights to IMC flights. It is possible that anxiety may have caused 
participants to revert back to a strategy developed during VMC flights, which could explain 
the increase in dwell time towards the outside world. Future studies could attempt to test this 
hypothesis by asking a group to train only in IMC.   
Summary 
The present study investigated the effects of anxiety on gaze behavior and performance 
in an aviation task. Anxiety was associated with a reduction in top-down attentional control 
which led to an increase in dwells towards the outside world and more random instrument 
scanning. The change in scanning randomness was related to both cognitive anxiety and 
performance change. These findings have immediate potential applications, as they suggest 
that it is possible to passively identify anxiety-induced changes to an operator’s mental state 
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during operational activity, via changes in visual scanning behavior. This could then be used 
in warning systems to potentially prevent unwanted performance outcomes before they 
occur.  
The proceeding experimental chapter aims to replicate and expand upon the findings 
of the current study. While interesting changes to gaze behaviour were found in the present 
study, as well as correlations between changes in entropy and performance, no overall 
performance effects were found. It is possible that task difficulty was low after the relatively 
extensive training. Use of a concurrent, cognitively demanding, task should increase task 
difficulty and therefore potentially elicit significant performance effects. Increasing 
cognitive demands is also interesting from a theoretical point of view, as ACT suggest that 
the effects of anxiety on attention should be exacerbated when spare cognitive resources are 
low. If this is the case, then entropy should be expected to be highest in high-anxiety, high-
cognitive load conditions. Also, it has been acknowledged that a potential limitation of the 
interpretation of the current study’s findings centres around the training regime. Specifically, 
the use of an alternating visual, to instrument, trial schedule during training may have meant 
that participants reverted back to a visual strategy in the pressure conditions. The proceeding 






Endnote 1 - Attentional control theory was originally developed to explain the effect of trait 
anxiety on performance and attention. It has however been readily applied to explain changes 
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Effects of Anxiety and Cognitive Load on Gaze Behavior in an Aviation 
Landing Task  
 
Cognitive anxiety and cognitive load have separately been shown to negatively impact 
the performance of complex visual-motor skills. Previous research has rarely examined the 
combined influence of both these factors on gaze behavior and performance. In the present 
study, participants performed an aviation instrument landing task in neutral and anxiety 
conditions, while performing a low or high cognitive load auditory n-back task. Both self-
reported cognitive anxiety and heart rate increased from neutral conditions indicating that 
anxiety was successfully manipulated. Response accuracy and reaction time for the auditory 
task indicated that cognitive load was also successfully manipulated. Cognitive load 
negatively impacted performance and the frequency of gaze transitions between areas of 
interest. Performance was maintained in anxious conditions, with a concomitant decrease in 
n-back reaction time suggesting that this was due to an increase in mental effort. Analyses 
of individual responses to the anxiety manipulation revealed that changes in cognitive 
anxiety from neutral to anxiety conditions were positively correlated with changes in the 
randomness of gaze behavior, but only when cognitive load was high. These results offer 
some support for an interactive effect of cognitive anxiety and cognitive load on attentional 




Being able to successfully perform complex visual-motor tasks in high-pressure, high-
workload situations is essential for success in many different domains, ranging from surgical 
medicine to aviation. Critical performance breakdowns in these situations can often have 
serious consequences for both the human operator and others. Cognitive anxiety has been 
identified as a negative and unpleasant psychological state that can occur during 
performance under high-pressure (Staal, 2004). It occurs when a current goal is perceived to 
be under threat (Cheng, Hardy, & Markland, 2009; Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 
2007), or when physical harm is perceived to be imminent (Stokes & Kite, 1997). Crucially, 
cognitive anxiety has been implicated as a key factor that can influence the performance of 
visual-motor skills (Janelle, 2002; Stokes & Kite, 1997). The cognitive demands when 
performing visual-motor tasks are also often high. For example, strategic choices often have 
to be made, or task related information must be manipulated. The present study aimed to 
investigate the effects of both cognitive anxiety and cognitive load on gaze behavior and 
performance while performing a complex, continuous, visual-motor task – specifically, 
landing a simulated aircraft in low visibility conditions. Attentional control theory (ACT; 
Eysenck et al., 2007) offers a comprehensive framework that accounts for how cognitive 
anxiety can influence performance through attentional changes.  
ACT postulates that anxiety leads to a disturbance in the balance between two 
attentional sub-systems: a goal-directed system and a stimulus-driven system (see Corbetta 
& Shulman, 2002). The goal-directed system directs attention based on current goals, task 
knowledge and predictions. In contrast, the stimulus driven system directs attention based 
on salient sensory events. The onset of cognitive anxiety is said to result in an increased 
prioritization of the stimulus-driven system over the goal-directed system, causing attention 
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to be directed away from goal-relevant information. ACT suggests that this overall 
imbalance is caused by anxiety-induced changes to the functioning of specific key working 
memory functions, namely: inhibition, shifting and updating. It is predicted that anxiety can 
compromise inhibitory control, causing attention to be more readily directed towards 
prepotent or task-irrelevant stimuli. Anxiety can also reduce the ability to shift attention 
efficiently between tasks, or within elements of an individual task. Finally, it is predicted 
that anxiety can impair the updating function, which will lead to a decreased ability to 
monitor, manipulate and store information in working memory.  
Importantly however, ACT suggests that anxiety can serve a motivational function, 
leading to an increase in on-task effort and liberation of processing resources which can 
actually maintain or increase performance. Therefore ACT makes an important distinction 
between performance effectiveness and processing efficiency, with anxiety being predicted 
to more readily affect the latter. Performance effectiveness is simply the observed 
performance, whereas processing efficiency is the ratio between the amount of effort or 
resources invested and the performance outcome. In sum, ACT predicts that anxiety can 
influence attentional control and potentially performance, through impairment of specific 
working memory functions, either individually or in combination.  
A number of studies have found supporting evidence for the predictions of ACT in 
complex visual-motor tasks by observing changes to gaze behavior (e.g., Behan & Wilson, 
2008; Causer, Holmes, Smith, & Williams, 2011; Nibbeling, Oudejans, & Daanen, 2012; 
Wilson, Vine, & Wood, 2009; Wilson, Wood, & Vine, 2009). Anxiety has been shown to 
increase the frequency of fixations on goal-irrelevant stimuli (Wilson, Wood, et al., 2009) 
and reduce the duration of ordinarily long target-focused fixations (Causer et al., 2011; 
Moore, Vine, Cooke, Ring, & Wilson, 2012; Wilson, Vine, et al., 2009). Allsop & Gray 
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(2014) investigated the effects of anxiety on attentional control in an aviation landing task. 
Participants first learnt how to perform an aviation landing task on a desktop flight simulator 
in simulated instrument meteorological conditions, which is where visibility is low and 
cockpit instruments provide guidance information. Participants acquired this skill by 
following a training protocol that progressed from high- to low-visibility meteorological 
conditions. Two landings were then performed in instrument meteorological conditions 
while wearing a head-mounted eye-tracker. An experimental group were subjected to a 
multidimensional anxiety manipulation before completing the second landing, whereas a 
control group continued unimpeded.  
Results showed that anxiety led to a higher proportion of eye-movement dwells 
towards the outside world and a lower proportion to cockpit instruments. Entropy, which is 
a measure of the randomness of scanning, also increased in anxiety conditions. Furthermore, 
change in anxiety from baseline to anxiety conditions positively correlated with both change 
in entropy and change in performance error. In line with ACT, these findings suggest that 
anxiety led to an increased influence of the stimulus-driven system, as attention was directed 
towards the task-irrelevant outside world and more randomly directed.  
One limitation of this study centers on the nature of the training protocol, specifically, 
the progression from low to high-visibility conditions. It is possible that the increased 
attention towards the outside world may have been a result of a reversion to a gaze strategy 
developed early in training, during high-visibility trials when the outside world was actually 
visible. Such a reversion is in-line with a reinvestment (c.f. Masters & Maxwell, 2008) 
account of the anxiety-performance relationship. Briefly, reinvestment theory suggests that 
anxiety can lead people to revert back to strategies and rules developed during the initial 
stages of learning. Therefore rather than attentional changes being explained by ACT, it is 
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possible that reinvestment theory may offer an alternative explanation of the findings. It is 
important from a theoretical perspective to attempt to rule out this possibility in order to 
determine which account offers the most parsimonious explanation. Nevertheless, Vine, 
Uiga, Lavric, Moore, Tsaneva-Atanasova & Wilson (2014) obtained analogous findings 
when investigated the effects of stress using expert, commercial pilots’ gaze behavior. 
In Vine and colleagues’ (2014) study, gaze behavior and performance of commercial 
pilots was measured while undertaking a periodic proficiency exam. Pilots were asked to 
perform a normal start-up and take off in a commercial-grade flight simulator. However, an 
engine fire was initiated the moment the aircraft gained a positive vertical velocity. They 
were then required to respond appropriately to the fire and land the aircraft. Participants were 
asked to evaluate the demands of the task and their coping capabilities before commencing 
the exam. The results showed that evaluating the exam as more threatening, which consists 
of high task demand and low coping evaluations, was associated with higher search rate and 
more fixations on unimportant regions of the cockpit. In accordance with Allsop & Gray 
(2014), it was shown that such evaluations were also associated with increased entropy, and 
decreased performance as evaluated by a flight instructor, although both effects were 
marginally significant (p = .06). The present study aims to extend the research that has 
investigated ACT in complex visual-motor tasks by examining the effects of both cognitive 
load and anxiety on gaze behavior and performance.  
Like other interference theories of anxiety (e.g., Sarason, 1984), attentional control 
theory is built around the assumption that anxiety consumes the limited resources of working 
memory. The effects of anxiety on attentional control and performance can then potentially 
be exacerbated when currently utilised resources converge on working memory limits 
(Berggren & Derakshan, 2013). Studies attempting to examine the interaction between 
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working memory resources and anxiety on attentional control can roughly be grouped into 
two categories: those investigating dispositional differences in working memory capacity, 
and those experimentally manipulating working memory load.  
The former set of studies have largely supported the predictions made by ACT, 
showing that deficits in working memory capacity can exacerbate the effects of anxiety on 
performance and attentional control in simple laboratory tasks (e.g Edwards, Moore, 
Champion, & Edwards, 2014; Johnson & Gronlund, 2009; Owens, Stevenson, Hadwin, & 
Norgate, 2014). For example, Johnson & Gronlund (2009) investigated the influence of 
working memory capacity on the relationship between trait anxiety and cognitive 
performance. A dual-task paradigm was employed where participants were asked to perform 
a short term memory task at the same as an auditory discrimination task. The results showed 
an interactive effect of trait anxiety and working memory capacity on auditory 
discrimination accuracy. Specifically, stronger negative relationships between trait anxiety 
and accuracy were found for low or average working memory capacity, in comparison to 
high working memory capacity individuals.  
Similar results were found by Edwards et al. (2015), who replicated and extended the 
study by examining the role of experimentally manipulated state anxiety. The results showed 
that working memory capacity, trait anxiety and state anxiety interacted to predict shifting 
efficiency (i.e., frequency of correct discrimination responses divided by the mean response 
time for correct trials). Summarily, trait anxiety predicted efficiency in such a manner that 
efficiency was lowest when state and trait anxiety was high, and where working memory 
capacity was low (see Wright, Dobson and Sears, 2014 for similar results in relation to the 
inhibition function). Taken together, these experiments suggest that anxiety more readily 
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affects attentional control and cognitive performance for individuals with low working 
memory capacity. Other studies have directly manipulated demands on working memory.  
Increasing cognitive load on working memory resources has been shown to affect 
attentional control both generally (e.g., Unsworth, Schrock, & Engle, 2004), and also 
compound the effects of anxiety (e.g., Berggren, Richards, Taylor, & Derakshan, 2013; Qi 
et al., 2014) in simple laboratory-based tasks. Berggren and colleagues (2013) investigated 
the combined effects of trait anxiety and experimentally manipulated cognitive load on 
inhibitory functioning using an antisaccade task. Cognitive load was manipulated by varying 
the complexity of an auditory tone recognition task. Results showed that individuals with 
high trait anxiety scores had slower saccade latencies during antisaccade trials, which is 
where gaze must be directed away from visual stimuli presented on a screen. Importantly, 
this effect was magnified when the tone recognition task was more cognitively demanding. 
Kinrade, Jackson, & Ashford (2010) examined the influence of anxiety and task complexity 
on various cognitive and motor tasks. They found, for example, that error-rates for modular 
arithmetic problems that placed greater demands on working memory (i.e., high complexity), 
were detrimentally affected by anxiety to a greater extent than less demanding problems.  
A limited number of studies have examined the effects of working memory demands 
on performance and gaze behavior in more complex visual-motor tasks (e.g., Nibbeling et 
al., 2012; Williams, Vickers, & Rodrigues, 2002). Findings from these studies are less 
homogenous than simple laboratory tasks. For example, Nibbeling et al. (2012) asked expert 
and novice darts players to perform a dart throwing task while both anxiety and cognitive 
load was manipulated. Cognitive load was manipulated by asking participants to either 
simply perform the darts task solitarily, or whilst counting backwards in steps of three from 
a large random number. Anxiety only negatively affected the dart performance of novices, 
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and this performance decrement was accompanied by a shorter goal-directed fixation on the 
target before movement initiation. Cognitive load led to longer dart times, however there 
was little evidence for any main or interactive effects on gaze behavior. Using a similar 
design with a table tennis task, Williams et al (2002) did find evidence of an interaction 
between cognitive load and anxiety. Specifically, in the high working memory condition 
(which involved a more complex shot pattern), anxiety produced a greater reduction in 
performance efficiency and led to a changes in gaze behavior that were not observed in the 
low working memory condition (players spent more time tracking the ball).  
The primary aim of the present study was to further examine the combined effects of 
anxiety and cognitive load on gaze behavior and performance during a complex, continuous 
visual-motor task. A secondary aim was to replicate the findings of Allsop and Gray (2014) 
whilst also ameliorating the aforementioned concerns regarding the training protocol. 
Participants therefore learnt an aviation landing task in instrument meteorological conditions 
where visibility was always low. If results were similar across both experiments then the 
lack of high-visibility trials early in learning mean that reinvestment explanations can be 
rebutted. After training, participants then completed landings whilst performing a secondary 
auditory task (the n-back task) in both neutral and anxiety conditions. There were two 
difficulty levels for this task. According to ACT, the influence of anxiety on attentional 
control and performance should be exacerbated when the demands on working memory are 
high. The study was therefore designed to test the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: In anxiety conditions there would be significantly greater dwell time on 
the outside world. The rationale here was that anxiety leads to a reduction in inhibitory 
functioning, leading to an increased likelihood of attention being directed towards prepotent 
responses. Therefore as the outside world is ordinarily the preponent source of navigational 
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information, anxiety conditions should result in more attention being directed towards this 
area of the visual scene even when it actual contains no task-relevant information. 
Hypothesis 2: It was expected that there be an interaction between anxiety and 
cognitive load for dwell time on the outside world such that there would be a larger increase 
(from baseline to anxiety) when cognitive load was high than low. This prediction was based 
on the ACT prediction that anxiety-induced impairments in inhibitory functioning will be 
exacerbated when working memory is taxed.  Hypothesis 3: In anxiety conditions there 
would be significant increase in scanning entropy as a result of less effective goal-directed 
attentional control and reduced ability to efficiently shift attention. 
Hypothesis 4: It was expected that would be an interaction between anxiety and 
cognitive load for entropy such that this increase would be larger when cognitive load was 
high than when cognitive load was low. This prediction was based on the ACT proposal that 
attentional shifting will be impaired to a greater extent when both anxiety and demands on 
working memory are high.  
Hypothesis 5: As individuals can react differently in anxious situations it was expected 
that there would be a positive relationship between the change in cognitive anxiety and 
change in entropy from neutral conditions to anxiety conditions (as was found in Allsop & 
Gray, 2014). Furthermore, a stronger relationship between these variables was excepted 






 X-Plane version 10 (Laminar Research) was used to simulate all landings. The 
simulated aircraft was a Cirrus Vision SPF50 with both the landing gear and flaps extended. 
Participants controlled the roll and pitch axes of the aircraft by using a Thrustmaster HOTAS 
Warthog joystick (Guillemot, Montreal, Canada) with their right hand (see Figure 5.1).  
 
 
Auto throttles maintained indicated airspeed at 51.4 m s-1 (100 knots). Flight data was 
recorded at a rate of 52 Hz. A back-projection system (Christie Mirage S+3K DLP; 101 Hz) 
rendered the external world onto a large screen (2.20 x 1.92 m; 1400 x 1050 pixels). The 
simulator was edited to display the external scene on the upper half of this screen (0.96 m), 
with the lower half showing a black, blank screen. The simulator was also edited to display 
an instrument panel consisting of five electromechanical style instruments on a ‘heads-
down’ TFT monitor (45 x 25 cm; 1600 x 1900 pixels). The five instruments were: attitude 
indicator (AI), altimeter (Alt), instrument landing system course deviation indicator (ILS), 
heading indicator (Hdg) and vertical speed indicator (VSI). The viewing distance for the 
projection screen and heads-down monitor were 1.8 and 1.0 m, respectively. A remote video-
based eyetracking (faceLAB; SeeingMachines) system was used to record eye movements 
(precision < 1.0°) at a rate of 60 Hz. A pair of headphones (Beyerdynamic DT770 Pro) were 
used to deliver the cognitive load task. To respond to the cognitive load task, participants 




Figure 5.1. Photograph of the experimental setup showing the heads-down instrument panel, 
back-projection screen, control devices and eye-tracking cameras 
 
Task  
 The landing task began with the aircraft positioned 11.11 km (6 nautical miles) away 
from the runway. The objective of the task was to land the aircraft by accurately following 
an ideal approach path to the runway. The ideal path is comprised of both vertical and lateral 
components. The vertical component, termed the glide slope, is a 3º plane extending upwards 
from the end of the runway. The lateral component is simply an extension of the runway 




orientated (heading, roll and pitch) for the ideal approach. Every trial was performed in low 
visibility, instrument meteorological conditions (IMC), where visibility was set to 1.2 km. 
Participants therefore needed to use cockpit instruments in order to follow this ideal path. 
Wind speed was set to 10.3 m s-1 (20 knots) for all trials, however, the direction was varied 
based on the experimental phase, as further detailed below. Numerical and visual 
performance feedback was provided by a custom-made program upon completion of each 
trial. Numerical feedback consisted of the separate performance errors (see measures 
section) from the ideal vertical and lateral paths. Visual feedback consisted of a graphical 
representation of the ideal vertical and lateral paths compared against the participants’ actual 
paths.  
Participants  
 Sixteen participants (11 Male, 5 Female; mean age = 26.6, SD = 3.8) completed the 
study. All participants were right handed, reported normal or corrected vision and had no 
previous experience of real or simulated fixed-wing flight. Participants were remunerated in 
return for their participation at a rate of 8 euros per hour. Ethical approval was granted by 
The University of Birmingham Ethics committee and informed consent was gained from all.  
Measures  
Performance 
Flight performance was operationalised using a vertical deviation metric used in 
previous studies (Allsop & Gray, 2014; Gibb, Schvaneveldt, & Gray, 2008; Gray, Geri, 
Akhtar, & Covas, 2008). Specifically, the root mean square error (RMSE) of the vertical 
deviations from the ideal 3° glideslope was calculated. This RMSE was derived directly 
from data displayed on the ILS instrument, with the unit of measurement therefore being in 
dots. In X-Plane, one glideslope dot represents a 0.28° error. The custom feedback program 
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automatically calculated and displayed lateral error in an identical manner, with one lateral 
dot equalling a 1.5° error; this was displayed along with the vertical error data at the end of 
each flight. 
Cognitive Anxiety 
Cognitive state anxiety was measured using the Competitive State Anxiety Inventory 
2-revised (Cox, Martens, & Russell, 2003), which has two subscales that provide typical 
thoughts and feelings associated with cognitive (5 items) and somatic anxiety (7 items). Only 
the cognitive anxiety subscale was used in the present research. An example item from this 
subscale is “I’m concerned about performing poorly”. Participants are then asked to rate, on 
a four point scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 4 (very much so), whether the item is 
indicative of their thoughts and feeling. In accordance with Cox et al. (2013) the overall 
cognitive anxiety score was obtained by multiplying the averaged item response by ten. 
Cognitive anxiety was measured after each flight in the experimental phase.  
Heart Rate 
 Heart rate was measured using a chest-strap heart rate monitor (Garmin Model 
HRM1G) to provide confirmatory physiological evidence of the effectiveness of the anxiety 
manipulation. The chest strap was positioned on the lower-mid thorax and it wirelessly 
transmitted heart rate data to a laptop. Data was recorded during each experimental trial at a 
rate of 1 Hz, with an average then being calculated for the trial.  
Gaze Behavior 
Raw horizontal and vertical screen coordinates on both the external world and 
instrument panel were stored in data files provided by the eye-tracker recording software 
(Facelab, Version 5; Seeing Machines). A custom-made Python script converted these 
coordinates into fixations using a dispersion threshold identification algorithm (c.f. Salvucci 
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& Goldberg, 2000). The minimum fixation threshold was set to 150 ms in accordance with 
previous similar research (Huemer et al., 2005). Fixations were assigned to six areas of 
interest (AOIs) based on the AOI screen coordinates and were confirmed manually. These 
AOIs were: external view, attitude indicator, altimeter, instrument landing course deviation 
indicator, heading indicator and vertical speed indicator. Fixation data was converted into 
dwells to provide dwell frequencies and durations. In order to examine general changes in 
attentional allocation, the various instrument panel AOIs were combined into one single 
instrument panel AOI. Percentage dwell times on this AOI and the external world AOI were 
used as dependent measures.  
Scanning entropy, which indicates the randomness of scanning behavior, was 
calculated using Stark and Ellis’ (1986) methodology in an identical manner to Allsop & 
Gray (2014). Higher values on this metric indicate more random scanning behavior, whereas 
lower values indicate more predictable scanning behavior. 
Procedure 
 Each participant visited the lab on two occasions separated by a maximum of one 
week, with each session lasting approximately two hours. The experiment was split into an 
acquisition phase which was then followed by an experimental phase. The acquisition phase 
developed the participants’ ability to perform the landing task. In the experimental phase, 
both cognitive anxiety and cognitive load were manipulated. 
Acquisition phase 
Participants completed a total of 22 acquisition trials, with 13 trials being completed 
in the first session and 9 in the second. In order to ensure that participants used the cockpit 
instruments, rather than adopting a similar movement strategy for each trial, the simulated 
wind was randomly set for the first 19 acquisition trials. Specifically, the wind direction was 
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randomly chosen from one of 4 angles: 20º, 160º, 200º and 340º; where 0º represents a direct 
headwind. For the final three acquisition trials, wind was set to 160º. 
At the start of the first session, after providing informed consent, the participants were 
seated in the simulator and an eye-tracker calibration was performed. This was merely to 
check for any participant-based gaze tracking issues. After confirming that there were no 
tracking issues, participants were given an information sheet that provided details and 
pictorial representations of the flight task and the cockpit instruments. The experimenter then 
verbally explained the task and the cockpit instruments, as well as providing a recommended 
order for fixating on the instruments. This order was based on recommendations by a 
certified flight instructor to aid motivation and acquisition of the task. The recommended 
order was as follows: ILS to AI, AI to HDG, HDG to VSI and VSI to ILS. Participants then 
watched a demonstration of the flight task by the experimenter. Following this, participants 
completed a 5 minute free-flight to acclimatise to the simulator, controls and cockpit 
instruments. Next, the participant began the actual acquisition trials. Due to the initial 
difficulty of the task, the experimenter supplemented the output from the feedback program 
with verbal feedback upon completion of each of the first three trials. At the start of the 
second session, the eye-tracker was calibrated and the heart rate monitor was positioned and 
checked. Eye-tracker calibration was checked before each trial throughout the second 
session. The participant then completed the remaining 9 acquisition trials.  
Experimental phase 
 In the experimental phase, both cognitive anxiety and cognitive workload was 
manipulated in a 2 cognitive load (Low, High) x 2 anxiety condition (Netural, Anxiety) 
within-subjects design (for further details, see the cognitive load and anxiety manipulation 
sections below). Therefore all participants performed a total of four trials in this phase. The 
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order of these trials was counterbalanced across participants, with half of the participants 
completing the anxiety trials first and half completing the neutral trials first. The ordering of 
cognitive load conditions was also counterbalanced across participants, the ordering was the 
same in neutral and anxiety conditions. Wind direction was set to 160º for all trials.   
At the start of this phase participants were informed that for the remaining trials they 
would be required to perform an auditory task at the same time as performing the landing 
task. It was emphasised that both tasks were of equal importance. Participants were then 
given four approximately one minute practice attempts on the cognitive load task (one low-
load attempt and three high-load attempts) without performing the flying task to acclimatise 
(these were not recorded). Once completed, the participant moved onto the experimental 
trials. The data recording for the cognitive load task, flight performance, heart rate and gaze 
behavior commenced at the start of each trial. This data was saved upon trial completion and 
cognitive anxiety was measured. Participants were debriefed upon completion of all the 
experimental trials. 
Cognitive load manipulation 
 An auditory n-back task (Kirchner, 1958) was used to manipulate cognitive load. 
This task consisted of a series of auditory stimuli that were sequentially played at an 
interstimulus interval of two seconds (Kane, Conway, Miura, & Colflesh, 2007). For each 
stimulus, the participant was instructed to respond as quickly and accurately as possible if it 
was a target. In the low cognitive load condition, n was set to 0. This means that participants 
simply listened for one specific, pre-disclosed, target stimulus. Participants were instructed 
on the target stimulus beforehand. In the high cognitive load condition, n was set to 2. In this 
condition, a stimulus is a target only when it is the same as two stimuli before. The auditory 
stimuli consisted of a pool of 14 consonants. Across both conditions, 25% of stimuli were 
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targets. Reaction time and percentage accuracy were measured. Incorrect responses were 
excluded from reaction time analyses as were responses of less than 300ms (no responses 
fell below this duration threshold).  
Anxiety manipulation 
 Anxiety was manipulated using a combination of monetary incentives and ego-
threatening instructions. A nearly identical manipulation was employed by Allsop and Gray 
(2014) and similar manipulations have previously been shown to successfully increase 
anxiety in a variety of other experiments (e.g., Cooke, Kavussanu, Mcintyre, Boardley, & 
Ring, 2011; Williams et al., 2002). For neutral, low-anxiety trials the instruction to 
participants was simply to “perform the best they can”. For high-anxiety trials, the 
manipulation consisted of three main steps. Firstly, immediately before commencing the 
high anxiety trials, participants were informed that they were now entering a phase of the 
experiment where they could win 50 euros based on the combined performance over the next 
two trials. Specifically, participants were told that they would be ranked against everyone 
else taking part, and that the person with the best performance, which is the lowest RMSE, 
would be rewarded. A leaderboard sign was then revealed and participants were told that the 
complete leaderboard would be e-mailed to participants at the end of the study. Secondly, a 
video camera (Sony DCR-TRV890E) was overtly set-up and mounted on a tripod behind 
the participant. Participants were informed that both trials would be recorded and potentially 
used in upcoming conference presentations and lectures based on whether their performance 
was significantly below average. 
Participants were also told that they would be flying in an online virtual environment 
called the Virtual Air Traffic Simulation Network, the experimenter loaded a custom-made 
program that allowed a mock log-in and connection to be made. Care was taken to ensure 
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this deception was not suspected. Specifically, upon entering the log-in details, the program 
displaying a command-line interface diagnosing and establishing the connection. Then the 
program opened a world-mapping program (Marble, Version 1.6) which was edited to show 
a top-down view of the airport and surrounding area. The area was populated with a number 
of aircraft and extended trail history indicators. Participants were debriefed on the true nature 
of the experiment upon completion of all trials.  
Statistical Analyses 
 Glideslope RMSE, cognitive anxiety, heart rate, n-back percentage correct, n-back 
reaction time, transition frequency and scanning entropy were analysed using separate 2 
anxiety condition (neutral conditions, anxiety conditions) x 2 cognitive load (low cognitive 
load, high cognitive load) repeated measures ANOVAs. To examine whether anxiety and 
cognitive load affected attentional allocation, percentage dwell time data was submitted to a 
2 anxiety condition (neutral, anxiety) x 2 cognitive load (low, high) x 2 AOI (external, 
instruments) repeated measures ANOVA. Significant effects were analysed using Tukey’s 
HSD post hoc procedures (p < .05).  
In accordance with hypothesis five and previous research (Gray, Allsop, & Williams, 
2013; Vytal, Cornwell, Arkin, & Grillon, 2012), analyses were performed in order to 
examine whether an individual’s response to the anxiety manipulation may be related to 
scanning entropy, and also whether cognitive load may moderate this relationship. Similar 
to the within-subject mediation and moderation procedure outlined by Judd, Kenny, & 
McClelland (2001) difference scores between neutral conditions and anxiety conditions for 
both low- and high cognitive load conditions, were created for the cognitive anxiety, entropy 
and performance variables. Three linear regressions were then performed.  
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Firstly, the simple overall relationship between change in entropy and anxiety, 
independent of any potential moderation effects, was investigated by collapsing the high and 
low cognitive load data. Change in entropy was then regressed onto change in cognitive 
anxiety. To investigate whether cognitive load may moderate any relationship between 
change in cognitive anxiety and change in entropy, two separate linear regressions were 
performed for data from the low and high cognitive load conditions. Raghunathan, 
Rosenthal, & Rubin's (1996) modification of the (Pearson & Filon, 1898) statistic was then 
used to formally compare whether there was a difference in the relationship between change 
in cognitive anxiety and change in entropy based on cognitive load. A final individual 
response analysis was performed to investigate the relationship between entropy and 
performance in an identical manner to Allsop & Gray (2014). Specifically, the correlation 
between change in entropy and change in performance was examined. 
Results 
Performance 
 The analysis of glideslope RMSE data (See table 5.1) revealed a non-significant main 
effect for anxiety condition, F(1,15) = 0.16, p = .90, ηp
2= .001, a significant main effect for 
cognitive load, F(1,15) = 4.62, p = .048, ηp
2= .24, and a non-significant Anxiety condition x 
Cognitive load interaction, F(1,15) = .15, p = .70, ηp
2= .01. Examination of the main effect 
for cognitive load showed that performance deteriorated in high cognitive load conditions. 
In sum, performance was maintained in anxious conditions, but deteriorated when cognitive 






 Mean cognitive anxiety data is displayed in figure 5.2. The analysis revealed a 
significant main effect for anxiety condition, F(1,15) = 10.19, p = .006, ηp
2= .41, a significant 
main effect for cognitive load, F(1,15) = 6.62, p = .02, ηp
2= .31, and a non-significant 
interaction between Anxiety condition and Cognitive load, F(1,15) = 1.62, p = .22, ηp
2= .10. 
Examination of the main effects revealed that anxiety was higher in the anxiety condition 
relative to the neutral condition and higher in the high cognitive load condition relative to 
the low load condition.  
 
Figure 5.2. Mean cognitive anxiety (left panel) and heart rate (right panel) plotted as a 
function of cognitive load in neutral (dashed line) and anxiety (solid line) conditions. Error 
bars represent standard errors of the mean.  
 
Heart Rate 
Heart rate data is displayed in figure 5.2. The analysis on this data revealed a 
significant main effect for anxiety condition, F(1,15) = 18.07, p = .001, ηp
2= .55, a non-
significant main effect for cognitive load, F(1,15) = .36, p = .56, ηp












































significant interaction between Anxiety condition and cognitive load, F(1,15) = .26, p = .62, 
ηp
2= .02. Heart rate was higher in the anxiety conditions.  
N-back task 
Data from two low workload trials were lost due to a computer error at the end of the 
trial (1 neutral, 1 anxiety trial). Listwise deletion removed these participants from the 
analyses, the pattern of results remains unchanged when using mean substitution. 
 
Figure 5.3. Mean n-back percent correct (left panel) and reaction time (right panel) plotted 
as a function of cognitive load in neutral (dashed line) and anxiety (solid line) conditions. 
Error bars represent standard errors of the mean.  
 
Percentage Correct 
Percentage correct data is displayed in figure 5.3. The analysis revealed a non-
significant main effect for anxiety condition, F(1,13) = .13, p = .73, ηp
2= .01, a significant 
main effect for cognitive load, F(1,13) = 49.59, p < .001, ηp
2= .79, and a non-significant 
interaction between Anxiety condition and Cognitive load, F(1,13) = .001, p = .98, ηp
2= .00. 























































Reaction Time  
Reaction time data is displayed in figure 5.3. The ANOVA conducted on this data 
revealed a significant main effect for anxiety condition, F(1,13) = 7.64, p = .016, ηp
2= .37, a 
non-significant main effect for cognitive load, F(1,13) = 1.52, p = .24, ηp
2= .1, and a non-
significant interaction between anxiety condition and cognitive load, F(1,13) = .35, p = .56, 
ηp
2= .03. Examination of the main effect for anxiety showed that reaction time was shorter 
in anxiety conditions. 
Table 5.1. Mean (SD) Glideslope RMSE, Transition Frequency and Scanning Entropy in 
neutral and anxiety conditions and low and high cognitive load conditions 
 
 Neutral Conditions 










Glideslope RMSE (dots) 0.46 (0.27) 0.53 (0.35)  0.44 (0.23) 0.53 (0.26) 
Transition frequency 187.81 (27.45) 169.63 (36.53)  188.88 (33.68) 166.50 (34.59) 
Scanning entropy 1.38 (0.18) 1.41 (0.18) 
 
1.44 (0.20) 1.40 (0.19) 
 
Gaze Behavior  
Percentage Dwell Time 
Figure 5.4 shows the mean percentage dwell time data. The analysis revealed a 
marginally significant interaction between anxiety condition and AOI, F(1,15) = 4.15, p = 
.06, ηp
2= .22,and a non-significant interaction between cognitive load and AOI, F(1,15) = 
1.35, p = .26, ηp
2= .08. The marginally significant interaction between anxiety conditions and 
AOI was explored by examination of the mean data. This data shows a tendency for 
percentage dwell time on the outside world to be higher, and percentage dwell time on the 
instruments to be lower, in the anxiety conditions when compared to the neutral conditions. 
159 
 
The Anxiety condition x Cognitive load x AOI interaction was non-significant, F(1,15) = 
.236, p = .63, ηp
2= .02, suggesting that the tendency to look towards the outside world in 
anxiety conditions was not exacerbated by high cognitive load.  
 
 
Figure 5.4. Mean percentage dwell time on the external world and the generalised 
instrument panel AOIs, in the neutral conditions (Panel A) and anxiety conditions (Panel 
B) in low cognitive load and high cognitive load conditions. Error bars represent standard 








































































Table 5.1 shows the transition frequency data. The ANOVA conducted on this data 
revealed a non-significant main effect for anxiety condition, F(1,15) =.05, p = .82, ηp
2= .003, 
a significant main effect for cognitive load, F(1,15) = 22.78, p <.001, ηp
2= .60, and a non-
significant interaction between anxiety condition and cognitive load, F(1,15) = .41, p = .53, 
ηp
2= .03. Less transitions between areas of interest were made in high cognitive load 
conditions in comparison to low cognitive load conditions.  
Scanning Entropy 
Mean scanning entropy data is displayed in table 5.1. The ANOVA conducted on this 
data revealed a non-significant main effect for anxiety condition, F(1,15) = .30, p = .59, ηp
2= 
.02, a non-significant main effect for cognitive load, F(1,15) =.23, p = .88, ηp
2= .002, and a 
non-significant Anxiety condition x Cognitive load interaction, F(1,15) = 2.27, p = .15, ηp
2= 
.13. Somewhat surprisingly, the experimental manipulations had no significant effects on 
scanning entropy.  
Individual Responses to Anxiety Manipulation 
For the sake of brevity, change in cognitive anxiety, change in entropy and change in 
performance will be referred to as cognitive anxiety, entropy and performance 
respectively, for the remainder of this section. When data was collapsed across cognitive 
load, cognitive anxiety was a marginally significant predictor of entropy, b = .009, 95% 
CI [-.001, .19], t = 1.867, p = .07, explaining 10% of the variance in entropy scores. The role 
of cognitive load was then examined (see figure 5.5). For low cognitive load conditions, 
cognitive anxiety did not significantly predict entropy, b = .002, 95% CI [-.013, .17], t = 
0.23, p = .82 and did not explain a significant proportion of the variance in entropy scores, 
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R2 = .004. However, when cognitive load was high, cognitive anxiety was a significant 
predictor of entropy, b = .015, 95% CI [.001, .03], t = 2.32, p = .036, explaining 28% of 
the variance. There was also a significant difference between the correlation coefficients, z 
= 1.72, p = .028. This suggests that cognitive load appears to have moderated the relationship 
between cognitive anxiety and entropy, with the positive relationship being stronger when 
cognitive load was high, than when cognitive load was low. The final analysis revealed that 
there was no relationship between entropy and performance, either when collapsed across 
cognitive load or when analysed separately (all p’ > .1).  
 
 
Figure 5.5. Regression lines of the relationship between cognitive anxiety and entropy in 
high (solid line) and low cognitive load (dashed line) conditions. Entropy refers to the 
difference between neutral and anxiety conditions (higher scores indicate an increase in 
entropy). Similarly, cognitive anxiety refers to the difference between neutral and anxiety 
condition scores. 
  

























The present studied aimed to investigate the combined effects of anxiety and cognitive 
load on gaze behavior and performance in a complex, continuous visual-motor task. Anxiety 
was manipulated using a combination of ego-threatening instructions and monetary 
incentives. Self-reported cognitive anxiety scores supported the effectiveness of the 
manipulation, with average cognitive anxiety increasing across anxiety conditions. This 
offers supportive evidence for the use of such manipulations when aiming to investigate the 
effects of anxiety. Participants also had more concerns and became more doubtful of their 
ability to perform in high cognitive load conditions, as evidenced by an increase in cognitive 
anxiety. Previous research has commonly either measured anxiety on one occasion, rather 
than for every combination of conditions (e.g., Williams et al., 2002), or calculated an 
average for just each anxiety condition (e.g., Berggren, Hutton, & Derakshan, 2011). 
Nibbeling et al., (2012) did however measure anxiety in all anxiety and cognitive load 
conditions and found similar results. In conjunction with the present study, this suggests an 
additive effect of cognitive load and anxiety manipulations on cognitive anxiety.  
The anxiety manipulation was also validated by a significant increase in heart rate, 
abating concerns associated with self-report measures. An 8.5 bpm average increase in heart 
rate was found, which is a comparable (e.g., Cooke et al., 2011) or slightly larger increase 
than other studies employing similar anxiety manipulations (e.g., Moore et al., 2012). These 
overall average anxiety responses do however mask individual differences in response to the 
anxiety manipulation. The present study accounted for this by performing additional 
analyses at an individual level. Future studies could seek to adjust the manipulations in order 
to produce more uniform increases in anxiety. Taking into account dispositional, trait 
anxiety, may also be beneficial. 
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Cognitive load was successfully manipulated by the auditory n-back task with high 
cognitive load trials having lower percentage accuracy scores than low cognitive load trials. 
Importantly, reaction time remained consistent across cognitive load conditions, suggesting 
that the decrease in percentage accuracy resulted from the increased demands of the 2-back 
condition rather than a speed-accuracy tradeoff. Interestingly however, anxiety conditions 
were accompanied by a decrease in reaction time, while accuracy was maintained. There are 
a number of likely explanations for this finding. The most parsimonious explanation is that 
anxiety may have served a motivational function, leading to a liberation of processing 
resources and more on-task effort. This increase in effort may therefore have meant that 
participants were better able to expediently respond to the n-back task. A number of previous 
studies support this line of reasoning, with self-reported effort consistently accompanying 
anxiety (Cooke et al., 2011; Wilson, Smith, & Holmes, 2007). The present study offers 
behavioral evidence for an increase in effort. Alternatively, it is possible that participants 
may have employed a strategy which aimed to expedite responses in an attempt to prioritise 
the flight task, at the expense of the n-back task. This seems less likely as accuracy would 
be expected to suffer as result, which wasn’t the case.  
According to ACT, anxiety leads to a disruption in the balance between a stimulus-
driven attentional system and a goal-directed system, with the former taking precedence over 
the latter. The results of the present study lend some support to this prediction. Specifically, 
anxiety was accompanied by an increase in the percentage dwell time directed towards the 
outside world and a corresponding decrease on the cockpit instruments. Although this result 
was only marginally significant (p = .06), the finding is broadly in-line with the results of 
Allsop & Gray (2014). It is probable that statistical significance may have not been reached 
due to the relatively small sample size of the current study. Importantly, in the present study 
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this result cannot be explained by reinvestment theory as participants learnt how to perform 
the flight task in instrument meteorological conditions from the very start of training. 
Therefore they could not be reverting to gaze strategies developed early in learning, as 
simulated visibility conditions were consistent throughout the experiment. Across both 
studies, anxiety seems to have led people to look towards the outside world, even though 
this view provides no task relevant information.  
No evidence was found for a larger increase in dwell time towards the outside world 
when both anxiety and cognitive load was high (i.e., an interaction between anxiety and 
cognitive load). It is somewhat difficult to interpret this finding. In previous research it has 
been shown that increased cognitive load can result in longer dwell times on the instruments 
and decreased dwell time on the external environment in novice pilots (Tole et al, 1992). In 
the present study, the same pattern of results was obtained (see Figure 3), however, the effect 
of cognitive load on attentional allocation was not significant. Given the findings of previous 
research, it is possible that the effects of anxiety and cognitive load worked to cancel other 
out. In other words, increased cognitive load acted to maintain or restrict gaze behavior to 
current cues (e.g., Tole et al., 1992), whereas anxiety seems to increase allocation towards 
task irrelevant stimuli. Future studies should aim to test the original hypothesis with larger 
samples to ensure sufficient power if an underlying effect is present. 
The hypothesized increase in scanning entropy during anxiety trials was surprisingly 
not supported. Instead, scanning entropy remained consistent across all conditions. 
However, a different picture emerged when the hypothesised individual differences in 
response to the anxiety manipulation were taken into account. Specifically, when collapsing 
across cognitive load, a marginally significant positive relationship was found between 
change in entropy and change in cognitive anxiety scores, from neutral to anxiety conditions. 
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A supplementary median-split analysis approach is presented in Appendix A. This 
alternative approach shows with greater clarity that an individual’s response to the anxiety 
manipulation was most likely responsible for the null effect. While unexpected, this result 
dovetails with Vine and colleagues’ (2014) study which showed that an individual’s reaction 
to a stressful event significantly predicted entropy. Taken together, these results suggest that 
increased entropy reflects an anxiety-induced decrease in attentional control as predicted by 
ACT. The hypothesized influence of cognitive load on this relationship was partially 
supported.  
The predicted interaction between cognitive load and anxiety conditions on entropy 
was not supported. However, this was most likely again due to the individual differences in 
response to the anxiety manipulation. In support of this assertion, cognitive load was found 
to moderate the relationship between an individuals’ response to the anxiety manipulation 
and their change in entropy. Specifically, a positive relationship between change in cognitive 
anxiety and change in entropy was only found for high cognitive load conditions. Whereas 
no relationship was found when cognitive load was low. This finding offers some support 
for the predictions of ACT and previous studies showing interactive effects of cognitive 
anxiety and cognitive load on attentional control in simple tasks (e.g., Berggren et al., 2013; 
Qi et al., 2014). It also tentatively suggests that performing tasks in both cognitively 
demanding and anxiety-laden situations has the potential to lead to more random gaze 
behavior.  
Alternative theoretical accounts should be considered when interpreting the results of 
the present study. Lavie’s (Lavie & Tsal, 1994; Lavie, 1995, Lavie, 2010) perceptual load 
theory aims to isolate the circumstances in which irrelevant stimuli will capture attention. 
Summarily, the theory suggests that perceptual processes have a limited capacity, these 
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processes are said to proceed until spare capacity is exhausted (Murphy, Groeger & Greene, 
2016). For instance, a task that is high in perceptual load may mean that that capacity limits 
are reached and distractors cannot be processed. On the other hand, when perceptual load is 
low, spare capacity is available to process both the primary task and irrelevant distractors. 
Research originally focused on perceptual, rather than post-perceptual load (e.g. Lavie, 
1995). Example manipulations of perceptual load included: changes to the number of items 
displayed on a computer screen or changes to the complexity of auditory tone recognition 
task (e.g., Sabri, Humphries, Verber, Mangalathu, Desai, Binder & Liebenthal, 2013). On 
the whole, results showed that when perceptual load was high, interference from distracting, 
irrelevant, stimuli was minimised (e.g., Lavie, 1995; Lavie & Cox, 1997).  
Recent revisions to the theory (Lavie, 2005) have included the dissociable effects of 
both perceptual, and cognitive load on distractor interference. Perceptual load theory 
suggests that cognitive load has the opposite effect to perceptual load, acting to increase 
distractibility (paralleling predictions of ACT). Therefore, it could be stated that a possible 
combination of these sets of predictions led to, in the present experiment: anxiety acting to 
increase cognitive load, leading to an increase in distractibility (indexed by entropy and time 
spent looking to the external world), whereas the auditory n-back task acted, at least partially, 
to increase perceptual load, leading to a decrease in distractibility. However, if this was the 
case, differences in distractibility should have been evidenced in neutral conditions. 
Specifically, if perceptual load was increased by the n-back task, a decrease in distractibility 
should have been evident in the neutral, high-cognitive load, condition. Furthermore, the n-
back task has previously been shown to correlate with higher level working memory 
functions (Gray, Chabris & Braver, 2003) and is quite different in nature to tasks used in 
auditory, or cross-modal, perceptual loading experiments (e.g., long versus short auditory 
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tones). Nonetheless, it will be important for future research to incorporate perceptual load 
theory when trying to disentangle the interactive effects of anxiety and cognitive load on 
performance and attention.  
It appears however that the combined effects of cognitive anxiety and cognitive load 
on attentional control are less discernible in complex visual motor skills. Across several 
studies, the combined effects of anxiety and either cognitive load (e.g., Nibbeling et al., 
2012; Williams et al., 2003) or working memory capacity (Wood, Vine, & Wilson, 2015) on 
gaze behavior are far from clear. It is possible that certain gaze behavior metrics may not be 
a sensitive enough proxy measure of attentional control. In the current study, gaze data was 
modelled as a Markov process which allowed changes to the sequencing of dwells to be 
investigated. This methodology offered preliminary evidence of an interaction between 
anxiety and cognitive load on attentional control. This could however be taken a step further 
by employing hidden Markov models to infer underlying psychological states from gaze 
data. Of particular interest, such methods have successfully been employed in similar 
instrument landing tasks to accurately predict task switching (c.f. Hayashi, 1997). It may 
therefore be possible to use this technique to more directly detect changes to attentional 
control as a result of anxiety. This would be particularly novel, as it could elucidate the 
specific underlying changes that occur, such as less efficient task switching, as a result of 
anxiety. This level of specificity is usually only possible in more ‘process pure’ laboratory 
tasks.  
Task performance in the present study mirrored the findings of Allsop & Gray (2014) 
and other complex continuous visual motor studies (Wilson, Chattington, Marple-Horvat, & 
Smith, 2007) with no significant change in performance error across anxiety conditions. 
Unlike Allsop & Gray (2014), performance changes from pre-test to anxiety conditions did 
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not correlate with change in entropy either. It should be noted however that the flight task in 
the current study did not require any interception manoeuvres to obtain the perfect approach 
path. Instead, participants were required to track and follow the perfect path after being 
correctly positioned at the start of the trial. The present task may therefore not have been 
demanding enough for this relationship to emerge.  
Collating the results across studies, it may suggest that continuous tasks are less 
susceptible to anxiety induced performance failures. Continuous tasks inherently offer 
greater opportunity for compensatory strategies to be developed or employed than discrete 
tasks. For instance, performance decrements for certain portions of each trial may be 
recovered during other portions. However, other research does not support the argument that 
continuous tasks are less prone to the effects of anxiety (Wilson, Smith, Chattington, Ford, 
& Marple-Horvat, 2006). The most likely explanation for the null effect in the current study 
is an increase in effort or cognitive resources. The reduction in n-back reaction time across 
anxiety conditions offers behavioral evidence to support this. Numerous studies have found 
that anxiety more readily affects performance efficiency than performance effectiveness. 
Indeed, compensatory effort has not only been connected with performance maintenance, 
but also performance increases in pressure situations (Mullen, Faull, Jones, & Kingston, 
2012).  
Cognitive load detrimentally impacted task performance in the present study which 
supports findings from numerous driving studies (e.g., Lei & Roetting, 2011; Reimer, 
Mehler, Wang, & Coughlin, 2012; Ross et al., 2014). Cognitive load has been shown to 
increase average dwell time on instruments (Tole, Stephens, Harris, & Ephrath, 1982) and 
decrease variability of gaze location (Riemer et al., 2012), both of which can consequently 
lead to fewer transitions between areas of interest over a given period. In line with these 
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findings, increased cognitive load led to fewer dwell transitions in the current study. A likely 
consequence of this reduction was that each instrument was not ‘sampled’ frequently 
enough. This would mean that individual pieces of information were not being satisfactorily 
updated in order to sustain performance.  
This study has revealed a number of interesting findings on the interaction between 
cognitive anxiety and cognitive load on gaze behavior and performance. However, the study 
is not without limitations and these should be considered when interpreting the results. 
Firstly, the participants in the current study were novices, future research should aim to 
examine these findings in other populations, such as expert pilots. Second and relatedly, the 
sample size was relatively low due to the inherent costs of training naïve participants. This 
may have meant that certain smaller effects could not be detected due to low power. Better 
powered studies should be pursued in future. Finally, participants were recommended a 
specific gaze pattern due to the initial difficulty of the task. It is possible that participants 
may have reverted to this gaze pattern in anxiety conditions, as per reinvestment theory, 
therefore potentially dampening any increases in entropy. Analyses presented in appendix B 
however offer evidence to quell this argument, but future studies could aim to test 
participants without any training instructions at all.  
In conclusion, the present study investigated the combined effects of cognitive anxiety 
and cognitive load on the gaze behavior and performance of a complex visual motor task. 
Cognitive load negatively impacted performance and was accompanied by a reduction in 
transitions between areas of interest. Results also offered evidence in support the predictions 
of ACT. Anxiety led to a reduction in response time to auditory n-back task implying an 
increase in effort. Of particular interest, cognitive load moderated the relationship between 
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individual changes in cognitive anxiety and entropy. It is hoped that this study will stimulate 
future research in this area.  
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Summary of Findings 
The aim of this thesis was to investigate the mechanisms that underpin visual-motor 
performance changes in pressurised situations. Experimental studies were designed in order 
to examine kinematic (chapter two) and attentional mechanisms (chapters three, four and 
five). The study presented in chapter two examined the effects of pressure on club head 
kinematics in a golf-putting task. Specifically, the study aimed to investigate whether the 
relationship between putt distance and downswing amplitude is affected by pressure. 
Predictions were based around self-focus theories of choking under pressure. Significant 
increases in self-reported cognitive and somatic anxiety intensity scores indicated that 
pressure was successfully manipulated. At a group-level, performance was not affected by 
pressure, however, analyses at an individual-level showed that responses to pressure varied 
across participants. Furthermore, correlations between individuals’ changes in performance 
from pre-test to pressure conditions correlated with changes in the slopes of the relationship 
between putt length and downswing amplitude. This demonstrated that golfers who 
performed worse under pressure employed a smaller range of downswing amplitudes for 
different putt distances. These findings were explained in-line with self-focus theories by 
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suggesting that pressure caused increased monitoring of movements. Alternative 
explanations were also outlined.  
Chapter three investigated whether pressure leads to attentional narrowing by utilising 
a novel useful field of view (UFOV) test. The experiment also aimed to investigate whether 
the individual-level analysis technique utilised in chapter two would again show that 
performance variables related to mechanistic variables. Novice golfers performed the same 
putting task employed in chapter two, whilst also being asked to pause at regular intervals 
in order to perform the useful field of view task. Results indicated that participants who were 
subjected to a pressure manipulation reported higher cognitive and somatic anxiety intensity 
scores, and also perceived somatic anxiety symptoms as more debilitative. Pressure was 
shown to negatively affect UFOV performance, but only for targets presented at large visual 
angles. Consistent with chapter two, pressure had no group-level influence on performance. 
However, individual-level analyses again showed that changes in UFOV performance from 
neutral to pressure conditions correlated with performance changes. These results were 
interpreted as providing support for attentional narrowing effects, as pressure negatively 
impacted the processing of peripheral stimuli. Findings were also tentatively linked with 
golf-putting movement kinematics, such as those described in chapter two, by suggesting 
that changes to peripheral vision may interfere with the regulation of the downswing 
movement.  
Following on from chapter three, the effect of pressure on attention was again 
investigated in chapters four and five. Specifically, both studies investigated the effects of 
pressure on attentional control in a different type of task, namely, a continuous instrument 
flight task. Predictions were based on attentional control theory. In chapter four, novice 
participants learnt how to perform the instrument flight task by attending a number of 
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training sessions where the instruments were accompanied by a clear, or clouded, view of 
the external world in a trial-by-trial alternating manner. In a test session, gaze behavior was 
recorded using a head-mounted eye tracker, and a novel entropy metric was used to quantify 
the randomness of visual scanning. In order to extend upon previous chapters, heart rate was 
also measured (in both chapters four and five) in order to provide corroborating evidence to 
support the effectiveness of the pressure manipulation. Results again showed that pressure 
was successfully invoked for participants subjected to a pressure manipulation, this was 
evidenced by both an increase in cognitive anxiety and a concomitant increase in heart rate. 
Gaze data indicated that attentional control was impaired under pressure, with scanning 
becoming less predictable and a greater proportion of time spent fixating on task irrelevant 
information. Similar to previous chapters, pressure again had no overall effect on 
performance. However, individual-level analyses showed that changes in scanning 
randomness from neutral to pressure conditions were negatively correlated with performance 
changes, and also positively correlated with changes in cognitive anxiety. This suggests that 
attentional control may be influenced when pressure situations invoke cognitive anxiety, and 
also that performance may be affected when attentional control is impaired. A limitation of 
the training schedule meant that alternative reinvestment explanations could not be ruled out. 
In order to replicate and extend upon the findings of chapter four, whilst also 
addressing the training limitation, chapter five investigated the effects of both pressure and 
cognitive load on attentional control and performance. It was predicted that attentional 
control and performance would be most affected when pressure and cognitive load was high 
due to consumption of limited cognitive resources. In this experiment, a heads-down 
instrument panel was accompanied by a large field-of-view external screen that showed, in 
all trials, a clouded view of the external world. In the test session, pressure was again 
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manipulated, however, an auditory n-back task was also utilised in order to manipulate 
cognitive load. In accordance with the results of all previous chapters, pressure was 
successfully manipulated and performance was maintained under pressure. Reaction time 
for the n-back task decreased under pressure, which suggested an increase in effort or 
cognitive resources. This potential increase in effort may have been responsible for the 
maintenance of performance under pressure. Performance was however impaired by 
cognitive load, and this was accompanied by a decrease in the number of transitions between 
instruments. In contrast to chapter four, the pressure manipulation did not lead to a group-
level increase in scanning randomness and changes in scanning randomness did not correlate 
with changes in performance. However, in line with chapter four, changes in cognitive 
anxiety from neutral to anxiety conditions predicted changes in scanning randomness, but 
interestingly, only when cognitive load was high. This result provided preliminary evidence 
for an interaction between cognitive anxiety and cognitive load on attentional control.  
Implications 
A number of interesting findings regarding the underlying mechanisms responsible for 
performance changes under pressure have emerged from the present body of research. The 
aim of this section is to discuss the findings in the context of previous research and examine 
the implications that these findings have from both theoretical and practical viewpoints.  
Effects of Pressure on Performance 
Chapter one outlined previous research showing that pressure has the potential to 
impact the performance of visual-motor tasks. Contrary to expectations, pressure had no 
overall, group-level, effect on performance in any of the four experiments reported in this 
thesis. This occurred despite investigating different types of visual-motor tasks (discrete: 
chapters one and two; continuous: chapters three and four) and different levels of participant 
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expertise. This also occurred despite manipulation checks indicating that pressure was 
successfully invoked in all four experiments. Specifically, self-report anxiety measures 
showed significant increases in cognitive anxiety for all four experiments, while objective 
heart rate measures employed in latter experiments (chapters four and five) provided 
corroborating evidence. The results of the current thesis are therefore contrary to many 
studies demonstrating that pressure can impair (e.g., Beilock & Carr, 2001; Gray, 2004), or 
improve (e.g., Cooke, Kavussanu, McIntyre, Boardley & Ring, 2011) performance overall. 
It is possible that the magnitude of pressure that was created in all of the current experiments 
was not sufficient in order to produce group-level effects. It is however argued that changes 
in manipulation check measures were comparable to, or larger than, those reported in 
previous studies showing significant performance effects, for both heart rate (e.g., Cooke et 
al., 2011; Janelle, Singer & Williams, 1999) and cognitive anxiety (e.g., Gucciardi & 
Dimmock, 2008).  
A number of components were commonly included in the manipulations used in this 
thesis, including: monetary rewards, competition, a viewable leaderboard, a video camera 
and ego-threatening instructions (e.g., results would be made known to others). These factors 
were incorporated in an attempt to maximise pressure and were included based on previous 
research validating their efficacy (e.g., Gray, 2004; Hardy, Mullen & Jones, 1996; Masters, 
1992). Further justification for their inclusion comes from the fact that high-level 
performance in a variety of domains will include many of these factors. However, the lack 
of pressure effects on group-level performance may potentially be due to certain components 
having opposing influences. Therefore, with hindsight, it is unclear whether these factors do 
additively increase pressure as suggested by Baumeister & Showers (1986). For instance, 
Mesagno, Harvey and Janelle (2011) specifically compared different pressure manipulations 
181 
 
and showed that monetary incentives led to improved performance. In contrast, the presence 
of an audience, or the presence of a camera along with evaluative instructions, led to 
impaired performance. Furthermore, these manipulations led to differences in cognitive 
anxiety and these differences mediated the performance effects. Other research has also 
recently shown that relatively small changes to the words and phrases used in framing 
pressure manipulations can cause differences in performance, anxiety and attentional control 
(Moore, Wilson, Vine, Coussens & Freeman, 2013). Therefore, it seems that very careful 
consideration must be given to the pressure manipulation employed, and interactions 
between individual components must be investigated more thoroughly, in order for pressure 
to be maximized and more uniform responses to be elicited.  
The findings of this thesis further highlights the importance in considering the level of 
analysis when examining performance under pressure (see Beilock & Gray, 2007).  
Although in the present studies no effects were found when examining performance across 
all individuals, analysis at the individual level indicated that this was caused by differences 
in response to pressure, thus nullifying each other. Techniques that allow the concurrent 
examination of different levels of analysis may be employed in future, such as hierarchical 
linear modeling (e.g., Beattie, Lief, Adamoulas & Oliver, 2011). Regardless of the method 
employed, by continuing to investigate performance under pressure at a group level, 
researchers may be missing the factors that separate ‘chokers’ and ‘clutch’ individuals. 
Kinematic Mechanisms 
A novel kinematic mechanism was found to be responsible for expert golfers’ 
performance changes under pressure in a golf-putting task (chapter two). Specifically, 
changes in the relationship between downswing amplitude and putt length correlated with 
changes in performance. While this analysis approach was novel in itself, kinematic 
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mechanisms responsible for expert golfers’ performance changes under pressure are scarce 
more generally. Previous research has mainly found kinematic mediators in novice golfers 
(e.g., Cooke, Kavussanu, McIntyre & Ring, 2010; Moore, Vine, Wilson & Freeman, 2012) 
but not expert golfers (e.g., Moore et al., 2013). Preliminary evidence for a pressure-induced 
reduction in downswing amplitude has been previously reported (e.g., Tanaka & Sekiya, 
2010; 2011), however these studies did not manipulate putt distance and the reduction did 
not correlate with performance changes. Unbeknownst to myself, other similar research 
published at the same time as the experiment reported in chapter two also investigated the 
effects of pressure on golf-putting kinematics in experienced golfers, while also 
manipulating and analysing putt distance.  
Hasegawa, Korama & Inomata (2013) asked experienced golfers (mean handicap: 5.7) 
to putt to a standard sized hole from 1.25, 1.5 and 1.75m. A median split approach was used 
in order to categorise participants into low and high pressure manipulation response groups 
based on increases in heart rate and cognitive anxiety (similar to the supplementary analyses 
presented in Appendix A for the experiment reported in chapter 5). Unfortunately the authors 
only reported backswing amplitude. Interestingly however, they did show that backswing 
amplitude reduced under pressure for the high manipulation response group and remained 
the same for the low response group. Also, the high response group’s performance 
deteriorated under pressure while the low response group’s improved. It is argued that these 
results are highly comparable to the results presented in chapter two.  
No reported analyses examined the relationship between performance change and 
backswing amplitude. The interaction between group, pressure condition and putt distance 
was also not significant, suggesting that pressure reduced backswing amplitude for each putt 
distance for the high response group, rather than leading to a smaller range of backswing 
183 
 
amplitudes. There are a number of possible reasons for this discrepancy. First, it is possible 
that utilising a median split approach to dichotomise responses to the pressure manipulation 
may have meant that such subtle effects could not be detected. Secondly, perhaps more 
similar results could have been found if downswing amplitude was analysed instead of 
backswing amplitude. Thirdly, in Hasegawa & colleagues study, participants putted into a 
hole, which means the control of putt distance was probably less important than in the study 
presented in this thesis (putts can be holed from multiple different speeds, a marker requires 
a precise speed from each putt distance). However, when taking the similarities between the 
studies, it is suggested that pressure can reduce putter-head movement amplitudes and that 
this may lead to performance changes.  
From a practical point of view, it may be tempting for expert golfers to attempt to 
maintain their usual movement amplitudes when in pressure situations. However, the above 
changes were qualitatively similar to those produced by self-focus manipulations (Beilock 
& Gray, 2012). Therefore it is suggested that the observed kinematic changes under pressure 
in chapter two may have possibly occurred, at least partially, as a result of increased 
movement monitoring. Therefore, take the golfer who has been informed that pressure has 
the potential to reduce movement amplitudes. They then find themselves in a pressure 
situation on the last hole of a competition and they begin to control their movement in an 
attempt to maintain their movement amplitude. Having not done so for the rest of the round, 
they are likely not aware what their normal amplitude is for the given putt distance. They 
are in a catch-22 situation, the act of attempting to protect against reduced movement 
amplitudes may, in-fact, reduce them. Coaches and athletes should carefully consider how 





Chapters three to five investigated attentional mechanisms that may be responsible for 
performance changes under pressure. The results of chapter three supported the assertion 
that pressure can lead to attentional narrowing (e.g., Easterbrook, 1959) and extends upon 
previous studies by using a useful field of view (UFOV) test to show that the detection of 
peripheral stimuli decreases under pressure, but only for larger (i.e., 20 degree) visual angles. 
Previous research supporting this assertion in visual-motor tasks (e.g., Bahrick, Fitts and 
Rankin, 1952; Janelle et al., 1999) had been criticised. Briefly, this research commonly 
presented a continuous salient, task to central vision, while an infrequent, less salient target 
was presented in the periphery. These studies found that the accuracy of detection for 
peripheral targets decreased under pressure. However, it was suggested that the difference 
in saliency was responsible for this decrease, with participants attending more to the salient 
central task. This limitation does not apply to the current results as equally salient stimuli 
were presented to both central and peripheral vision. The findings of chapter two are 
supported by previous studies demonstrating that life stress can lead to attentional narrowing, 
which can in-turn lead to a greater chance of athletic injury (e.g., Rogers, Alderman and 
Landers, 2003; Rogers and Landers, 2005). The present findings further suggest that 
performance changes under pressure may be another consequence of attentional narrowing. 
Apart from adding to previous attentional narrowing literature, the current results also add 
to UFOV research by showing that UFOV is also affected by pressure, as well as previously 
reported factors such as cognitive load (e.g., Ikeda & Takeuchi, 1975; Murata, 2004), age 
(e.g., Sekuler, Bennet & Mamelak, 2000) and fatigue (e.g., Ho & Wang, 2010).  
It could be argued that participants invested less effort in performing the UFOV test 
under pressure, therefore offering an alternative explanation for impairments in UFOV. This 
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is possible, as the contingencies and rewards introduced during the pressure manipulation 
were not linked with performance on the UFOV test. Therefore participants may have chosen 
to invest effort on the putting task, which offers potential rewards, over and above the UFOV 
task. However, it is unclear why lack of effort would selectively impair performance at large 
eccentricities. If lack of effort was responsible, it is argued that performance would be 
impaired across all eccentricities.  
The observed impairments in UFOV may be due to a number of mechanisms. UFOV 
performance has previously been suggested to involve both low-level perceptual processing 
abilities and higher-level cognitive abilities, such as attentional control (Owsley, 2013). For 
instance, psychophysiological studies have shown that UFOV performance is related to both 
low and high-level stimulus processing abilities. Specifically, when examining the 
relationship between UFOV performance and visual event related potentials (ERP), certain 
early (i.e., low level) and late (i.e., high-level) ERP features have been shown to correlate 
with UFOV performance (O’Brien, Lister & Peronto & Edwards, 2015). However, it appears 
that very few studies have specifically examined the effects of emotion on the underlying 
mechanisms that may be responsible changes in UFOV.  
Schmitz, De Rosa & Anderson (2009) conducted a noteworthy functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) study where participants viewed images of faces in central vision, 
while various buildings (i.e., houses) were simultaneously presented to peripheral vision. 
Immediately preceding this, participants viewed positive (e.g., photogenic animals, people 
on the beach) or negative images in order to manipulate emotion. Results showed that 
negative emotions decreased the coupling between the primary visual cortex and areas of the 
brain associated with processing of unattended places (i.e., houses in peripheral vision), 
while positive emotions had the opposite effect. Based on this finding, it was suggested that 
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emotion directly influences early perceptual processes. Taken together, these studies are 
presented as an indication that the observed effects of pressure on UFOV performance may 
have been due to low-level abilities, higher-level abilities, or both.  
Chapters four and five provided evidence to support the predictions of attentional 
control theory in a continuous, instrument landing visual-motor task. Pressure led to 
impairments in gaze behavior, supporting previous research (e.g., Wilson, Smith, 
Chattington, Ford & Marple-Horvat, 2006). Furthermore, the present findings extend upon 
previous research by suggesting that anxiety can lead to increases in the randomness of 
scanning behavior. There was also a tendency across both studies for participants to look 
towards the outside world, even though this contained very little task relevant information. 
Taken together these results suggest that anxiety disrupted the balance between goal-directed 
and stimulus-driven attentional systems. 
While the findings of these experiments dovetail with the predictions of attentional 
control theory, the null effects found in experiment four could be suggested to be explainable 
by perceptual load theory (Lavie, 1995, Lavie, 2010). Summarily, this theory predicts 
dissociable effects of cognitive and perceptual load, on distractibility to task irrelevant 
stimuli. Specifically, cognitive load is predicted to increase distractibility, whereas 
perceptual load is predicted to have the opposite effect. It is possible that the increased 
difficulty of the employed n-back task increased perceptual load, at least partially, whereas 
anxiety increased cognitive load, thus leading to a null effect. However, the the n-back task 
is different in nature to auditory tasks used in previous perceptual studies (e.g., Sabri, 
Humphries, Verber, Mangalathu, Desai, Binder & Liebenthal, 2013). Also, if perceptual load 
was increased by the n-back task, then results (either entropy or percentage dwell time data) 
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should have shown evidence for a decrease in distractibility in the high-load, neutral 
conditions.  
The results also cannot be definitively used to implicate the underlying processes that 
were responsible for changes in gaze behavior. Convergent evidence should be sought to 
examine the extent to which changes in entropy are representative of changes to attentional 
control. Furthermore, sequencing of gaze behavior may be due to closed-, or open-loop 
control mechanisms, or a combination of both (Ellis & Stark, 1986; Hameluck, 1990). 
Closed-loop control suggests that information gathered at the current gaze location 
determines the next gaze location, whereas open-loop control suggests that internal mental 
models of the task drives future gaze locations. Mental models, or scanning patterns (open-
loop control), are suggested to be stored in long-term memory (e.g., Endsley, 1999), and 
similar previous research has providing some evidence to indicate that information retrieval 
from long-term memory is less affected by pressure (Stokes & Raby, 1989). In contrast, the 
information gathering and processing implicated by control-loop processes requires working 
memory resources. For instance, maintaining situational awareness is resource intensive 
(Wickens, 2002). Taken together, it is therefore tentatively suggested that the results of the 
experiments presented in this thesis are more in-line with impairments to closed-loop control 
processes. Specifically, the findings of chapter five provided preliminary evidence to suggest 
that entropy is related to cognitive anxiety only when cognitive load is high. The combined 
influence of cognitive anxiety and load apparently consumed resources needed to process 
and integrate information gathered at each dwell location. This then lead to greater searching, 




While it is argued that the results of this thesis have contributed to knowledge in this 
area, a number of limitations should be considered when interpreting the findings. Firstly, 
the sample size in each of the experiments was relatively low. Although the sample sizes 
were similar to comparable studies examining the effects of pressure (e.g., Beilock & Carr, 
2001; Gray, 2004), this may have meant that smaller effects were harder to detect. Future 
studies should employ larger sample sizes to alleviate this potential problem.  
Secondly, anxiety was measured retrospectively in all but one of the experiments 
(chapter three also measured anxiety during performance), meaning that memory bias may 
have impacted the response accuracy. As an example, participants who performed well in 
pressure situations may have reported less cognitive anxiety, and vice versa. However, 
retrospective methods of assessing anxiety have been previously validated (Butt, Weinberg 
& Horn, 2003), and prospective methods are not without their limitations. For instance, 
individuals with a repressive coping style are likely to underreport anxiety in self-report 
measures (Woodman & Davis, 2008).  
The third set of limitations relate to the pressure manipulations employed throughout 
the current thesis. As stated previously, various manipulation checks indicated that pressure 
was successfully invoked. However, the magnitude of pressure created by these 
experimental manipulations almost certainly does not match the levels found in the real-
world. It is unclear why the mechanisms that underpin performance changes under pressure 
should be different based on the severity of the pressure situation, nevertheless, care should 
be taken before generalising these findings across contexts.   
Fourthly, in experiment one, it is possible that learning effects may have resulted in 
the observed null overall effect of pressure on performance. However, two latter experiments 
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(experiments two and three) both used between-subject designs and also found null effects 
of pressure on overall group-level performance. More significantly, learning effects were 
not seen for the control group, instead, the control group’s performance was  comparable to 
the pressure group. This lends some support to oppose the potential learning effect limitation, 
however, it is conceded that experiment one’s use of a non-counterbalanced, repeated 
measures design, means that this possibility cannot be ruled out. 
Fifthly, gaze behavior (chapters four and five) only provides an indication into the 
direction of overt attentional allocation. Therefore, as overt and covert attention are not 
inseparably linked (e.g., Posner, 1980), it is possible that participants were internally 
attending to different features than were indicated by the gaze data.  
Directions for Future Research 
The studies presented in this thesis have examined, in laboratory experiments, the 
mechanisms that underlie performance changes under pressure. Investigating these 
mechanisms in such a manner has obvious experimental control advantages. However, as 
stated in the limitations section, the magnitude of pressure is likely to be much lower than 
experienced in real-life pressure situations. In order to allow researchers the opportunity to 
determine, with greater confidence, the changes that actually occur in the real-world, studies 
could be designed to take advantage of naturalistic pressurised contexts. For instance, 
kinematic mechanisms, such as reported in chapter two, could be relatively easily captured 
in real-life competition using commercially available club head mounted motion trackers. It 
is acknowledged that this approach presents a number of challenges. From an ethical 
standpoint, the methods used to collect data in real-life situations would need to be 
unobtrusive in order to not interfere with performance.  
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Unobtrusive data collection methods are available. Doppler radar (e.g., TrackmanTM, 
Interactive Sports Games, Denmark) systems are now extensively used during most PGA 
Tour competitions in order to track players’ ball flights, for both research and viewer 
entertainment purposes. These systems could be used to derive club head parameters at 
impact, and therefore prerequisite swing changes, that are associated with pressure-induced 
performance changes. Remote eye-tracking camera systems (as employed in chapter five) 
could be used to examine changes to gaze behavior during the performance of visual-motor 
tasks, such as driving or flying, in real-world pressure situations. Furthermore, manipulation 
checks in the latter situations would not necessarily need to be sacrificed. For example, heart 
rate could be assessed completely unobtrusively using camera-based computer vision 
photoplethysmography techniques (c.f., Poh, McDuff & Picard, 2011; McDuff, Gontarek & 
Picard, 2014). Future studies could also build upon the gaze behavior analyses employed in 
the current thesis. 
The studies presented in chapters four and five offer evidence, for the first time, to 
suggest that anxiety influences the randomness of gaze behavior. While these results are 
interesting, future studies should seek to better understand the cognitive processes that are 
responsible for these changes. If entropy is representative of attentional control, it is 
suggested that individuals with dispositional deficits in attentional control should exhibit 
larger increases in entropy in pressure situations. Deficits could be assessed, for example, 
using the trait attentional control scale (Derryberry & Reed, 2001). Convergent evidence 
from self-report or think aloud protocols could also be used to examine the underlying 
processes associated with increases in entropy. Related to this point, more complex statistical 
models may be able to elucidate the underlying processes that cause pressure-induced 
changes in gaze behavior. The current entropy calculation modelled the gaze data as a 
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Markov process, where the location of the next dwell location is dependent on the current 
dwell location. Hidden Markov models have, for instance, been used to correctly infer (as 
validated by think aloud procedures) underlying psychological states from gaze data. In 
particular, such methods have been employed in similar instrument landing tasks to 
accurately predict task switching (c.f. Hayashi, 1997). More advanced statistical methods 
may also be utilised in a different manner. 
Various different theories outlined, and explored, in this thesis attempt to explain the 
underlying changes that lead to performance changes in pressure situations (e.g., theory of 
reinvestment, attentional control theory). Research into these theories has often been 
conducted independently, by focusing on one theoretical account over another. However, as 
stated previously by Beilock and Gray (2007), pressure may cause changes to multiple 
underlying processes at the same time. A more integrated approach is needed in future, both 
theoretically, and as a consequence, statistically. Some advancements have been made on 
both the former (e.g., Nieuwenhuys & Oudejans, 2011), and latter fronts (e.g., Otten, 2009). 
For instance, Otten (2009) utilised structural equation modelling to investigate the casual 
relationships between a large range of processes (e.g., reinvestment, perceived control and 
confidence) on performance under pressure. This approach acknowledges the complexity of 
predicting performance under pressure by allowing the influence of a number of antecedents, 
processes and outcomes to be investigated collectively.  
Conclusion 
 The present thesis aimed to investigate the psychomotor mechanisms responsible for 
visual-motor performance changes in pressure situations. The results of the present thesis 
suggest that pressure can lead to individual differences in behavioral responses to pressure 
situations, both in terms of performance and mechanistic variables. Importantly, changes to 
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both kinematic and attentional mechanistic variables under pressure were shown to correlate 
with performance changes. It is hoped that this thesis provides a base for future research and 
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Supplementary Median-Split Analysis for Chapter Five 
An alternative median-split approach is presented to analyse whether individual 
responses to the anxiety manipulation may be responsible for the non-significant effects of 
experimental conditions on entropy. Eight participants were categorised into a ‘high 
manipulation response’ group, while eight were catergorised into a ‘low manipulation 
response’ group using a median split approach. Specifically, two average cognitive anxiety 
variables were calculated for each participant: one for the neutral conditions, one for the 
anxiety conditions. An average change score was then calculated for each participant by 
subtracting the anxiety condition average from the neutral condition average. Finally, a 
median split grouping was performed based on these changes scores, with the means (and 
standard deviations) for the low- and high manipulation response groups being 0.38 (±2.33) 
and 9.38 (±5.32), respectively. An independent samples -test confirmed that this process was 
successful in creating groups that were significantly different t(14) = -4.39, p = .001.  
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The manipulation response groups were used as a between-subjects factor in a 2 
anxiety manipulation response (low manipulation response, high manipulation response) x 
2 anxiety condition (neutral, anxiety) x 2 cognitive load (low cognitive load, high cognitive 
load) mixed factorial ANOVA with repeated measures on the last 2 factors. Of central 
interest are the results from two interactions. Firstly, the ANOVA revealed a significant 
interaction between anxiety manipulation response and anxiety condition, F(1,14) = 6.84, p 
= .02, ηp
2= .33. Breaking down this interaction revealed that entropy significantly increased 
between neutral and anxiety conditions for the high manipulation response group, but 
remained constant for the low manipulation response group (see figure A1). This finding 
closely supports the results from chapter four. Secondly, there was a non-significant 
interaction between manipulation response, anxiety condition and cognitive load, F(1, 14) = 
1.51, p = .24, ηp
2= .10. This suggests that cognitive load did not have a significant effect on 
the interaction between manipulation response and anxiety conditions. The considerable loss 
of power associated with median split approach may be responsible for this null effect. This 
loss of power, along with other concerns with the median split approach stated by numerous 
authors (e.g., Irwin & McClelland, 2003; MacCallum, Zhang, Preacher & Rucker, 2002), 






Figure. A1. Mean scanning entropy in neutral and anxiety conditions for the low 
anxiety manipulation response (dashed lines) and high anxiety manipulation response 
























Supplementary Gaze Behavior Analysis for Chapter Five 
Supplementary gaze behavior analyses were performed to mitigate concerns that 
participants may have reverted to the explicitly recommended gaze pattern (see acquisition 
phase description) in anxiety conditions. Specifically, participants’ AOI sequences were 
compared against a perfect AOI sequence which strictly adhered to the recommended AOI 
transition order. Comparisons for all experimental trials were then made using the 
ScanMatch (Cristino, Mathôt, Theeuwes & Gilchrist, 2010) Matlab toolbox which uses a 
Needleman-Wunsch algorithm (Needleman & Wunsch, 1970) to produce an alignment 
score. Higher alignment scores indicate a closer match between the ideal sequence and the 
actual sequence. Identical statistical analyses were performed on this data as the entropy 
data.   
 
 This analysis revealed a non-significant effect for anxiety F(1,15) = 1.86, p = .19, 
ηp
2= .11, a significant effect for cognitive load F(1,15) = 14.66, p = .002, ηp
2= .49, and a non-
 
Figure. B1. Mean alignment score plotted as a function of cognitive load in neutral 


























significant interaction F(1,15) = .50, p = .49, ηp
2= .03. Cognitive load led to greater 
dissimilarity between the actual gaze sequences and the ideal prototypical sequence (see 
Figure B1). There was no significant effect of anxiety on alignment scores, which shows that 




Cristino, F., Mathôt, S., Theeuwes, J., & Gilchrist, I. D. (2010). ScanMatch: a novel 
method for comparing fixation sequences. Behavior Research Methods, 42(3), 692–
700. http://doi.org/10.3758/BRM.42.3.692 
Irwin, J. R., & McClelland, G. H. (2003). Negative consequences of dichotomizing 
continuous predictor variables. Journal of Marketing Research, 40(3), 366–371. 
http://doi.org/10.1509/jmkr.40.3.366.19237 
MacCallum, R. C., Zhang, S., Preacher, K. J., & Rucker, D. D. (2002). On the practice of 
dichotomization of quantitative variables. Psychological Methods, 7(1), 19–40. 
http://doi.org/10.1037/1082-989X.7.1.19 
Needleman, S. B., & Wunsch, C. D. (1970). A general method applicable to the search for 
similarities in the amino acid sequence of two proteins. Journal of Molecular Biology, 
48(3), 443–453. http://doi.org/10.1016/0022-2836(70)90057-4 
 
